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An analysis of possible socio-economic effects of a Cooperative, Connected and Automated Mobility 
(CCAM) in Europe - Effects of automated driving on the economy, employment and skills 
 
A Cooperative, Connected and Automated Mobility (CCAM) is expected to have an overall positive impact on our 
economy and society. It is anticipated that sectors like automotive, electronics and software or freight transport 
will be positively affected while other sectors like insurance or maintenance and repair will face significant 
challenges. Important labour changes lie ahead for professional drivers, decreasing driving responsibilities 
towards new more technical roles. Some of these jobs will disappear in the long-term. This study feeds into the 
definition of an EU approach towards CCAM, strengthening the Commission’s understanding of the societal aspects 
linked to it. 
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Executive summary 
A Cooperative, Connected and Automated Mobility (CCAM) is likely to have significant impacts 
on our economy and society. It is expected that CCAM will unveil new and unprecedented 
mobility opportunities that hold the potential to unlock a range of safety, environmental and 
mobility/energy efficiency benefits. At the same time, it is anticipated that it will bring deep 
changes in the labour market, progressively making some occupations and skills less relevant, 
while at the same time opening up new opportunities for different businesses and requiring 
new and more advanced skills. With Europe accounting for 23% of global motor vehicle 
production (1) and almost 72% of inland freight transported by road in Europe (2), the full 
deployment of Connected and Automated Vehicle (CAV) technologies is expected to have a 
substantial impact on the European economy. The economic impacts of CAVs will go far beyond 
the automotive industry, into sectors like insurance, logistics or health, among others. While 
it is clear that CAVs could offer unique opportunities for value creation, it is also essential to 
acknowledge that they might imply a substantial transformation of our economy and society.  
Objective  
The study analyses the value at stake for both economy and society as a result of a transition 
towards CCAM in Europe. It identifies the economic sectors that are most likely to be affected 
by CCAM as well as the factors driving future changes in each sector. The ultimate goal is to 
estimate ranges of potential impacts for the main affected sectors, with the support of a set 
of scenarios. The study also analyses the potential effects of CCAM on the workforce and skills 
that may be needed in the mobility transition. The focus of the study is exclusively on road 
transport for both passengers and freight.  
Methodology and scenarios 
A deployment scenarios matrix has been developed by considering projections of vehicle travel 
made with different levels of automation, for both passenger and commercial vehicles in 2025 
and 2050 (3), on the basis of three levels of development in technology, policy and users’ 
adoption (see Table 1). For passenger transport, our own assumptions of the amount of travel 
served by Mobility-as-a-Service (MaaS) versus Individual Ownership (IO) are given.  
Table 1. Deployment scenarios matrix 
SCENARIOS 
LEVELS OF DEVELOPMENT PER AREA 
TECHNOLOGY POLICY USERS 
Baseline Eurostat (
4) and EU Reference Scenario 2016 (5), without accounting 
for CAV technologies  
Scenario 1. Low uptake Slow Little Few 
Scenario 2. Medium uptake Moderate Moderate Moderate 
Scenario 3. High uptake Fast Strong Many 
Source: Own elaborations. 
These scenarios, together with a set of Key Performance Indicators (KPI), serve as a basis for 
the estimation of impacts per sector. To this aim, influencing factors like impacts of CAVs on 
traffic, accidents or the environment, each of which have implications on the economy, are 
studied. Besides a qualitative analysis based on literature, an attempt to provide some 
quantitative assessment is performed using the data available from existing sources (e.g. 
                                           
(1) According to 2016 data from ACEA World Motor Vehicle production Statistics (see footnote 54 for more details). 
(2) European Commission (2017a).  
(3) Passenger vehicle rates are extracted from Nieuwenhuijsen et al. (2018) and then taken as a basis for making 
assumptions on commercial vehicle rates. 
(4) Data from 2015, from different Eurostat Databases, namely: Structural Business Statistics (SBS) and National 
Accounts (NA) (see footnotes 73 and 74 for further details), and according to the Nomenclature statistique des 
Activités économiques dans la Communauté Européenne (NACE) Rev. 2 classification (Eurostat, 2008).  
(5) European Commission (2016a); precisely, taking the modified baseline of EU Reference Scenario 2016 from Hill 
et al. (forthcoming 2018) to see the evolution from 2015 up to 2050.  
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Eurostat Database), and relating it to the scenarios. To the extent possible, findings are 
described for the European context. Other trends like electrification of transport are only 
partially covered in this analysis, as the main focus is on automation and connectivity. 
Along the study, some simplifying assumptions have been adopted given the uncertainty and 
complexity of the topic under study, as well as the lack of data (few studies exist on the topic). 
These should be revisited in the future, accounting for additional insights into CAVs behaviour 
and effects in different areas. Although it is implicitly considered in the narrative used to define 
the different scenarios, the study does not consider interactions between sectors. The 
estimations may therefore suffer from some double counting and from non-linear effects that 
cannot be properly addressed in the present work.  
In addition, the economic impacts have to be seen as the global impacts of the introduction 
of CAVs to the European case. How much these impacts will contribute to the European 
economy has still to be seen. Much will depend on the capability of European businesses to 
stay competitive vis-à-vis new competitors, especially from the communication and 
Information Technology (IT) sectors, as well as on the ability of education and training systems 
to take anticipatory actions that address the skills needed in the future. It is also worth 
mentioning that the indicator to measure the economic impacts that has been adopted in this 
study is the potential revenues. The impact on the future European value added has not been 
considered at this stage.  
The reader is invited to consider the estimations presented in this study as well-qualified 
indications of future trends and not in absolute terms. 
Main economic figures in the 2015-2050 period 
Figure 1 shows the current state of the sectors that are most likely to be affected by CCAM, 
including their relative size within the present EU-28 economy.  
Figure 1. Current state of the main sectors affected by CCAM, showing 2015 figures on Value Added 
(VA), persons employed and share of Gross Value Added (GVA) in the total EU-28 
 
Source: Own elaborations (based on 2015 data from Eurostat SBS and NA databases) (6).
                                           
(6) The share of GVA is indicated at the centre of each bubble as % and is represented by the size of each respective 
bubble.  
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Some potential impacts for some of these sectors are indicated below.  
As far as the automotive sector is concerned, CAVs may reinforce vehicle sales in line 
with travel activity increases. The higher the level of automation, the stronger the effect 
on Vehicle Kilometres Travelled (VKT), mostly as a result of a reduction in driving costs 
(including changes in the value of travel time) and new users like young people, elderly or 
disabled (7). Even though new mobility service models (MaaS) may increase vehicle usage 
intensity (8), the resulting decreased vehicle ownership may considerably impact vehicle 
sales. Our scenario estimations provide ranges of passenger vehicle sales increases from 
18% to 39% during the period 2015-2025 and from 33% to 51% in the period 2015-2050. 
Figure 2 and Figure 3 show VKT and vehicle sales projections respectively. In Figure 3, it 
is possible to observe long-term lower vehicle sales on scenario 3 as a result of a dominant 
MaaS-based travel regime. Using current average car prices (9), total revenues from 
passenger car sales could exceed 550 billion euros by 2050. It is also expected that the 
sales of heavy commercial vehicles will increase in response to a more intense road travel 
activity in the future, which could be further reinforced by a more efficient operation of 
automated trucks. In this case, a growth of 19-29% could be expected in the period 2015-
2025 and 38-68% in the 2015-2050 period. Total revenues from commercial vehicle sales 
could almost reach 150 billion euros in 2050 (10).  
Figure 2. Passenger transport (in billion vehicle kilometres) for Baseline scenario (BL) and 
scenarios 1, 2 and 3 (Sc1, Sc2 and Sc3) 
 
Source: Own elaborations. 
                                           
(7) As cited in e.g. Wadud et al. (2016).  
(8) A 75% usage increase is stated in Schoettle and Sivak (2015) or a 10 times increase in Arbib and Seba 
(2017).  
(9) An average passenger car sales price of 27,496 euros is used (Hill et al., forthcoming 2018). Please note that 
automated driving technologies are not included in this price, but counted separately in the electronics and 
software sector. 
(10) Using the following three average vehicle prices for Light, Medium and Heavy Duty Vehicles: 30,238 euros 
(Hill et al., forthcoming 2018), 60,233 euros (average of 7.5, 12 and 18 Tonne vehicle prices from Lastauto 
Omnibus-Katalog, 2017) and 100,000 euros (average price of 4*2 and 6*2 HDVs considering Lastauto 
Omnibus-Katalog, 2017) and their relative shares in 2025 (according to 2015 data from ACEA Consolidated 
registrations by country Statistics, further explained in footnote 84) and 2050 (baseline of DIONE fleet impact 
model, Thiel et al., 2016). 
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Figure 3. Estimated vehicle sales for passenger transport (in million cars) 
 
Source: Own elaborations. 
The electronics and software sector would clearly benefit from the production and sale 
of new components and systems needed for automated driving (including hardware and 
software components). Whereas software will gain a more dominant role (in terms of 
monetary value proportion) with regard to today (11), the market for CAVs’ hardware 
components like cameras, lidar, etc. will also grow (12). With the previously mentioned 
vehicle sales projections, total revenues from the sector could almost reach 180 billion 
euros by 2025 for both passenger and freight automated vehicles (13). 
The telecommunication, data services and digital media sectors are also expected to 
experience significant growth, as in-vehicle connectivity increases and becomes pervasive. 
5G networks will support the exchange of massive amounts of data generated by a future 
CAV. The monetization of car data holds a great potential (McKinsey&Company states it 
could generate from $450 to $750 billion globally in revenues by 2030 (14)) and users are 
already demonstrating willingness to pay for services built around this data (15). 
Vehicle automation will act as a transformational technology in the freight transport 
sector by diminishing operating costs and allowing more efficient logistics (16). These 
benefits would justify the idea that this sector becomes one of the early adopters of CAV 
technologies (17). The two most costly elements in commercial vehicles operation are fuel 
and drivers, both of which can be reduced through truck automation (18). When it comes 
                                           
(11) From a 10%-90%-0% to a 40%-40%-20% for software, hardware and contents (including the apps that 
connect and integrate software and hardware) respectively, as stated in Römer et al. (2016).  
(12) Asselin-Miller et al. (2017).  
(13) It is important to note that the cost of automation is too uncertain at present and therefore subject to 
significant changes. Our calculations are based on an assumed cost of full automation (level 4/5) for 
passenger vehicles of around $10,000 by 2025 (from Mosquet et al., 2015), which is also used in Wadud’s 
Total Cost of Ownership (TCO) analysis (2017). Though it could represent a lower bound estimate when 
compared to other sources (e.g. Bansal and Kockelman, 2017). For trucks, £15,000 is used (average of the 
estimated prices for different types of trucks indicated in Wadud, 2017). It could also represent a lower 
bound estimate. Thus, in euros, the cost of full automation is 8,091 and 16,870 for passenger vehicles and 
heavy duty vehicles respectively. Other estimations are made for lower levels of automation (see details in 
3.2.2). 
(14) Bertoncello et al. (2016).  
(15) Dungs et al. (2016).  
(16) World Economic Forum (2016a).  
(17) Wadud (2017).  
(18) Gundermann et al. (2015).  
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to fuel savings, truck platooning could decrease fuel consumption by 2-8% for the leading 
vehicle and 8-13% for the following vehicle (19). The role of a professional driver can be 
radically transformed in the future (starting with early platooning applications), gradually 
undertaking other duties than driving and possibly turning into a more technical role (20). 
To which extent this will lead to a reduction in the number of drivers needed still remains 
an unanswered question that deserves careful attention. It is also important to stress that 
CAV technologies could help to compensate the shortage of long-haul drivers (21), as e.g. 
Germany is expecting to lose around 250,000 drivers who will retire in the next 10 to 15 
years (22). Effects of CCAM on truck driver jobs are further discussed in the employment 
section below. 
The insurance sector could be disrupted by the expected drastic reduction in the number 
of road accidents. The improved road safety conditions might imply significant discounts 
in motor vehicle premiums. On the basis of discounts currently applied to vehicles equipped 
with collision avoidance systems (23), our estimations indicate potential decreases in 
insurance premiums of 10-30% in 2025 and 15-40% in 2050 compared to today. These 
reductions could represent up to 53 billion euros in 2050 (24).  
A lower crash rate would also drive a large part of the changes expected in the 
maintenance and repair sector, with revenues decreasing as a result of a lower demand 
for crash-related repairs (25). Although a lower acceleration/deceleration could also lead to 
reductions in maintenance, this potential decrease could be offset by higher labour and 
equipment costs of repair (26). Telematics will enable predictive maintenance applications 
that would also lead to lowering repair frequency and overall maintenance costs (27). The 
Original Equipment Manufacturers’ (OEM) privileged access to car sensor data would make 
them well-positioned in this type of offerings (28). Competition in car maintenance would 
be higher, thereby creating downward price pressure and reduced VA in these services. 
One potential factor leading to a growth in revenues in this sector could be linked to the 
cleaning and repair activities that could be needed for shared vehicles (29). 
An overview of the expected direction of change in each of the sectors is given in Table 2. 
Table 2. Main economic effect per sector 
Industries 
Main effect prevailing in 
2025 - 2050 scenarios 
Automotive  
Electronics and software  
Telecommunication, data services and digital media  
Freight transport  
Insurance  
Maintenance and repair  
LEGEND:  Positive effect,  Negative effect       
Source: Own elaborations. 
                                           
(19) SARTRE (2014), as cited in Janssen et al. (2015).  
(20) Clements and Kockelman (2017).  
(21) Lanctot (2017).  
(22) Hollis (2016).  
(23) Palmer (2015), as cited in Wadud (2017).  
(24) Revenues from new insurance categories (e.g. cyber security, product liability for software and hardware) 
are not considered in these calculations.  
(25) Thierer and Hagemann (2015).  
(26) Wadud (2017).  
(27) European Commission (2017b).  
(28) Mohr et al. (2014).  
(29) Bösch et al. (2018).  
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Main findings on employment and skills 
The concerns on job destruction by machines can be dated back to the first industrial 
revolution. The short run effects of effective technologies implementation negatively 
impacted workers (30) but on the long run, technology advancements eventually led to 
higher job creation (31). In general, estimating the number of jobs at risk of automation 
has been proved difficult and can lead to completely different results depending on minor 
changes applied in the approach used. Frey and Osborne find for example that 47% of US 
jobs are at risk of computerisation (32) but Arntz et al. find that only 9% of jobs in OECD 
countries is at risk instead (33). The former study estimates the share of jobs threatened 
by automation based on experts opinion over specific occupations while the latter uses the 
same methodology but with a task-based approach, so based on the same experts 
predictions but estimating the degree of their automation-risk predictions on the proportion 
of automatable task within each occupation.  
At the present state of art, Automated Vehicles (AVs) cannot perform all the tasks required 
in most driving-related jobs and there is much uncertainty if they will ever do (34). 
However, a partial tasks substitution (e.g. platooning substitutes the tasks that now strictly 
require a second driver to perform) will increase competition in the lower-skills labour 
market. Firstly, because the tasks substitution by AVs will make the job appealing for more 
people that previously had a dislike for driving (35). Secondly, because lower demand for 
drivers will make the transport sector less accessible. The competition effect will not only 
be restricted to the transport sector but to all the other lower-skilled occupations where 
displaced drivers will apply (36).  
According to our estimations, workers endangered of technological substitution (drivers 
and mobile plant operators, ISCO 83) working in land transport (NACE 49 sector) amount 
to approximately 1.5% of total EU-15 employment in 2012 and those who require new 
training to keep performing the job (metal, machinery and related trades, ISCO 72) in 
wholesale, retail and repair of motor vehicles (NACE 45 sector) amount to 0.7% of total 
EU-15 employment in 2012 (37). It also seems evident that employment effects will not 
only be restricted to the land transport sector but will impact all sectors that employ drivers 
such as warehousing and support, wholesale trade or postal and courier activities. ITF 
estimates that the current 3.2 million truck-driving jobs in Europe may decrease to 2.3 or 
even up to 0.5 million by 2040 according to different scenarios (38). A slow CAV uptake or 
an informative awareness campaign can lead workers to qualify on time and mitigate the 
transition costs for them (39). Retraining or income assistance programs are mechanisms 
that can support the transition (40).  
It is relevant to note that both occupations under study (ISCO 72 and 83) have low levels 
of Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) use, whereas ICT skills will be 
increasingly demanded in the future. CEDEFOP highlights the increasing land transport 
sector dependency on ICT-based and specialized equipment and products (41). Thierer and 
Hagemann also emphasize the need for ICT skills in addition to the traditional vehicle repair 
skills (42). In this context, a shortage of ICT professionals has been identified for 2020 (43). 
If the demanded skills can be matched in the future, there could be opportunities for 
                                           
(30) The White House (2016).  
(31) ITF (2017).  
(32) Frey and Osborne (2017).  
(33) Arntz et al. (2016).  
(34) Litman (2018). 
(35) Miller, J. (2015).  
(36) The White House (2016).  
(37) The selected occupations come from the International Labour Organization ISCO-08 International standard 
classification of occupations.  
(38) ITF (2017).  
(39) Ibid. 
(40) Rea et al. (2017).  
(41) CEDEFOP (2016).  
(42) Thierer and Hagemann (2015).  
(43) European Commission (2016b).  
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reallocation of employees. For instance, Thierer and Hagemann claim that in the future 
some highly qualified mechanics might move over to higher-paying jobs in the information 
sector (44). The ITF also postulates that skilled and experienced drivers could be demanded 
in the case that remote control rooms are installed for CAVs monitoring (45).  
Inequality between low-skilled and high-skilled workers will widen. AVs can make some 
sectors more profitable but most of the benefits will be reaped by those highly skilled 
workers who can either produce and repair the new vehicles or those who get more 
productive with the additional time previously spent in transport activities. This has been 
proven to be the case in other non-transport-related sectors (46). The European 
Commission highlights that by 2025, about 50% of EU’s jobs offerings will target highly 
qualified people (47). However, another aspect to consider is the easier geographical 
connectivity facilitated by CAV technologies, which could enable workers to accept jobs 
from firms previously rejected due to distance to the workplace or because less accessible 
in general (48). This effect is likely to be positive on labour market participation and on 
skills match between employers-employees.  
Another challenge is predicting what kind of new occupations will be created in the 
future. Even though recent labour market experiences suggest that those will be mostly 
skewed on the higher part of the skill distribution (49), it is very difficult to determine the 
qualifications and characteristics of the future jobs demanded by the economy.  
At the level of skills required for driving a CAV, the automation of the driving task will 
increasingly require supervision and selective intervention skills in opposition to manual 
control and manoeuvring skills (50). Understanding the automated driving systems 
functioning will also be essential for a safe operation of AVs, for which the highly 
heterogeneous vehicle systems could represent a challenge (51). As automation is gradually 
deployed, progressive and continuous training could become more relevant than the 
current one-off initial training (52). 
The impacts of CCAM on employment are largely influenced by the speed of introduction 
of the new technologies and mobility changes. The more gradual the introduction will be 
the higher the probability that the negative implications on employment will be absorbed 
by the economic system of the European society. 
Conclusions and way forward 
The present study has highlighted some main challenges and opportunities linked to the 
transition towards CCAM, which will need to be faced in order to unlock the benefits that it 
could bring to our society and economy. Policymakers and industry players in Europe shall 
then seize the opportunity of capturing these benefits within the EU by adopting different 
measures. The findings presented in this study will contribute to the ongoing debate on 
the type and magnitude of potential impacts of CCAM on our economy and society.  
Although the scenarios analysed do not represent a forecast of impacts, they help to 
illustrate a set of possible effects that could drive fundamental changes in different sectors 
of our economy and society. Results of this initial assessment, corroborated by additional 
data, will be used as input to a more thorough study where the different elements identified 
here will be integrated in a modelling framework able to handle the dynamics and the 
causal loops intrinsic to the European economic sector. 
 
                                           
(44) Thierer and Hagemann (2015).   
(45) ITF (2017).  
(46) As stated in e.g. ITF (2017), The White House (2016), Arnzt et al. (2016), Frey and Osborne (2017), OECD 
(2016).  
(47) European Commission (2016c).  
(48) Litman (2018).  
(49)  ITF (2017). 
(50) Spulber and Wallace (2016).  
(51) Ibid.  
(52) Ibid.  
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1 Introduction 
The development of automated driving technologies is gaining momentum at present and 
it has become no more a question of if but when autonomous vehicles will be a reality in 
our roads (Mosquet et al., 2015; DHL Trend Research, 2014). As their market deployment 
becomes closer, with some levels of autonomy already available in the market (up to SAE 
level 2 technologies, SAE International, 2016 (53)), central questions are being raised, such 
as the economic and societal implications that these technologies will have. A Cooperative, 
Connected and Automated Mobility (CCAM) is likely to bring fundamental changes to our 
economy and society. It is expected that CCAM unveils new and unprecedented mobility 
opportunities that hold the potential to unlock a wide range of safety, environmental and 
efficiency benefits. At the same time, it is anticipated that it will bring profound changes in 
the labour market, progressively making some occupations and skills less relevant, while 
at the same time opening up new opportunities for different businesses and requiring new 
and more advanced skills. Given that Europe accounts for 23% of global motor vehicle 
production (being second after China (54)) and almost 72% of inland freight is transported 
by road in Europe (55), the full deployment of Connected and Automated Vehicle (CAV) 
technologies is likely to have a substantial impact on the European economy. The different 
stakeholders along the automotive value chain will be affected, e.g. vehicle manufacturers 
and suppliers, dealers and aftermarket services providers, mobility services providers. But 
the economic impacts of CAVs will go far beyond the automotive sector, into sectors like 
insurance, logistics or health, among others. In a context of high global competitiveness, 
Europe must harness the opportunities brought by CAV technologies and strengthen its 
leadership position in innovative mobility (which is currently the largest economic sector 
in the world, European Commission, 2017c). 
The analysis of socio-economic effects of CAVs is recently growing attention, given its 
significance for both businesses and the life and working conditions of citizens. Far-
reaching socio-economic impacts can be already associated to these technologies, like an 
increase in safety (through reduced road accidents), an improved accessibility (for persons 
with limited transport access), a growth in productivity (with changes in the value of travel 
time) or a transformation of current transport and vehicle-related jobs (professional 
drivers, mechanics and engineers, to name a few). They could also give rise to inequality 
and social division, like in the case that it leads to different levels of services for different 
users or to a widening of the digital gap (POLIS, 2018). Besides, they could lead to traffic 
and emissions increases, as a consequence of safer travelling conditions, new users and 
new usage patterns (Fagnant and Kockelman, 2015). They can also raise important ethical 
considerations (Renda, 2018). They have the potential to create new highly qualified jobs 
while making others obsolete. However, the analysis of their socio-economic implications 
still remains a largely unexplored area, with a limited number of publications existing in 
the field. Further analysis is thus needed to cover the gap, and more especially within the 
European Union, so that anticipatory strategic actions can be made with extensive 
knowledge of the possible consequences of adopting different measures. For example, a 
new skills training program could be prepared to cover the changes in skills needed in the 
future. Industries can also prepare themselves by adapting their business models (e.g. as 
many are already doing through new partnerships or recruitments). Subsidies could be 
offered to displaced workers. While it is clear that CAVs could offer unique opportunities 
for value creation, it is also essential to acknowledge that they might raise important 
concerns and imply a substantial transformation of our economy and our social and living 
conditions. Wide European policy areas are thus affected by the introduction of CAVs, such 
as the ones on regional development, transport, energy, climate change and environment, 
ethics, growth and jobs and skills (European Commission, 2017d). 
                                           
(53) For more details on the SAE levels of autonomy, see 2.1.  
(54) ACEA World Motor Vehicle production Statistics, available at: 
http://www.acea.be/statistics/tag/category/world-production (last accessed 9 April 2018).  
(55) With nearly half of the total freight transport activity and more than 80% of the total passenger transport 
activity done by road (European Commission, 2017a).  
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With increasing market penetration, automation will likely act as a transformational factor 
in mobility, closely interwoven with on-demand mobility services and electro-mobility. The 
higher the level of automation, the larger the socio-economic effects (up to the so called 
Passenger Economy (56) linked to full automation). Urbanization, the shifting global 
population dynamics and the rapid expansion in global connectivity will also disrupt the 
current mobility paradigms. In terms of readiness for the deployment of fully automated 
vehicles, a myriad of challenges still remain to be addressed, ranging from the 
development of CAV technologies (mostly the training of algorithms) to users’ acceptance 
and adoption of CAV systems, and the enabling legal and regulatory aspects. But hype in 
the media may lead to inflated expectations about CAVs, currently showing their strong 
disruption potential (Panetta, 2017). These challenges need to be faced in order to unlock 
the unprecedented benefits that CAV technologies could bring, keeping social fairness and 
improved competitiveness as crucial targets to be pursued.  
In order to understand and anticipate some of the likely economic and employment 
changes brought about by CAVs, a comprehensive analysis of recent studies has been 
conducted. In this analysis, the main economic sectors affected by these technologies have 
been studied: automotive manufacturing and supply chain, electronics and software, 
telecommunication, data services, digital media, freight transport, passenger transport, 
insurance, maintenance and repair and other sectors. On the basis of Key Performance 
Indicators (KPIs) for each sector and on different assumptions on the rate of penetration 
of the new technologies, different scenarios have been designed and analysed in a 
qualitative manner. Different societal implications such as the impacts on traffic, accidents 
or environment, each of which have implications on the economy, are also studied. Finally, 
the analysis is specifically covering the potential effects of CAVs on the workforce and is 
drawing conclusions on skill gaps that may emerge in the mobility transition. 
1.1 Policy context 
The EU must undertake a leading role in shaping the global change in order to stay 
competitive in the automotive sector, which represents more than 3% of EU’s Gross Value 
Added (GVA), provides jobs for over 5 million people (57) and stands as the largest private 
Research and Development (R&D) investor in the EU (European Commission, 2017c). To 
this aim, the European Commission is actively supporting the coordinated rollout of CAVs 
by 2020 through a wide range of measures and initiatives in cooperation with stakeholders 
from the industry and Member States (European Commission, 2017c). Since the 
Declaration of Amsterdam (European Union, 2016), different advances have occurred in 
the field, such as the signature of the Letter of Intent in Rome on March 2017 by EU 
ministers, plus Norway and Switzerland, on testing and large scale demonstrations of 
Connected and Automated Driving (CAD) (European Commission, 2017e), and the 
establishment of High Level Structural Dialogues (two have occurred to date, and an Action 
Plan on Connected and Automated Driving (CAD) has been produced, German Federal 
Ministry of Transport and Digital Infrastructure, 2017a). The Cooperative Intelligent 
Transport Systems (C-ITS) Platform initiated in 2014 was successfully concluded with the 
publication of a second report that further develops a shared vision on the interoperable 
deployment of C-ITS towards CCAM in the EU (European Commission, 2017f). Linked to it, 
the C-ROADS Platform was initiated in 2016 by European Member States and road 
operators for cross-border testing and implementation of harmonised and interoperable C-
ITS services. Besides, the GEAR 2030 initiative was established at the beginning of 2016 
as a High Level Group (HLG) on the Automotive Industry in order to agree on a roadmap 
to follow over the next 15 years, which was delivered by the end of 2017 (European 
Commission, 2017d). Several Roundtables on CAD have been held since 2015 (European 
                                           
(56) The Passenger Economy is a term coined by Intel that can be defined as the economic and societal value 
generated by fully automated vehicles (SAE level 5) (Strategy Analytics, 2017). It represents the value of 
the products and services derived from fully automated vehicles and is closely linked to Mobility-as-a-Service 
(MaaS). According to this study, the Passenger Economy can represent a US$ 7 trillion global opportunity by 
2050, 24% of which is allocated to Europe. 
(57) According to our analysis, as explained in 3.2.1.    
 11 
Commission, 2015) to strengthen the digital dimension of CCAM. From these roundtable 
discussions, the European Automotive - Telecom Alliance (EATA) (ACEA, 2016a) and the 
5G Automotive Alliance (5GAA) (Nica, 2016 (58)) were created in an effort to promote the 
wider deployment of CCAM and 5G in the automotive sector respectively. R&D funding 
opportunities have been made available through the Horizon 2020 programme over the 
last decades and more recently with calls particularly devoted to Automated Road 
Transport (ART) (59). In 2017, Europe organised the first conference on CAD (60). 
Internationally, the G7 declarations on CAD brought together the transport ministers of 
the G7 states and the European Commissioner for Transport to jointly encourage the 
developments in the field of CAD. Moving towards low-emission technologies, such as 
electric powertrains for vehicles, is also a high priority action for Europe. More recently, 
the three Commissioners for Transport, Budget and Human Resources and the Digital 
Economy concluded on the opportunity for Europe to lead in the field of connected mobility, 
highlighting that CCAM builds on the Digital Single Market strategy and is an integral part 
of the Commission's strategy on low emission mobility and the 2018 Mobility Package 
(European Commission, 2017g). Relevant pillars are the Commission's C-ITS strategy 
(European Commission, 2016d) and the updated EU telecoms rules to boost investments 
in high-speed and quality networks (European Commission, 2016e; European Commission, 
2016f). 
Working conditions and social challenges take a prominent role in this context of change. 
The European Commission has put forward an agenda for the future of mobility in the EU, 
to boost jobs, growth and investment while ensuring a socially fair transition as well as 
safe and secure travel conditions (European Commission, 2017c). The adaptation of the 
workforce to the new skills that are demanded by novel technologies is a critical success 
factor in reaping the benefits associated to them. The anticipation of future needs, closely 
followed by a stronger societal dialogue and support mechanisms, is emphasized in the 
communication. Specifically, the Commission is supporting sectoral partnerships in the 
automotive sector through its "Blueprint for Sectoral Cooperation on Skills" (European 
Commission, 2017h) under the actions envisaged in the "New Skills Agenda for Europe" 
initiative (61). The aim is to promote cooperation between employers, trade unions, 
education and training institutions to identify and address skills mismatches and develop 
skills strategies and update curricula and training modules. To support the work of such 
sectoral partnerships, the Commission launched a call for proposals under its Erasmus+ 
programme in early 2017 (European Commission, 2017i). Anticipation, adaptation and 
investment are strongly required in the transition towards the future mobility. As 
announced by the end of 2017, a third and last part of the "Europe on the Move" package 
will be presented along the first half of 2018 (European Commission, 2017j), where CCAM 
will be a key pillar. 
The need for a European shared strategy on CAVs has been stressed by the GEAR 2030 
HLG in its final report from 2017, as it was previously underlined in the Amsterdam 
Declaration and in the C-ITS strategy (European Commission, 2017d). This covers a 
regulatory framework that enables the market deployment of these vehicles, as well as to 
continue with research and testing efforts at EU and Member State levels. It also calls for 
the assessment of long-term impacts of CAVs, especially on jobs and ethical aspects, which 
can be discussed and integrated into broader EU policies aimed at ensuring social 
acceptance. The importance of facilitating a societal dialogue to contribute to the public 
acceptance of these technologies is emphasised, involving the European Commission, all 
social partners, Member States, local and regional authorities, as well as through pilot and 
research initiatives. In line with this, the Council of the European Union concluded end of 
                                           
(58) 5G Automotive Association (5GAA) website available at: http://5gaa.org/ (last accessed 13 April 2018).  
(59) European Commission Innovation and Networks Executive Agency (INEA) H2020 Automated Road Transport 
list of related projects available at:  https://ec.europa.eu/inea/en/horizon-2020/h2020-transport/projects-
by-field/automated-road-transport (last accessed 5 April 2018).  
(60) The 1st European Conference on Connected and Automated Driving website is available at: 
https://connectedautomateddriving.eu/conference/ (last accessed 13 April 2018).  
(61) Details on the New Skills Agenda for Europe can be found in: 
http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=1223 (last accessed 5 April 2018). 
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2017 on the digitalisation of transport, specifically emphasising the importance of a wide 
societal dialogue and therefore calling on the Commission to “assess the socio-economic 
and environmental impact of automation and digitalisation in the field of transport taking 
into account the new skills needed in that sector, and, if necessary, to propose measures 
to address those impacts” (Council of the European Union, 2017). 
The importance of creating added-value for society has also been emphasised by the 
European Economic and Social Committee (EESC), in the opinion document titled 
“Implications of the digitalisation and robotisation of transport for EU policy-making” 
adopted mid-2017 (European Economic and Social Committee, 2017). Political debate and 
involvement of civil society in transport planning processes are highlighted as necessary 
steps to be undertaken for that purpose. The EESC emphasises the relevance of “dealing 
with these structural changes in a proper way, by preparing strategies on how to ensure a 
fair and smooth transition, decrease negative social impacts and respond to the skills gap, 
combined with the appropriate monitoring of progress”. Social dialogue and information 
and consultation actions addressed at workers at all levels are suggested to play a key role 
in the transition process.  
In this framework, the present study aims at shedding light on the possible socio-economic 
impacts of a transition to a CCAM mobility. Enhancing the present knowledge in this area 
can be extremely beneficial to inform future EU policies in different fields that lead to a 
maximisation of the opportunities brought by new technologies and services in mobility. 
1.2 Purpose and scope of the study 
The present study analyses in a qualitative and, to some extent, also quantitative way the 
value at stake for both the economy and society as a result of a transition towards a CCAM 
mobility in Europe. The results of this exploratory study are feeding into the definition of 
an EU approach towards CCAM, specifically aimed at strengthening the Commission’s 
understanding of the societal aspects linked to it. 
The specific goals of this study are herein presented: 
— Defining a set of scenarios of the future mobility by road, in consideration of CAV 
technologies and usage patterns, with a short-to-medium and medium-to-long 
perspective. 
— Identifying the economic sectors in Europe that are most likely to be affected by CCAM 
as well as which influencing factors might drive future changes in each of these sectors.  
— Estimating the ranges of potential impacts for the main affected sectors, with the 
support of the defined scenarios.  
— Analysing the potential effects of CCAM on the European workforce, both in terms of 
jobs at risk and those that could be increasingly demanded in the future.  
— Identifying the skills that may be required in the mobility transition. 
The focus of the study is exclusively on road transport for both passengers and freight. It 
specifically targets the socio-economic effects linked to different degrees of automation 
(SAE International, 2016). In the context of this study, 2015 has been considered as the 
baseline date. This report has been informed by desk research jointly with data analysis 
on the basis of currently available data sources (e.g. Eurostat Database) and supported by 
dedicated stakeholders’ consultation activities. Findings are therefore mainly qualitative 
and, to the extent possible, they are described for the European context. Given the current 
lack of data and studies, simplified assumptions have been necessary and should be 
reviewed in subsequent analysis efforts that follow the present study. 
While it is impossible to separate the CCAM trend from other on-going and future trends 
(like the electrification of transport or on-demand mobility services, among others), this 
study aims at specifically addressing the automation and connectivity trends in particular. 
Some references to these parallel trends are anyhow made in specific parts of the report. 
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The report uses the term Automated Vehicle (AV) to refer to the different automation 
systems capable of performing part or all of the Dynamic Driving Task (DDT), as 
recommended by SAE (SAE International, 2016) (i.e. from level 0 to level 5 automation). 
Autonomous would be thus equivalent to fully automated (i.e. level 5 automation). In line 
with these terms, Connected and Automated Vehicle (CAV) is also used along the report, 
given that in the future connectivity and automation will merge (European Commission, 
2016d). The CCAM (Cooperative, Connected, and Automated Mobility) acronym is also 
widely used throughout the report, with a special focus on the road transport mode. Finally, 
in the employment context, the term automation can be sometimes used to broadly refer 
to the replacement of labour input by machine input for some types of tasks within 
production and distribution processes (Fernández-Macías, 2017). 
The remainder of the report is organised as follows: 
— Section 2 describes the automation levels and automation deployment scenarios which 
are the basis of the study. 
— Section 3 provides a review of the potential economic and societal impacts of CCAM. 
— Section 4 points out which are the limitations of the study and which future lines of 
work could possibly emerge from this work. 
— Finally, Section 5 summarises the main findings of the study. 
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2 Reference automation levels and deployment scenarios 
2.1 Automation levels 
Firstly, it is necessary to define the systems under study. For this purpose, we refer to the 
harmonised classification system for automated driving levels provided under SAE J3016 
recommended practice “Taxonomy and Definitions for Terms Related to On-Road Motor 
Vehicle Automated Driving Systems” (SAE International, 2016). SAE J3016 currently 
stands as the most widely adopted classification. Automation levels are defined on the 
basis of whether it is the human or the machine in charge of the DDT, ranging from level 
0 where the DDT is entirely performed by the human driver (no automation) to level 5 
where the DDT is entirely performed by the automated driving system (full automation) 
(see Figure 4). The DDT comprises both the lateral control (steering) and the longitudinal 
control (accelerating, braking) of the vehicle, together with the monitoring of the 
environment. The introduction of highly automated driving functions will probably take 
place incrementally (ERTRAC, 2017), with first systems introduced in specific contexts and 
scenarios of lower complexity (e.g. motorway driving) and gradually covering broader and 
more complex driving situations. This evolutionary approach (also called “Something 
everywhere” approach) is generally embraced by traditional car manufacturers which offer 
AVs with varying levels of automation and increasingly sophisticated Advanced Driver 
Assistance Systems (ADAS). It involves initially having lower levels of automation but 
covering different road environments and situations. On the contrary, the revolutionary 
(otherwise known as “Everything somewhere”) approach is primarily focusing on urban 
areas and refers to a high level of automation in dedicated spaces. It is usually embraced 
by disruptive players (e.g. technology companies).  
This study is using the SAE classification and to the extent possible, it aims at identifying 
different ranges of effects for the distinct levels of automation through the use of scenarios. 
Figure 4. Summary of SAE international’s levels of driving automation for on-road vehicles 
 
Source: SAE International, 2014 (Copyright © 2014 SAE International). 
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2.2 Automation deployment scenarios 
2.2.1 CCAM policy and technology development 
As noted in the final report from GEAR 2030 HLG (European Commission, 2017d), CCAM 
brings new policy and regulatory challenges for both the European Commission and 
Member states on a number of areas, such as road safety, environment, competitiveness 
and jobs, societal and ethical issues, to name a few. What makes the situation particularly 
challenging is the need to develop a new coherent legal framework for systems that do not 
yet exist, without hampering innovation. Below, a few highlights from GEAR 2030 final 
report are provided. 
With some Member States already having in place a national strategy for CAVs (e.g. 
France, Germany, United Kingdom, The Netherlands, Sweden), testing on a large scale is 
part of the current and forthcoming activities in several EU countries. Large scale testing 
will clearly contribute to technological progress and the development of rules, as well as to 
increase public acceptance and cooperation among stakeholders (European Commission, 
2017d). The existing 1949 Geneva and 1968 Vienna conventions on road traffic allow for 
testing of CAVs at the level of EU Member States. However, there is a need to confirm at 
the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) the compatibility of both 
conventions with higher levels of automation (still with a driver) and to accelerate the 
discussions on the high/full automation cases where a driver will not be needed (especially 
because of urban shuttles that can be available soon). Apart from traffic rules, vehicle 
legislation (e.g. Directive 2007/46/EC on vehicle type approval) will also need to ensure 
the safety compliance of new vehicles. UNECE regulations for vehicle safety rules are being 
adapted (e.g. Regulation 79 on steering) but, in the meantime, a national ad-hoc safety 
assessment is being used for the vehicle approval. The need to consider new categories of 
vehicles (e.g. new vehicle design) as well as updates through the vehicle lifetime (e.g. 
software) has been acknowledged in the framework of the type-approval legislation. For 
what concerns the sharing of data in digital maps, the Intelligent Transport Systems (ITS) 
Directive 2010/40/EU provides a legal and technical framework. Driver training (e.g. 
driving licence directive, professional driving directive) should also be discussed in the near 
future. New road safety concerns (like confusion/distraction or misuse) could appear and 
would need to be tackled through the in-vehicle Human-Machine Interface (HMI) and other 
means. 
Data recording has been identified as a useful means to clarify liability assignments in case 
of an accident with a CAV, thus as an element to be required in the vehicle type approval 
legislation. Although both the Motor Insurance Directive (MID) and the Product Liability 
Directive (PLD) are understood to be valid for the near term, they may need to be revised 
in the future and the European Commission will monitor this need as well as the need for 
additional EU legal instruments. As part of the Digital Single Market Strategy, the 
Commission is addressing liability issues, as well as data sharing and ownership rules, 
which are crucial for automated driving (European Commission, 2017c). In the context of 
the C-ITS strategy (European Commission, 2016d), the European Commission is tackling 
data protection and cybersecurity issues among others and is currently preparing a 
Commission Delegated Regulation on the specifications on C-ITS under the ITS Directive 
2010/40/EU (European Commission, 2017k) with the aim of establishing right and clear 
framework conditions to improve the interoperability and continuity of C-ITS across 
Europe. 
From a technological point of view, one relevant on-going debate focuses on the 
communication technologies to use in future CAVs (Fildes and Campbell, 2017). The use 
of cellular networks could increase to enable the exchanges of large amounts of data as 
well as for infotainment purposes inside the vehicle. In addition, existing communication 
technologies (i.e. ETSI-ITS G5) together with forthcoming and future ones (i.e. LTE-V2X, 
satellites, 5G) could better support Vehicle-to-Everything (V2X) (which will be essential for 
trucks platooning) and vehicle positioning. As an example, Volkswagen plans to equip its 
vehicles with ETSI-ITS G5 from 2019 (Schiebe, 2017).  
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Autonomous driving technology development is rapidly progressing, although some of the 
ambitious targets set by key players in the field are being delayed (Hawkins, 2017). 
Technological challenges remain strong to make fully automated driving a reality (Marshall, 
2017), with the training algorithms being a crucial step to be made in order to ensure a 
safe and efficient vehicle operation in every driving situation (Nash, 2018). Another 
important open question is whether level 3 technologies will be actually deployed in the 
market, as some manufacturers are already expressing concerns and opting for deploying 
technologies up to level 2 and subsequently level 4 and 5 AVs (Albright et al., 2017). 
One significant risk, in the EU and other regions of the world, is the fragmentation of 
regulatory approaches. This is why the European Commission is committed to the 
development of an EU strategy on CCAM, which contributes to the protection of jobs of 
European citizens and the materialisation of significant societal benefits, as well as to the 
success and competitiveness of European industries. However, steps are already being 
taken by Member States individually, which would need to converge towards a single 
European approach in the future. For instance, this is the case of Germany, that amended 
the Road Traffic Act (Strassenverkehrsgesetz, StVG) in June 2017 with rules addressed to 
level 3 and level 4 automated driving (Burianski and Thiessen, 2017). These rules allow 
that, under certain conditions, the driver may divert his/her attention away from traffic 
and vehicle control, but still needs to be in the car and is obliged to take over the driving 
task following a request by the driving system or if the conditions for using the automated 
driving functionality are recognizably no longer fulfilled. The use of a black box that records 
who is in control of the vehicle at any time is foreseen. Besides, Germany established an 
Ethics Commission on CAD in September 2016, chaired by Professor Udo Di Fabio, a former 
judge of the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany, and including experts from 
academia, society, the automotive industry and the digital technology sector. In June 2017, 
the Commission delivered a report with 20 ethical rules set as initial guidelines for 
policymakers and lawmakers, setting out special requirements in terms of safety, human 
dignity, personal freedom of choice and data autonomy (German Federal Ministry of 
Transport and Digital Infrastructure, 2017b).  
Under such a challenging policy and technological context, the evolution of CAVs could take 
different forms, also on the basis of users’ acceptance. It is nevertheless expected that the 
period during which these new technologies will coexist with conventional legacy vehicles 
will be long (European Commission, 2017f). It is also relevant to consider the link with 
Mobility-as-a-Service (MaaS), given that an autonomous mobility can reinforce MaaS and 
shared mobility services through the reduction of one significant operational cost, i.e. the 
driver (Corwin et al., 2015). Similarly, there is a clear interconnection with Electric Vehicles 
(EVs) (McCauley, 2017), supporting the decarbonisation of transport. Automation, 
electrification and ride-sharing can reinforce each other and will probably shape the future 
of road transport and mobility. 
2.2.2 Users’ uptake of CCAM 
It is widely believed that CAVs will be the main mode of transport in the future and for this 
reason a great number of studies are trying to identify people’s perceptions towards this 
upcoming technology. Users’ perceptions will be taken into account by manufacturers in 
order to define the way that this technology will be introduced in everyday life.  
On the one hand, the attitudes towards connected vehicles seems to be positive taking 
into account the strong users’ willingness to pay for connected car services (Cookson and 
Pishue, 2017). On the other hand, in the AVs domain, a recent study has revealed that 
more than half of the surveyed Europeans (53.3%) would consider buying an AV, while 
the percentages in the US and Japan are slightly lower (50% and 41% respectively) (Yano 
Research Institute, 2018). The percentage for the US is in line with (Bansal and Kockelman, 
2017) where around half of the respondents indicated to be prepared to pay for full 
automation. In another international survey (5,000 respondents from 109 countries), the 
positive reactions for fully AVs are predominant (78%) (Kyriakidis et al., 2015a). However, 
a significant portion of people (22%) is still showing a negative attitude to them. From the 
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positive answers, 5% of all users would pay more than $30,000. Positive or negative 
opinions are many times associated to factors such as gender, age, country of origin, etc. 
Regarding services that are offered to passengers of AVs, in a survey among 1,500 users 
from Germany, Japan and the US (Dungs et al., 2016), it was found that 75% of users are 
willing to pay for such services; the average amount is approximately 190 euros. The 
categories with the highest percentage of willingness to pay are “Communication” (e.g. 
social networks), “Productivity” (e.g. work) and “Basic requirements” (e.g. sleep), while 
on the other side the lowest percentage one is related to “Entertainment” (e.g. games) 
services.  
The attitude towards AVs can differ significantly between the two genders. This gender 
differentiation in terms of willingness to use such vehicles is directly influenced by emotions 
that vary in both positive and negative ways (Hohenberger et al., 2016, Kyriakidis et al., 
2015a), that tend to affect men differently from women. In a sample of around 1,600 
German participants, Hohenberger et al. (2016), found out that, compared to men, women 
are dominated by negative feelings, such as anxiety and “not pleasure”. These feelings 
make women less willing to use automated cars, while this “not pleasure” feeling turns into 
real pleasure to men, followed by less anxiety which finally leads to eagerness to use AVs.  
There is also a clear difference in attitudes with regard to age. The effect of age on users’ 
acceptance is mainly linked to the existence of significant generation differences not only 
in the willingness to pay for AV services but also in the adoption of automation features. 
Elderly people exhibit a lower willingness to pay for AVs (Bansal and Kockelman, 2017), 
while younger people seem to be ready to pay 50% more for such services compared to 
older users (Dungs et al., 2016). This readiness to pay is directly related to their willingness 
to use fully automated vehicles that is expressed by 40% of users in the age group of 25-
34 years old (in a nationwide sample of more than 3,000 individuals), and follows a 
downturn when age increases. In the age group of 45-54 years old, the willingness to use 
full automation decreases down to 23.4%. This unwillingness to pay is associated to their 
lower preference for partial or full autonomy, which finally leads to an inclination towards 
automation features with a supportive role to the driver, who retains vehicle’s control 
(Abraham et al., 2016). A year later, a similar survey was conducted by the same team in 
order to make a comparison between 2016 and 2017. The interesting finding is that results 
from the 2017 survey show a significant decrease in the intention of using fully automated 
cars and an increasing preference towards automation features supporting the driver. This 
decrease was observed in all age groups, and particularly among participants aged 25 to 
34 years old, whose willingness to use fully AVs decreases by 20%. To take the survey a 
step further they investigated the hesitations concerning the acquisition of a fully 
automated car. Issues of control loss by the driver, the conviction that this car will never 
work properly and feelings of non-trust and unsafety towards fully automated driving are 
the main interviewers’ concerns (Abraham, 2017). 
Although private cars are the most common means of transport, public urban transport is 
also a major asset with 77.6% responding positively to the potential use of autonomous 
public transport without being significantly affected by factors such as age and sex 
(Pakusch and Bossauer, 2017). On the other hand, past experience on autonomous 
transport seems to have a positive effect on citizens; according to (Pakusch and Bossauer, 
2017) 88% of the participants who had already used autonomous public transport would 
use it again in the future. The same holds with past experience on autonomous driving in 
private vehicles, which increases the possibility of these drivers to use different and novel 
transport modes. Regarding the favourable type of autonomous transport means, in a scale 
from 1 to 5 (from the lowest to the highest preference), participants showed a higher 
preference on rail-bound means (on average 3.83) compared to non-rail-bound ones (on 
average 2.87). 
A transport option that is gaining popularity in recent years is car sharing, which is a 
membership based service where customers get access to vehicles for a short period of 
time. According to (Prieto et al., 2017) car sharing is more likely to be adopted by city 
center residents and degree graduates. Gender also affects the willingness of use: women 
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seem to take safety into account when it comes to car sharing, thus they are less positive 
into using it compared to men. Also, new car owners tend to have positive opinion for car 
sharing, probably in order to avoid wear and increased kilometers travelled. In this context, 
AV technology has the potential to make car sharing more attractive among users. In 
conventional car sharing, the user must walk to the place where he/she can access the 
shared vehicle; in the shared AVs case this is not needed as the vehicle collects the user 
at their starting point. Moreover, it can improve one-way car sharing scenarios by dealing 
with the relocation problem (Firnkorn and Müller, 2015). Another advantage of AV 
technology is that it can be used to combine the positive effects of privately owned with 
shared vehicles: access to a transport means on request but with affordable cost at the 
same time (Haboucha et al., 2017). 
In spite of the general willingness to use CAVs, there still remains a significant number of 
interviewers who expresses doubts or rejects this upcoming technology. In this context, 
just an accident is enough to negatively affect public opinion, like the one that has 
happened in Arizona on the 19th of March 2018, where Uber’s self-driving test car was 
involved in a mortal accident with a pedestrian (62). Users’ acceptance is an area that needs 
further analysis in the future, especially following direct experiences with CAVs. 
2.2.3 Deployment scenarios used in this study 
Private mobility and freight transport emerge as two distinct deployment applications of 
CAV technologies in the future. Focusing on the former (i.e. passenger vehicles), a recent 
study from the Netherlands has applied a System Dynamics (SD) model to simulate the 
long-term innovation diffusion of vehicle automation. It considered a base scenario and an 
optimistic scenario with two variants: conservative and progressive, with the latter 
scenario representing a strong economic growth, political support and technology 
development as well as a positive customer attitude (63). Although specific for the 
Netherlands, the model is intended to be general with a holistic perspective in the 
boundaries of developed countries. The Nieuwenhuijsen et al. (2018) results are taken as 
a basis for drawing the scenarios used in our study. The positive focus adopted in the paper 
helps to target the identification of the strongest effects (both positive and negative) that 
could come associated to CCAM. Therefore, we have developed three scenarios (scenarios 
1, 2 and 3) corresponding to the base scenario, conservative optimistic scenario and 
progressive optimistic scenario of the Dutch study, and reflecting three different levels of 
development in the three key areas: technology, policy and users. In addition, we have 
developed a baseline scenario, which is not considering the automation trend and relies on 
the 2015-2050 projections made in the EU Reference Scenario 2016 (European 
Commission, 2016a (64)) and other data from 2015 (e.g. Eurostat Database, ACEA 
Statistics). For all the scenarios, two timeframes are considered: 2025 and 2050. Market 
penetration (65) figures are then taken from the Dutch paper to serve as a qualitative 
indication of the proportion of different automation levels in vehicle travel, but are not used 
as a quantitative input in any of the study calculations. Even if the figures provided in this 
study seem to be quite optimistic (66), they are more reliable than just consumers’ or 
experts’ points of view as they aim at tackling the dynamic and complex nature of the 
innovation system of vehicle automation. We thus base our analysis on them from a 
                                           
(62) Aftereffect of this fatal accident was Uber’s decision to pause all testing in Tempe, Pittsburgh, San Francisco 
and Toronto. 
(63) For more details on the optimistic scenario (“AV in bloom”), please refer to Milakis et al. (2017).  
(64) Precisely, taking the modified baseline of EU Reference Scenario 2016 from Hill et al. (forthcoming 2018).  
(65) In the context of the Nieuwenhuijsen et al. (2018) study, market penetration of a given automation level 
seems to be interpreted as the percentage of the fleet size of the specific level of automation compared to 
the total fleet size. Fleet size is then specified as the number of vehicles in use at a certain moment in time 
in a certain region. There is some ambiguity in the use of distinct terms (market shares, fleet shares, vehicles 
in use), so it is important to clarify that we have interpreted the figures given as amount of travel done with 
each automation level. 
(66) SAE level 5 vehicles are not expected to be available before 2030, except for testing (ERTRAC, 2017), 
although some sources indicate 2025 as expected date for fully automated vehicles (Mosquet et al., 2015; 
Leech et al., 2015). Nieuwenhuijsen et al. (2018) assume some level 4 and 5 vehicles to exist in 2025 in the 
optimistic scenarios (both conservative and progressive optimistic scenarios). 
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qualitative perspective, so that we can understand the maximum level of automation 
reached at a certain point in time and how representative it is in the total amount of travel 
done at that moment. For the passenger transport scenarios, assumptions on the amount 
of travel served by Individually-Owned (IO) vehicles and MaaS respectively are made, 
considering an increasing trend over time towards MaaS in all scenarios and from scenario 
1 to scenarios 2 and 3. Passenger transport scenarios are presented in Table 3. 
For the freight transport application, Wadud (2017) Total Cost of Ownership (TCO) analysis 
is taken as a reference, where commercial vehicle applications appear as a likely early 
adoption case of automated driving technologies. Approximate shares of different 
automated driving levels are estimated, based on Nieuwenhuijsen et al. (2018) and 
assuming that shares of higher levels of automation would be higher for freight transport 
than for passenger transport. In this context, truck platooning is specifically mentioned in 
the various scenarios, differentiating between platooning applications that still require a 
driver on-board and those future use cases where the driver would not be necessary 
anymore. Freight transport scenarios are presented in Table 4. 
For clarification along the report, the presented scenarios have been used in a qualitative 
way for the calculation of estimations per sector (namely in the sectors: automotive, 
electronics and software, insurance and power).  
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Table 3. Deployment scenarios matrix indicating shares of vehicle travel of non-AVs versus AVs for passenger transport 
SCENARIOS 
LEVELS OF DEVELOPMENT PER 
AREA 
PASSENGER TRANSPORT ASSUMPTIONS (67) 
TECHNOLOGY POLICY USERS  2025 2050 
Baseline Eurostat and EU Reference Scenario 2016 (data from 2015), without accounting for CAV technologies 
Scenario 1. 
Low uptake 
Slow 
 
Little 
 
Few 
 
Vehicle 
travel (68) 
14% Non-AV - 86% AV 
(L1 21%, L2 51%, L3 14%)  
100% AV 
(L2 34%, L3 62%, L4 2%, L5 2%) 
Rate IO - 
MaaS (69) 
80% IO - 20% MaaS 70% IO - 30% MaaS 
Scenario 2. 
Medium 
uptake 
 
Moderate 
 
Moderate 
 
Moderate 
Vehicle 
travel 
4% Non-AV - 96% AV 
(L1 8%, L2 24%, L3 49%, L4 7%, L5 8%) 
100% AV 
(L2 3%, L3 9%, L4 29%, L5 59%) 
Rate IO - 
MaaS 
60% IO - 40% MaaS 40% IO - 60% MaaS 
Scenario 3. 
High uptake 
Fast Strong Many 
Vehicle 
travel 
1% Non-AV - 99% AV 
(L1 3%, L2 10%, L3 28%, L4 23%, L5 35%) 
100% AV 
(L3 1%, L4 13%, L5 86%) 
Rate IO - 
MaaS 
40% IO - 60% MaaS 10% IO - 90% MaaS 
Source: Own elaborations.  
 
                                           
(67) Passenger transport is intended as passenger vehicle mobility in the context of this study.  
(68) Approximate shares of different automated driving levels, based on Nieuwenhuijsen et al. (2018); this footnote is applicable to all scenarios and timeframes 
(69) Assumptions of amount of travel made by IO vehicles versus travel made by MaaS; this footnote is applicable to all scenarios and timeframes 
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Table 4. Deployment scenarios matrix indicating shares of vehicle travel of non-AVs versus AVs for freight transport 
SCENARIOS 
LEVELS OF DEVELOPMENT PER 
AREA 
FREIGHT TRANSPORT ASSUMPTIONS (70) 
TECHNOLOGY POLICY USERS  2025 2050 
Baseline Eurostat and EU Reference Scenario 2016 (data from 2015), without accounting for CAV technologies 
Scenario 1. 
Low uptake 
Slow 
 
Little 
 
Few 
 
Vehicle 
travel (71) 
6% Non-AV - 94% AV 
(L1 19%, L2 25%, L3 50%)  
100% AV 
(L3 40%, L4 30%, L5 30%) 
Platooning 
(72) 
Platooning not yet available Platooning with drivers 
Scenario 2. 
Medium 
uptake 
 
Moderate 
 
Moderate 
 
Moderate 
Vehicle 
travel 
100% AV 
(L1 5%, L2 20%, L3 30%, L4 25%, L5 
20%) 
100% AV 
(L3 5%, L4 25%, L5 70%) 
Platooning Platooning with drivers Platooning without drivers 
Scenario 3. 
High uptake 
Fast Strong Many 
Vehicle 
travel 
100% AV 
(L2 10%, L3 20%, L4 20%, L5 50%) 
100% AV 
(L4 10%, L5 90%) 
Platooning Platooning with drivers Platooning without drivers 
Source: Own elaborations.  
 
                                           
(70) Freight transport covers Light Commercial Vehicles (LCV), Medium Commercial Vehicles (MCV) and Heavy Commercial Vehicles (HCV).  
(71) On the basis of the passenger transport scenarios defined in Table 3, freight transport travel made with different levels of automation is estimated. The main reasoning 
behind these estimations is that CAV technologies would be available for freight transport applications sooner than for passenger transport ones (therefore vehicle travel 
shares of AVs would be expected to be higher, e.g. a 5-10% higher) and the highest level of automation available at each timeframe would represent a higher share; this 
footnote is applicable to all scenarios and timeframes. 
(72) Platooning applications are distinguished for 2025 and 2050, specifically referring to the need to have drivers on-board the vehicles or not.  
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3 Socio-economic impacts 
3.1 Evaluation framework 
3.1.1 Conceptual framework 
An important aspect to investigate when dealing with AVs and their implementation is the 
impact that they have on the society, in terms of mobility as well as in relation to the socio-
economic impact that these new technologies can cause in our daily activities. 
The introduction of AVs in our society has impacts on many economic sectors that are 
affected directly or indirectly. In order to define the magnitude of this phenomenon it is 
necessary to establish a robust methodological framework which will facilitate the definition 
of the affected sectors and the more appropriate KPIs that constitute the base for the 
estimation of the socio-economic impacts. The methodological framework followed in the 
study is shown in Figure 5. 
Figure 5. Methodological framework followed in the study 
 
Source: Own elaborations. 
A precise definition of the economic sectors affected by the introduction of AVs is decisive 
and is based on a careful desk research on the topic. Few studies have already investigated 
such topic, considering also its very recent deployment and its complexity. A first step 
towards this type of research is the one by Clements and Kockelman (2017) that performed 
a similar research in United States (US). In their study, the authors, through a qualitative 
approach, examine the socio-economic effects of the introduction of AVs in many 
economics sectors, such as: the automotive industry, electronics and software technology, 
trucking and freight movement, personal transport, auto repair, medical services, legal 
assistance, construction and infrastructure, land development, digital media, police (traffic 
violation), oil and gas. In their conclusions, they provide an estimation of economy-wide 
effects that could lead to an increase of 8% of US Gross Domestic Product (GDP). 
Considering the novelty of this topic and the lack of reliable and unique data, a cautious 
qualitative approach appears to be the best methodology for the time being. A similar 
methodology has been chosen for the development of the current study, where the 
definition of the KPIs is fundamental in order to carefully collect available data and also 
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aim to consider different future scenarios and provide a timeframe for the identified 
impacts. 
The impacts that AVs have on the whole society and, more in detail, on some specific 
sectors will be captured through a qualitative approach where, starting from the current 
status, hypotheses will be formulated on the basis of specific inputs derived from 
specialized literature on the topic. 
The sectors that have been identified as the ones that will be affected the most by CCAM 
are: automotive (manufacturing and sales), constructions, data services, digital media, 
electronics and software, freight and passenger transport, repair and maintenance, power 
sector, telecommunication, insurance, land development, legal activities, oil and gas, traffic 
police, education and medical services. However, it is important to consider the following 
caveats: 
— The study does not cover the interaction between these sectors. 
— It only looks at output (in monetary terms) and employment. It does not include neither 
price, income nor substitution effects in each of these sectors because there are 
insufficient data to make meaningful estimates of these. 
These sectors have been combined ad hoc for the specific purpose of this analysis and each 
of the mentioned ones is composed by a list of economic activities strictly linked to the 
automotive sector and/or its components. The main reference for the data collection is the 
Structural Business Statistics (SBS) of Eurostat (73). SBS data provides economical and 
financial information, as well as data on employment for each economic sector according 
to the Nomenclature statistique des Activités économiques dans la Communauté 
Européenne (NACE) Rev. 2 classification (Eurostat, 2008). This dataset contains socio-
economic information at the most disaggregated level available in Eurostat; this allows 
capturing the closest values to the ones of each specific activity.  
SBS contains information at a very high level of disaggregation, this could lead to a possible 
data gaps, and hence a certain level of underestimation has to be taken into account. Being 
aware of such limitation, we believe that SBS data is the most appropriate for the purpose 
of the present analysis. 
Despite the effort of capturing the most accurate and refined data, it is important to 
highlight that, in some cases, some sectors comprise a list of economic activities, among 
which few of them are actually relevant for the present analysis; this entails a possible 
overestimation of the assessment hereafter presented. 
In the present study each economic sector is defined through the reference to one or more 
NACE Rev. 2 economic activities, as it is illustrated in each sector’s analysis. A 
comprehensive definition of each NACE Rev. 2 sector is available in Annex 1. 
For each of the economic activities a list of relevant common KPIs has been identified, 
according to the last SBS available data in Eurostat, which are the following: number of 
persons employed, turnover, number of enterprises, personnel costs, Value Added (VA). 
The analysis is looking at the entire EU, therefore the EU-28 aggregated values provided 
in SBS were taken, when this figure was not available, we summed up the data for the 
available Member States. The figures are always referring to the most recent complete 
available data, which is year 2015. For the sectors where we are providing estimations, 
the reference currency year is 2015. 
Moreover we provide an indication of the share of GVA, % GVA, of each specific economic 
activity on the overall European GVA. In this case the total European value is provided by 
the National Account (NA) dataset of Eurostat (74).  
                                           
(73) Eurostat Structural Business Statistics (SBS) Database, available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/data/database?node_code=sbs_na (last accessed 9 February 2018). 
(74) Eurostat National Accounts (NA) Database, available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/data/database?node_code=na10 (last accessed 16 February 2018).  
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The VA figures for each economic activity is taken from SBS, which provides NACE Rev. 2 
classification up to 4 digits, while the NA dataset provides data, NACE Rev. 2 classification, 
up to 2 digits. In order to be consistent in our calculation, since two different datasets were 
used, SBS and NA, for each economic activity we identified the ratio between the same 
level of disaggregation, mainly 2 digits, and apply the found ratio for each 4 digit economic 
activity identified through the SBS dataset. This additional calculation allows us to weigh 
each economic activity and sector on the overall GVA, which is provided by the NA dataset. 
This extra step was considered fundamental in order to avoid results that would combine 
two different data sources, which are based on different assumptions and methodologies. 
Similarly we considered how much, each economic activity is accounting in Europe in terms 
of people employed. In this case the total European figure about employment was taken 
from the Labour Force Survey (LFS) of Eurostat (75), covering EU-28 for 2015. When 
looking at the SBS and LFS, NACE Rev. 2 classification at 2 digits, no clear patterns were 
found that could justify the need for weighting the SBS data over the LFS ones. Having 
said this, for the calculation of % persons employed in each industry, the two data sets 
were used. 
For both the % GVA and % persons employed, a successive aggregation was made, 
summing up each economic activity belonging to the same sector in order to have a final 
total share for the entire sector considered. 
For what concerns the employment analysis, data from Eurofound has been used, that 
includes employment share figures from Eurostat LFS and task indicators from Eurofound’s 
database (76). 
This dataset constitutes the reference point on which to speculate in order to estimate 
possible socio-economic effects, based on qualitative and quantitative inputs from 
literature review, within the framework of the defined scenarios. 
3.1.2 Preliminary assumptions 
Some preliminary assumptions based on existing literature are summarised below and 
taken as the basis for the identification of relevant parameters of analysis (KPIs), then 
used in the assessment of the different sectors: 
- AVs will be gradually populating the roads of the EU, following technology and policy 
developments. Their deployment is based on a number of exogenous assumptions 
regarding the speed of introduction of AVs. They are not based on economic 
estimates of the demand for such vehicles, taking into account prices, income and 
substitution effects. 
- Vehicle sales can be certainly affected by a growing trend towards car/ride sharing, 
but might be offset by a reduction in vehicle’s lifetimes as a result of a more 
intensive vehicle usage. 
- Increases in the amount of road travel can be expected as a consequence of the 
safer and more comfortable driving conditions enabled by AVs, as well as from 
making it accessible to new user groups (e.g. disabled, elderly). Possible congestion 
effects of increased travel are not taken into account though. 
- Part of the increased demand for road travel can come from modal shifts taking 
place from rail or air towards road transport, as well as from different forms of 
group travel (e.g. taxis, buses). It is important to mention that shifts driven by 
price and substitution effects and their impact on consumer demand for each mode 
are not calculated. 
                                           
(75) Eurostat Labour Force Survey (LFS), available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/data/database?node_code=lfsi (last accessed 20 March 2018).  
(76) Eurofound’s European Jobs Monitor (EJM) tasks Database, available at: 
https://www.eurofound.europa.eu/publications/report/2016/labour-market/what-do-europeans-do-at-
work-a-task-based-analysis-european-jobs-monitor-2016 (last accessed 10 February 2018).  
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- How these potential increases in road travel will affect traffic congestion remains 
highly uncertain and is dependent on the degree in which AVs will be capable of 
“coordinating” themselves for a better use of the roads. As a consequence, road 
trips may slow down and more time is spent in cars. This increases the opportunity 
cost of time of car travel. Carrying out non-driving tasks reduces the opportunity 
cost of car travel. It is important to emphasize that the calculations carried out in 
this study (output, turnover) are based on market prices and do not include 
opportunity costs (positive or negative) for consumers/drivers. That means that an 
important part of the economic benefits is not captured in this exercise. 
- Productivity gains from the possibility of carrying out non-driving tasks during the 
ride can be also expected (but are not estimated in this study). 
- AVs will become a sort of “Computer-on-wheels”, where software components will 
increasingly gain a dominant position with hardware decreasing its share on the 
automotive value chain. 
- Traffic accidents are expected to decrease, especially by tackling those where 
human errors were present, which as a consequence will decrease costs of 
insurance, legal services, medical services, auto repairs, etc. 
- Fuel consumption reduces in trucks platoons, and it is possible to avoid hours-of-
service restrictions, leading to savings to truck companies. Driver tasks would 
change, possibly leading to losing driver jobs in the long-term. The energy impact 
of specific fuel savings will possibly be offset by the additional fuel consumption 
linked to an increase in road traffic kilometres. 
- Revenues from traffic fines and parking facilities in urban areas might suffer a 
severe reduction, also decreasing the demand for traffic police. However, it is 
important to note that these are excluded from the economic benefits, as they 
represent a transfer between drivers and taxpayers, not a net economic value gain. 
- Ultimately, these vehicles will also impact land use and investments in 
infrastructure, with e.g. remote parking facilities. 
A representation of some possible impacts paths is made in Figure 6 below, highlighting 
the economic sectors that would be affected.  
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Figure 6. Impact path of CAVs (+/- signs indicate increases or decreases and not whether effects 
are positive or negative) 
 
Source: Own elaborations. 
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3.1.3 Evaluation matrix 
On the basis of these preliminary assumptions and the conceptual framework defined 
before, a set of industries/services that are expected to be highly affected by CCAM (either 
positively or negatively) have been selected.  
The table below (Table 5) presents possible indicators for each of these sectors to approach 
the question “How could CAVs affect the EU economy and society?”, specifying possible 
sources of data (i.e. indicating which Eurostat NACE Rev. 2 economic activities we believe 
to be linked to each relevant sector) and preliminary indications of which factors might be 
influencing and how (in which direction, increase or decrease in sector revenues or jobs). 
These form the basis for the subsequent sectoral analysis. 
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Table 5. Evaluation matrix focusing on the sectors most likely to be affected by CAV technologies (sectors indicated in grey seem to be affected to a 
lesser extent) 
SECTORS INDICATORS UNITS 
DATA 
SOURCES 
POSSIBLE INFLUENCING FACTORS AND 
LIKELY DIRECTIONS OF CHANGE 
Automotive (vehicle 
manufacturing and 
distribution) 
Number of jobs Jobs 
Eurostat (NACE 
C29.10, C27.11, 
C27.40, C28.11, 
G45.1, G45.3) 
Vehicle sales are expected to increase if Vehicle 
Kilometres Travelled (VKT) increase, personal 
ownership prevails, as well as through the 
extended vehicle usage in car/ride sharing. On 
the other hand, vehicle sales could decrease if 
VKT decreases, e.g. such as in the case that 
shared mobility prevails. Although, an increased 
vehicle utilisation will lead to shorter vehicle 
lifetimes. 
Number of vehicles 
sold per year 
Vehicles/year 
Revenues per year 
(in vehicle sales) 
Euro/year 
Electronics and 
software 
Number of jobs Jobs 
Eurostat (NACE 
C26.20, C26.40, 
C26.51, J62) 
Revenues from this sector are expected to 
increase with sensors, controllers, actuators, 
self-driving software, maps, etc. that will be 
required for automated driving. 
Revenues per year 
(in self-driving 
software, maps, etc.) 
Euro/year 
Telecommunication  
Number of jobs Jobs Eurostat (NACE 
J61.2, F42.22, 
F43.21) 
The increased connectivity requirements and data 
exchanges in an AV will increase revenues in this 
sector. Revenues per year Euro/year 
Data services 
Number of jobs Jobs Eurostat (NACE 
J63.11 and 
J63.12) 
New services linked to vehicle automation and 
connectivity will increase revenues from data 
services. Revenues per year Euro/year 
Digital media 
Number of jobs Jobs 
Eurostat (NACE 
J60.20, G47.91, 
J60.10) 
Revenues linked to contents provision could 
increase with greater demand for digital media 
during commutes. Revenues linked to radio and 
music could decrease if there is a decreased 
demand for radio and music (preference for 
visual). 
Revenues per year 
for content providers 
Euro/year 
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SECTORS INDICATORS UNITS 
DATA 
SOURCES 
POSSIBLE INFLUENCING FACTORS AND 
LIKELY DIRECTIONS OF CHANGE 
Digital media 
(continued) 
 
Revenues per year in 
online shopping 
Euro/year 
  
Revenues per year in 
radio and recorded 
music 
Euro/year 
Freight transport  
Number of jobs 
(truck drivers) 
Jobs 
Eurostat (NACE 
H49.41, H49.42, 
H49.2, H50.2, 
H50.4, N77.12) 
Truck driver jobs could decrease with fully 
automated trucks. Revenues from road transport 
commercial operations could increase as fuel 
consumption and travel time decreases with truck 
platooning, number of truck drivers needed 
decreases (even if wages could increase with a 
more technical role, e.g. monitoring the CAV) and 
if driver time restrictions no longer apply. Possible 
modal shifts towards road transport (e.g. from 
rail or sea) could appear as a consequence of the 
more efficient road operation. 
Revenues per year Euro/year 
Cost per truck driver Euro/hour 
Number of hours of 
transport per driver 
Hours/driver 
Number of jobs -  
freight transport via 
rail 
Jobs 
Revenues coming 
from freight 
transport via rail  
Euro/year 
Number of jobs -  
freight transport via 
water 
Jobs 
Revenues coming 
from freight 
transport via water 
Euro/year 
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SECTORS INDICATORS UNITS 
DATA 
SOURCES 
POSSIBLE INFLUENCING FACTORS AND 
LIKELY DIRECTIONS OF CHANGE 
Passenger 
transport 
Cost of driving Euro/km 
Eurostat (NACE 
H49.10, H49.31, 
H49.32, H49.39, 
H51.10, 
M77.11) 
Taxi driver jobs could decrease with fully 
automated vehicles. Possible modal shifts towards 
road transport (e.g. from rail or air) could appear 
as a consequence of the more efficient and 
comfortable road travel. As well as from public 
transport towards private mobility. 
Household 
expenditure on 
transport (% of total 
expenditure or 
income) 
Euro or % 
Number of public 
transport related 
jobs  
Jobs 
Number of taxi 
driver jobs  
Jobs 
Number of air 
transport related 
jobs 
Jobs 
Number of rail 
transport related 
jobs 
Jobs 
Number of rental car 
related jobs  
Jobs 
Rental car revenues 
per year 
Euro/year 
Taxi revenues per 
year 
Euro/year 
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SECTORS INDICATORS UNITS 
DATA 
SOURCES 
POSSIBLE INFLUENCING FACTORS AND 
LIKELY DIRECTIONS OF CHANGE 
Passenger 
transport        
(continued) 
Airplane revenues 
per year 
Euro/year   
Train revenues per 
year 
Euro/year 
Insurance 
Number of jobs Jobs 
Eurostat (NACE 
K65.12, K65.20) 
Revenues from motor vehicle insurance policies 
could decrease if accidents decrease. But 
complex liability assignment could lead to more 
costly liability claims. Collision expenses could 
increase with CAV’s more costly technology. 
Revenues per year 
(insurance policies) 
Euro/year 
Collision expenses Euro 
Maintenance and 
repair 
Number of jobs Jobs 
Eurostat (NACE 
G45.20) 
Revenues from vehicle repair linked to crashes 
would decrease with improved road safety 
circumstances. 
Revenues per year 
(vehicle repair) 
Euro/year 
Revenues per year 
(other, e.g. vehicle 
personalization) 
Euro/year 
Power 
Number of jobs Jobs 
Eurostat (NACE 
D35.1) 
Future CAVs will likely be electric, leading to 
increases in electricity sales. Revenues per year 
(electricity sales) 
Euro/year 
Traffic police 
Number of jobs Jobs 
Eurostat (NACE 
O84.24) 
The size of police force needed for traffic 
surveillance could decrease if drunk driving, 
speeding, and other misbehaviours become less 
frequent. 
Size of police force 
needed (for traffic 
surveillance) 
Policemen 
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SECTORS INDICATORS UNITS 
DATA 
SOURCES 
POSSIBLE INFLUENCING FACTORS AND 
LIKELY DIRECTIONS OF CHANGE 
Traffic police    
(continued) 
Government 
revenues per year 
(from traffic fines) 
Euro/year 
  
Education 
Number of jobs Jobs Eurostat (NACE 
O85.32, O85.4, 
O85.5) 
Shifts in education programs could be expected 
as a result of skills and occupations demanded for 
future mobility technologies and services. Revenues per year Euro/year 
Construction of roads 
and motorways 
Number of jobs Jobs 
Eurostat (NACE 
F42.11) 
If CAVs lead to additional traffic demand, new 
roads might be required, leading to an increase 
in this sector revenues. Demand for new roads 
construction could instead decrease if CAVs lead 
to a better use of road space. Similarly, future 
CAVs might allow for different parking space 
requirements, as well as for reduced 
infrastructure equipment such as signs, 
guardrails, rumble strips, etc. 
Revenues per year Euro 
Medical 
Number of jobs Jobs 
Eurostat (NACE 
Q86.10) 
Demand for medical services would decrease if 
CAVs lead to less number of road accidents. 
Revenues per year Euro/year 
Number of supplies 
and doctors 
Doctors 
Number of hospital 
visits / 
hospitalizations 
Hospital visits / 
Hospitalizations 
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SECTORS INDICATORS UNITS 
DATA 
SOURCES 
POSSIBLE INFLUENCING FACTORS AND 
LIKELY DIRECTIONS OF CHANGE 
Legal 
Number of jobs Jobs 
Eurostat (NACE 
M69.10) 
Revenues from liability claims could decrease if 
CAVs lead to fewer accidents, reducing as well the 
demand for attorneys. 
Revenues per year 
(from liability claims) 
Euro/year 
Number of attorneys 
needed (specialized 
in personal injuries) 
Attorneys 
Oil and gas 
(production and 
distribution) 
Number of jobs 
(extraction) 
Jobs 
Eurostat (NACE 
B06, G47.3, 
G46.71) 
This sector could suffer decreases in revenues if 
vehicles are more fuel efficient and less parking 
search time is required. Also, if there is a 
transition towards EVs. Revenues could instead 
increase in the case of a rise in VKT due to 
higher accessibility and repositioning of shared 
CAVs, or if CAVs are bigger/heavier (e.g. comfort 
features). 
Number of jobs 
(retail) 
Jobs 
Revenues per year Euro/year 
Land development 
Number of jobs Jobs 
Eurostat (NACE 
H52.21, M71.11, 
O84.13) 
Revenues in this sector could increase with more 
efficient parking (i.e. knowing free spaces 
beforehand) but they could also decrease with 
less parking demand. 
Revenues per year 
(parking) 
Euro/year 
Revenues per year 
(from NEW land 
developments of 
former parking 
areas) 
Euro/year 
Source: Own elaborations. 
 
 34 
3.2 Economic effects across industries 
Before proceeding to the sectoral analysis, a review of previous studies that have dealt 
with the economic impacts of CAVs is provided. 
Firstly, a study from Deloitte University Press identified different driving forces, ranging 
from mature powertrain technologies and lightweight materials to connectivity, automation 
and new mobility preferences, which can potentially generate a new ecosystem for 
transport and mobility (Corwin et al., 2015). Significant value shifts are expected in such 
a future mobility ecosystem, which will require business model changes and new 
partnerships (business as usual will not work). Mohr et al. (2014) provided an overview of 
the main business activity changes that different stakeholders would be facing (e.g. OEMs, 
suppliers, digital players, telecom players), mostly as a result of car connectivity. 
Overall, the impacts of CAVs in the economy are expected to be positive (e.g. Clements 
and Kockelman, 2017). However, it also seems clear that certain industries are going to 
be negatively affected. For instance, the insurance sector will probably suffer important 
economic losses as a result of enhances in road safety (estimated at -60% by Clements 
and Kockelman, 2017). In contrast, the digital sector is expected to generate outstanding 
benefits (estimated at +33% by Clements and Kockelman, 2017). Improvements in 
efficiency, productivity and safety for freight transport and logistics activities are identified 
(European Economic and Social Committee, 2017). Manufacturing and service industries, 
both big and small and medium-sized enterprises (including start-ups), will also profit from 
new business opportunities that concern automation and robotics, services for citizens' 
mobility, solutions for more efficient logistics, or the digitalisation of the whole transport 
system (European Economic and Social Committee, 2017).  
In the analysis done by Clements and Kockelman (2017), thirteen industries are covered 
by reviewing the existing literature, concluding that economic gains can reach $1.2 trillion 
in the US. They do not specify any timeframe for these benefits to be achieved. 
A recent study from RICARDO identified a $273 billion opportunity in relation to CAVs 
during the period between 2020 and 2030 (Asselin-Miller et al., 2017). This amount can 
be divided as follows: $210 billion from connectivity, $41.5 billion from autonomous 
hardware components, $15 billion from new software and $7.2 billion from autonomous 
driving chips. These benefits seem to refer to the global market opportunity, as no specific 
reference to Europe or other areas is made. 
A World Economic Forum study of 2016 identified that by 2025 there will be a $0.67 trillion 
global opportunity as a result of the digital transformation of the automotive industry 
(World Economic Forum, 2016b). 
Only for the UK, these benefits are estimated to be a £51 billion UK opportunity by 2030 
(annual economic benefit) (Leech et al., 2015). This figure comes from: 
— A £40 billion opportunity coming from consumers (£20 billion from a decreased value 
of travel time, £15 billion from more efficient trips and £5 billion from reduced costs 
including insurance, running costs and parking),  
— £2 billion coming from producer profits as a result of increased demand and local 
content,  
— £16 billion wider impacts (e.g. reduced travel and freight costs, telecommunication 
data traffic increases, growth in revenues from sectors like digital media, electronics, 
etc.), 
— £2 billion from taxation, and  
— £2 billion from improved safety (assuming a 50% decrease of human error related 
accidents);  
— to which £11 billion are discounted, corresponding to infrastructure investments and 
rise in road maintenance costs.  
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This study found that, by 2040, the annual economic benefits are expected to be at £121 
billion. In this study, the indicated benefits are additional and not just simply arising from 
a redistribution of resources.  
Another study estimated an annual global value of around $560 billion by 2035 for the core 
services related to CAVs, including new car revenues, hardware upgrades, apps and other 
digital features (Römer et al., 2016). Annual savings for the US are set to be around $1.3 
trillion, divided as follows: $488 billion in total savings from accident avoidance, $169 
billion in fuel savings and $645 billion from an increased productivity. 
A study conducted by Strategy Analytics and Intel in 2017 found a global $7 trillion 
opportunity in revenues from services linked to fully automated vehicles in 2050, of which 
$1.7 trillion would correspond to Europe (Lanctot, 2017). 
These studies are summarised in Table 6, following a chronological order in terms of 
timeframe for the expected impacts. 
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Table 6. Summary of previous studies quantifying the economic potential of CAV technologies 
Reference 
Estimated 
economic potential 
Details/Decomposition Region Timeframe 
Clements and 
Kockelman, 
2017 
$1,200 billion 
— $418 billion from industry-specific effects 
— $448 billion in savings from increased productivity 
— $488 billion in savings from collisions 
— Discounting $138 billion from collision value overlap (between the $488 
billion in savings from collisions and the savings in the auto repair, 
insurance, legal and medical sectors) 
US 
No 
timeframe 
Asselin-Miller 
et al., 2017 
$273 billion 
— $210 billion from connectivity 
— $41.5 billion from autonomous hardware components 
— $15 billion from new software 
— $7.2 billion from autonomous driving chips 
Global 2020 - 2030 
World 
Economic 
Forum, 2016b 
$670 billion 
— Value at stake for automotive players as a result of 3 key digital 
themes (within the digital transformation of the automotive industry): the 
connected traveller, AVs and the enterprise/ecosystem 
— (in addition, $3.1 trillion in societal benefits coming from the digital 
transformation; of which more than $1 trillion would come from reduced 
accidents and lower insurance premiums) 
Global 2025 
Leech et al., 
2015 
£51 billion 
— A £40 billion from consumers (£20 billion from a decreased value of 
travel time, £15 billion from more efficient trips and £5 billion from 
reduced costs including insurance, running costs and parking) 
— £2 billion from producer profits  
— £16 billion wider impacts (e.g. reduced travel and freight costs, 
telecommunication data traffic increases, growth in revenues from sectors 
like digital media, electronics, etc.) 
— £2 billion from taxation 
— £2 billion from improved safety  
UK 2030 
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Reference 
Estimated 
economic potential 
Details/Decomposition Region Timeframe 
Leech et al., 
2015      
(continued) 
 
— Discounting £11 billion from infrastructure investments and road 
maintenance costs  
 
Römer et al., 
2016 
$284 billion 
— $103 billion in special equipment (on-board control, guidance, and 
communication systems)  
— $86 billion in mobile apps (V2V telematics and communication) 
— $95 billion in new vehicles 
Global 2030 
$558 billion 
— $189 billion in special equipment for high/full automation  
— $109 billion in mobile apps (V2V telematics and communication) 
— $260 billion in new vehicles 
— (in addition to this, $1.3 trillion in savings: $488 billion in total savings 
from accident avoidance, $169 billion in fuel savings and $645 billion from 
an increased productivity) 
Global 2035 
Lanctot, 2017 
$7,000 billion 
— $3.7 trillion in consumer MaaS 
— $3 trillion in business / Business-to-Business (B2B) MaaS 
— $203 billion in new and emerging pilotless vehicle services 
— (in addition to this, benefits of $234 billion in public safety costs related 
to traffic accidents in the period 2035-2045) 
Global 2050 
$1,700 billion 
Global Passenger Economy service revenues, out of the $7 trillion global 
revenues 
Europe 2050 
Leech et al., 
2015 
£121 billion (No details available) UK 2050 
Source: Own elaborations. 
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This review clearly reflects large differences in the findings from different studies, which 
denotes the great uncertainty around the topic. The assumptions made in each of these 
studies can also differ to a great extent, as does the timeframe considered for the effects. 
In some cases, they seem to mix up concepts and to lack a proper economic analysis 
framework (at least, on the basis of the available details). Compared to these previous 
efforts of assessing socio-economic implications of CAVs, the present study aims at using 
a scenario-analysis approach that allows to distinguish among different trends and time 
periods in the context of the EU. The focus is not paid on the economic quantifications as 
forecasts of the future evolution, but as indications of potential effects given a set of 
conditions. 
Being clear that CAV technologies hold a disruptive potential in radically transforming our 
mobility system, industries and society, the next sections aim at shedding some light onto 
the potential range of impacts that can materialise in different sectors of the European 
economy. For some sectors, these impacts have been quantified for the deployment 
scenarios defined in the study.  
3.2.1 Automotive (vehicle manufacturing and distribution) 
3.2.1.1 Scope and size 
Under the automotive sector category, we have considered both vehicle manufacturing 
(including vehicle components like engines or electric lighting equipment) and vehicle sales 
activities (both wholesale and retail), while activities linked to logistics or vehicle 
maintenance and repair have been tackled separately (see 3.2.4 and 3.2.7). Also, 
electronic and software components are left out of the automotive sector (see 3.2.2). 
The relevance of EU’s automotive sector is clearly reflected in the fact that it provides jobs 
for more than 5 million people, including around 3 million jobs in vehicle manufacturing 
and close to 2 million workers in vehicle sales, and that it accounts for approximately 3% 
of the EU GVA and around 2.5% of total EU employment (77). The EU is among the world 
leader producers of motor vehicles, and it is the area where the automotive sector 
represents the largest private investor in R&D. The sector is also particularly important 
given its links to upstream and downstream industries (e.g. steel, textiles, Information and 
Communication Technologies - ICT, mobility services, repair). In 2015, the EU-28 produced 
more than 16 million passenger vehicles and almost 2.5 million commercial vehicles (78), 
accounting for 23% of global motor vehicle production. There are currently around 290 
million vehicles on Europe's roads (the equivalent of one for every two people), of which 
38 million are commercial vehicles. The market of motorcycles is left out of this analysis, 
as the deployment of CAV technologies in this type of vehicles seems unlikely in the near 
to medium term (Asselin-Miller et al., 2017). 
Detailed figures corresponding to this sector in Europe are given below (Table 7). 
 
                                           
(77) According to our combination of activities to form the automotive sector. Other statistics for the sector are 
available in https://ec.europa.eu/growth/sectors/automotive_es (last accessed 28 March 2018), which also 
include maintenance activities and others, that we are studying separately. 
(78) Data of 2016 extracted from ACEA Passenger cars EU and Commercial vehicles EU Statistics, available at: 
http://www.acea.be/statistics/tag/category/passenger-cars-production and  
http://www.acea.be/statistics/tag/category/commercial-vehicles (last accessed 2 April 2018). 
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Table 7. Indicators of the automotive sector  
Sector  Subsector  Description  Indicators Value 
Automotive 
C27.11 
Manufacture of electric motors, 
generators and transformers 
Number of persons employed 254,570 
Turnover (million euros) 50,550.6 
Number of enterprises  12,500 
Personnel costs (million euros) 10,331.9 
Value added (million euros) 13,994.9 
% Persons employed (79) 0.12% 
% GVA (80) 0.12% 
C27.40 
Manufacture of electric lighting 
equipment 
Number of persons employed 155,553 
Turnover (million euros) 29,551.7 
Number of enterprises  7,520 (81) 
Personnel costs (million euros) 6,071.0 
Value added (million euros) 8,887.3 
% Persons employed 0.07% 
% GVA 0.08% 
C28.11 
Manufacture of engines and 
turbines, except aircraft, vehicle 
and cycle engines 
Number of persons employed 245,976 
Turnover (million euros) 87,085.9 
Number of enterprises  1,700 
Personnel costs (million euros) 15,834.1 
Value added (million euros) 19,397.4 
% Persons employed 0.11% 
% GVA 0.17% 
                                           
(79) Calculated using the total EU-28 figure for persons employed in 2015: 215,231,000 (see footnote 75 for more details). This footnote applies to all the sectors and 
subsectors for which the share of employment has been calculated. 
(80) Calculated using the total EU-28 figure for GVA in 2015: 13,241,913 million euros (see footnote 74 for more details) and following the weighting procedure explained in 
3.1.1. This footnote applies to all the sectors and subsectors for which the share of GVA has been calculated. 
(81) EU-28 value not available; calculated as the sum of the available countries (missing ones: Cyprus, Malta).  
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Sector  Subsector  Description  Indicators Value 
Automotive 
(continued) 
C29 Manufacture of motor vehicles 
Number of persons employed 2,441,910 
Turnover (million euros) 1,032,492.1 
Number of enterprises  19,500 
Personnel costs (million euros) 123,570.3 
Value added (million euros) 200,414.7 
% Persons employed 1.13% 
% GVA 1.69% 
G45.1 
Sale of cars and light motor 
vehicles 
Number of persons employed 1,471,435 
Turnover (million euros) 878,167.8 
Number of enterprises  210,356.0 
Personnel costs (million euros) 48,703.2 
Value added (million euros) 88,245.8 
% Persons employed 0.68% 
% GVA 0.82% 
G45.3 
Sale of motor vehicle parts and 
accessories 
Number of persons employed 701,567 
Turnover (million euros) 184,690.1 
Number of enterprises  120,946.0 
Personnel costs (million euros) 18,439.2 
Value added (million euros) 28,916.0 
% Persons employed 0.33% 
% GVA 0.27% 
 Total  
Number of persons employed  5,271,011  
Turnover (million euros)  2,262,538  
Number of enterprises   372,522  
Value added (million euros)  359,856  
% Persons employed 2.45% 
% GVA 3.15% 
Source: Own elaborations (based on Eurostat data from 2015). 
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3.2.1.2 Challenges and opportunities 
Connectivity and automation will considerably affect the automotive sector, specifically 
through changes along the value chain (and value share) and new mobility behaviours that 
will certainly affect the demand for new vehicles and new mobility requirements. At 
present, 90% of the value of a car lies on hardware whereas 10% of it relates to software 
but these shares will be interchanged in the future with software becoming increasingly 
important as a differentiation aspect linked to manufacturers’ profits (Römer et al., 2016 
as cited in Asselin-Miller et al., 2017). Software could then become 40% of the vehicle 
value (Römer et al., 2016; Clements and Kockelman, 2017). Contents will become a 20% 
of the value of a car, and hardware will thus decrease to a 40% (Römer et al., 2016). Thus, 
business-as-usual based on hardware-selling has the risk of becoming a commodity and 
less attractive due to decreasing margins (Manyika et al., 2013, as cited in European 
Commission, 2017l). Critical control points in the new value chain will include the HMI, 
digital platforms, real-time geospatial information and car sensor data (European 
Commission, 2017l).  
The changes in the value chain and share will require vehicle manufacturers and technology 
providers to make substantial adaptations of their manufacturing processes and 
organisations, as well as strategic decisions including investments and partnerships, in a 
context of high competition among traditional players and new entrants. Numerous 
examples of partnerships and investments have already been made in the field, e.g. BMW, 
Audi and Daimler with HERE (Boeriu, 2015) or Bosch with Mercedes (Fingas, 2018). The 
effects on the economy linked to these changes in the automotive value chain are discussed 
in the next sections (e.g. software in 3.2.2 or data services and digitalisation in 3.2.3).  
Secondly, new trends in mobility are also likely to influence the automotive landscape as 
it stands at present. MaaS will open up mobility for underserved users like disabled, elderly 
or young people without a driving license. Automated driving technologies could strengthen 
these mobility practices by reducing the cost of the driver among others (e.g. insurance) 
and could eventually lead to a decrease in vehicle ownership, thereby having an effect on 
vehicle sales (still to be seen if a decrease in vehicle ownership is offset by more intense 
vehicle use in a MaaS setting). CAV technologies, alone or in conjunction with MaaS, could 
lead to more private vehicle travel, as a result of more favourable driving conditions, and 
boost VKT up to significant levels. Ahead of this challenging landscape, traditional vehicle 
manufacturers and technology companies are establishing partnerships or making 
investments in companies that offer mobility services, like Daimler with MyTaxi (Boogar, 
2014), Volvo with Uber (Ibison, 2016) or Volkswagen with Gett (McCarthy, 2016). How 
new mobility behaviours (increase mileage and interaction with MaaS trend) could affect 
the future mobility, and specifically, the revenues of the automotive sector, is discussed 
next. 
Starting from the current and expected travel activity in Europe (without 
connectivity/automation), we explore below how CCAM can affect the demand for transport 
in the future and the resulting effects on the automotive sector activities. 
Evolution of the transport activity in the EU (baseline scenario) 
Before discussing how CAVs may influence travel demand in the future, an analysis of the 
transport activity in the EU is made, using VKT data from the EU Reference Scenario 2016 
(European Commission, 2016a; precisely, taking the modified baseline of EU Reference 
Scenario 2016 from Hill et al., forthcoming 2018). In the present study, these projections 
are considered as the baseline scenario (as described in 2.2.3). According to these 
projections, increases in VKT are estimated in the EU in the period from now to 2025 and 
2050: a growth of about 9% and 30% is identified for passenger vehicles for the periods 
2015-2025 and 2015-2050 respectively and 16% and 46% for freight transport for the 
same respective periods (see Figure 7). Developments in the economic activity drive the 
higher increases expected for the period up to 2030, both for passenger and freight 
transport sectors (European Commission, 2016a). The post-2030 passenger transport 
growth is slower than in the period before, because of an almost stagnant population after 
 42 
2040 and saturation effects limiting the growth. Freight transport follows a similar trend in 
the period 2030-2050. Road transport will continue being the prevalent mode for 
passenger transport, in particular passenger cars, although the pace of growth is lower 
compared to other modes. It is important to note that the modal share of passenger cars 
is expected to decrease progressively (as the EU Reference Scenario 2016 cites: from 73% 
in 2010 to 70% in 2030 and 67% in 2050, possibly as a consequence of saturation levels 
in car ownership in many EU-15 countries, high congestion, fossil fuel price increases, 
higher use of collective transport modes like high speed rail and the ageing of the EU 
population). Other sources project that passenger transport activity is expected to increase 
by 23% during the period 2010-2030 and 42% for 2010-2050, while freight transport 
growth is estimated at 36% by 2030 and 60% by 2050 (Gibson et al., 2017). To conclude, 
EU transport activity is expected to continue growing in the next decades, though at a 
slower pace than in the past, with road transport maintaining its dominant role (Gibson et 
al., 2017). Full data set from the modified baseline of EU Reference Scenario 2016 (Hill et 
al., forthcoming 2018) is available in Annex 2. 
Figure 7. Passenger and freight transport activity by road (VKT, in billion vehicle kilometres - 
Gvkm) 
 
Source: Own elaborations (based on modified baseline of EU Reference Scenario 2016, Hill et al., forthcoming 
2018). 
Possible effects of CCAM in travel activity 
CCAM will likely modify the landscape presented in Figure 7, most possibly leading to 
increases in VKT (as cited by authors like Fagnant and Kockelman, 2015; Cohen and Cavoli, 
2017). There are three main mechanisms for which CAVs could lead to changes in vehicle 
travel demand (Wadud et al., 2016):  
— Reduced cost of driver’s time (e.g. reduced insurance costs, reduced perceived 
discomfort costs of driving, perceived costs of travel time),  
— New user groups (like elderly, disabled or young people), and  
— New mobility service models (MaaS and shared mobility).  
While the first and second mechanisms seem to clearly lead to vehicle travel increases 
(with a wide range of possible increases), the effects on travel from the third one could 
2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050
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either lead to increases or decreases in vehicle travel activity. Estimations from the recent 
literature are provided below.  
Concerning the first mechanism (reduced cost of driver’s time), a range of travel increases 
from 4% for low automation levels to 60% for full automation is estimated (applicable for 
light duty vehicles) (Wadud et al., 2016). As far as the second mechanism (new users) is 
concerned, personal vehicle travel could increase in the range between 2% and 10% as a 
result of more drivers among the older and young people groups, as well as more travel 
per elderly driver (Wadud et al., 2016). Another estimate points at an annual 14% increase 
in Vehicle Miles Travelled (VMT) in light duty vehicles travel (Harper et al., 2016). Other 
research studies estimate that new user groups would result in an increase between 2% 
and 9% (Fagnant and Kockelman, 2015), or even reach a 40% increase (Brown et al. 2014 
as cited in Harper et al., 2016). These effects found in the literature are summarised in 
Table 8. 
Table 8. CAV mechanisms leading to changes in travel activity, as identified in the literature 
 VKT changes Source 
Reduced cost of driver’s 
time 
+4% to +60% Wadud et al., 2016 
New user groups 
+2% to +10% Wadud et al., 2016 
+14% Harper et al., 2016 
+2% to +9% 
Fagnant and Kockelman, 
2015 
+40% Brown et al., 2014 
Source: Own elaborations. 
It is evident that different urban areas across the globe are undergoing a shift towards 
MaaS (Goodall et al., 2017). Private car ownership (and even holding a driving license) is 
becoming less popular among young generations (‘millennials’) (Shirouzu, 2016; Sivak and 
Schoettle, 2016) that seem to be more prone to use this type of services (Prieto et al., 
2017). The number of car sharing users worldwide has increased from approximately 0.4 
million to 4.9 million in the 2006-2014 period (Briggs, 2014 as cited in Prieto et al., 2017). 
European car sharing customers are expected to increase from 700,000 customers (using 
21,000 vehicles) in 2011 to 20,000,000 customers (using 240,000 vehicles) in 2020 
(Peterson, 2014). The global market for shared vehicles and mobility offerings is predicted 
to increase 35% a year through 2020 (Bernhart, 2014 as cited in World Economic Forum, 
2016b). By 2030, 10% of vehicles sold could be shared vehicles (Bertoncello et al., 2016).  
CAVs could reinforce the MaaS trend, by eliminating driver costs and significantly reducing 
other cost elements (e.g. insurance), making it competitive with public transport (a price 
below $1 per mile is estimated for robo-taxis by Römer et al., 2016). Some authors 
anticipate that by 2030, 95% of US Personal Miles Travelled (PMT) will be based on shared 
on-demand autonomous electric vehicles (Arbib and Seba, 2017). A similar path would be 
followed in other geographic areas, including Europe (Seba, 2017). This forecast may seem 
too extreme relative to other estimates, but invites to reflect on a possible future mobility 
landscape, where transport services might even become free (or nearly free) on the basis 
of advertisement supported business models (McFarland, 2017; Arbib and Seba, 2017).  
As an example illustrating these trends, there are automated shuttles currently operating 
in two European cities: Rotterdam (The Netherlands) and Civaux (France) (Albright et al., 
2017). 
A detailed discussion of the possible effects on travel activity from this mechanism (new 
service models) is provided in Box 1. 
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Box 1. Effects of on-demand CCAM mobility on vehicle travel activity 
MaaS could lead to significant travel increases, as a result of the improved accessibility 
and better driving conditions (even without accounting for automation). Younger and older 
age groups can particularly enjoy the benefits provided by on-demand mobility services 
(Silberg et al., 2015). The increase in PMT could reach as much as 3-4 additional trillion 
VMT by 2050 (i.e. more than double the figures of 2015 in the U.S.) (Silberg et al., 2015). 
This additional amount of travel will be dependent on the degree to which trips will be 
shared among users, from no significant increase if trips are shared (Average Vehicle 
Occupancy - AVO = 2.0), up to the highest growth if vehicles travel empty (thus necessarily 
being automated; AVO = 0.95). In this context, it is relevant to note that, even if drastically 
lower costs are enabled by a shared autonomous mobility (Arbib and Seba, 2017), it cannot 
be taken for granted that users will be willing to share the trip with other passengers, as 
doing so may only represent a slightly lower cost on the basis of an already low fare 
(McFarland, 2017).  
A study in the Netherlands concluded that car sharing induces 15-20% fewer vehicle 
kilometres than before using car sharing and over 30% less car ownership amongst car 
sharers (Nijland and van Meerkerk, 2017). However, car sharing can induce more road 
travel in non-car users, as a result of modal shifts from walking or cycling (Le Vine et al., 
2014). With CAVs used on demand, vehicle usage intensity could significantly increase. 
Shared AVs may induce an increased travel per vehicle as a result of their repositioning 
travelling empty to pick up new passengers or reach a certain location, estimated at 11% 
(Fagnant and Kockelman, 2014) and 75% (Schoettle and Sivak, 2015). Another estimate 
points at a 10 times usage increase (Arbib and Seba, 2017). Therefore, the personal 
demand reduction linked to a shared mobility might be cancelled out by the increased 
empty-running travel. Increases in vehicle asset utilisation could range from a roughly 4% 
(as vehicles are currently parked 96% of the time) to around 90% of the time. This will 
certainly have an effect in vehicle lifetimes (about a 40% reduction is indicated in Schoettle 
and Sivak, 2015). 
Notable declines in the number of vehicles would be expected with MaaS and shared 
mobility, which some authors have estimated at a reduction of 95% of today’s private cars 
(Burghout et al., 2015), and which could have the potential to lower the overall travel 
demand. A 97% reduction in the number of vehicles is evidenced by the ITF (2016), where 
each vehicle would be running almost 10 times more kilometres than at present, but the 
total VKT would reduce by 37% (even during peak hours). Another study points at one car 
sharing vehicle replacing 9 to 13 individually used vehicles (Shaheen and Chan, 2015). 
Similarly, another reference notes that one autonomous taxi could replace the demand 
served by 10 conventionally driven vehicles (Bischoff and Maciejewski, 2016). Wadud et. 
al (2016) estimated a maximum potential reduction of travel of 20% resulting from 
previous vehicle owners that reduced their travel activity through car-sharing (upper bound 
estimate). In the Wadud (2016) study, no changes of VKT are considered for the lower 
bound estimation, as personal demand reduction can be offset by an increase in empty-
vehicle driving to pick up new passengers. The OECD Lisbon-based study (ITF, 2015) 
provided estimates of potential travel increases coming from on-demand mobility services, 
namely ride sharing and car sharing, which range from 6% to 89% more VKT depending 
on these two scenarios and whether high-capacity public transport is available or not in 
addition to the shared vehicles fleet. Considerable vehicle fleet size reductions would 
become feasible, in the order of 80-90% (10-20% of vehicles would satisfy the same travel 
demand previously offered by 100% cars). During the transition period though, some 
experts have estimated a total vehicle travel increase between 30% and 90% with mixed-
fleets of shared AVs and traditional private cars, potentially also increasing the number of 
vehicles (ITF, 2015).  
The effects linked to the third mechanism (new service models), especially the ones that 
are also related to automation, are summarised in Table 9. 
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Table 9. CAV-MaaS mechanism leading to changes in travel activity, as identified in the literature 
 VKT changes Source 
New mobility service 
models 
-20% to 0% Wadud et al., 2016 
+6% to 89% ITF, 2015 
+30% to 90%  ITF, 2015 
-37% ITF, 2016 
Source: Own elaborations. 
In spite of these considerations around on demand shared mobility, private vehicle 
ownership might remain dominant in the future following the AVs luxury and comfort 
advantages at a small cost difference (Bösch et al., 2018). If this is the case, the projected 
travel increases might pose significant challenges to our transport system. Road capacity 
could be challenged by an important growth in demand in conjunction with traffic 
inefficiencies of automated driving technologies, especially linked to the following two 
factors: early stages of technology deployment where safety priorities will lead to 
conservative margins and the interaction with conventional vehicles where unexpected AV 
behaviours will create traffic inefficiencies/conflicts. Traffic management in such a scenario 
will certainly require new approaches (Alonso Raposo et al., 2017). 
On a more qualitative level, Gruel and Stanford (2016) found that VKT is likely to increase 
in all three different possible scenarios of future mobility discussed on the basis of the 
Sterman (2000) baseline model of traffic and congestion, which can be understood to be 
someway aligned to the three mechanisms formerly explained. However, the size of these 
respective increases is expected to differ significantly, and no quantification of these 
changes is given in the paper. 
It is worth mentioning that most of these travel effects are linked to full automation 
dominating the market, which has an unclear timeframe. 
From travel activity to vehicle sales 
These changes in travel activity linked to CAVs will potentially affect vehicle sales, under 
the assumption that more vehicle travel leads to more vehicle sales (as assumed by 
Clements and Kockelman, 2017). What is clear is that the development of CAVs, jointly 
with a growth of MaaS, will challenge the traditional vehicle manufacturers’ business model 
(Cavoli et al., 2017). To prevent the potential negative effects in vehicle sales linked to an 
increase in MaaS, many vehicle manufacturers are partnering with transport networking 
and car/ride sharing companies (see examples in the introduction of this section). Another 
anticipatory action made by some vehicle manufacturers is linked to enhancing their 
capabilities in Artificial Intelligence (AI), programming or other areas in order to remain 
competitive ahead of the new technological challenges in the field (see examples in the 
introduction of this section). Technology companies are particularly strong in the area of 
electronics and software and are heavily competing with Original Equipment Manufacturers 
(OEMs) in the development and commercialisation of AVs. Römer et al. (2016) groups the 
incumbent OEMs and suppliers together with the new disruptive players in 5 categories 
and argues their respective potential to capture value, identifying the main challenges to 
be faced. From this analysis, it is clear that none of them will be able to succeed without 
support. In this changing landscape, servitisation (i.e. service-based business models) acts 
as an alternative revenue source to traditional vehicle sales, relying on periodic revenue 
inputs like subscription services (e.g. OnStar from General Motors) (European Commission, 
2017m). MaaS models might replace vehicle sales through generated applications and 
contents, and automakers might eventually become mobility service providers and fleet 
operators of CAVs, in strong competition with a range of consumer industries (e.g. 
web/internet, retail) (Lanctot, 2017). These services are further discussed in 3.2.3. 
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3.2.1.3 Estimated effects for different scenarios 
Given the high uncertainty in the evolution of the future mobility, there is a lack of 
consistent predictions in travel demand changes. We have made our own estimates that 
rely on the assumptions made for the deployment scenarios in Table 3  and Table 4 (i.e. 
share of vehicles being automated, and the respective shares of different levels of 
automation) as well as on the available literature findings. 
For passenger transport, travel activity estimates are based on the following assumptions:  
— Taking into account Wadud et al. (2016) estimations, the following levels of impacts 
corresponding to the effects from mechanisms 1 (reduced cost of driver’s time) and 2 
(new users) are established: 
● Three levels for mechanism 1: low 4-20%, medium 20-30%, high 40-60%.  
● Two levels for mechanism 2: low 2-6%, high 6-10%.  
— Each scenario and timeframe are given a certain level of potential impacts from each 
mechanism, on the basis of the rates of different automated driving systems given in 
the passenger transport deployment scenarios. For instance, mechanism 2 is expected 
not to be present in scenario 1 given that it is linked to full automation which is not 
present in this scenario (just partially in 2050). For the same reason, mechanism 1 is 
expected to be low, as only partial benefits might exist in intermediate levels of 
automation.  
— Then, total average figures are calculated for each scenario/timeframe, also summing 
the corresponding baseline projected increase (taking data for private cars travel 
activity from the updated baseline scenario of EU Reference Scenario 2016, Hill et al., 
forthcoming 2018). This has been done because the effects of automation are 
considered in addition to the ones included in the baseline. However, it is relevant to 
mention that some overlapping might exist between them, which cannot be identified 
at this stage. 
As a result, estimates for passenger transport are given in Table 10. 
Table 10. Changes of VKT per scenario - passenger transport 
 
CHANGES OF VKT PER SCENARIO - PASSENGER TRANSPORT 
2015-2025 2015-2050 
Baseline +9% +30% 
Scenario 1. 
Low uptake 
5-20% (mechanism 1 low) => 
Average 12% + 9% BL = 
21% 
20-40% (mechanism 1 medium) 
=> Average 30% + 30% BL = 
60% 
Scenario 2. 
Medium 
uptake 
20-40% (mechanism 1 medium) + 
2-6% (mechanism 2 low) => 
Average 34% + 9% BL = 
43% 
40-60% (mechanism 1 high) + 
6-10% (mechanism 2 high) => 
Average 58% + 30% BL = 
88% 
Scenario 3. 
High 
uptake 
40-60% (mechanism 1 high) + 
6-10% (mechanism 2 high) => 
Average 58% + 9% BL = 
67% 
40-60% (mechanism 1 high) + 
6-10% (mechanism 2 high) => 
Average 58% + 30% BL = 
88% 
Source: Own elaborations. 
Effects from mechanism 3 (MaaS/shared mobility) on VKT are ignored in these travel 
activity calculations, but their effects on potential vehicle sales are considered in a 
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subsequent step on the basis of the scenario assumptions (i.e. share of IO versus MaaS 
travel, see next step of the calculation for passenger transport). 
For freight transport, travel demand estimates are based on the following assumptions:  
— Effects from mechanism 2 (new users) and mechanism 3 (MaaS/shared mobility) are 
expected not to be applicable for freight transport, but still increases in VKT could be 
possible in the case of more convenient and cheaper travel conditions allowed by 
autonomous commercial vehicles (shifting travel from rail or water towards road), as 
well as from the fact that these technologies would allow for longer driving times 
without the current driving time and night work restrictions (e.g. Regulation (EC) No 
561/2006 and Directive 2002/15/EC (82)). 
— The largest transport increase is estimated for scenario 3 in 2050 (representing the 
highest automation levels and respective travel shares), and corresponds to the 
reasoning that commercial vehicles could increase from a maximum of 16 hours of 
driving per day today (which is understood to be in line with current practice, following 
the necessary resting time of drivers) to about 21 hours of driving per day (i.e. a 30% 
increase).  
— Taking into account these hypothetical circumstances and baseline projections from the 
updated baseline scenario of EU Reference Scenario 2016 (the part corresponding to 
freight transport activity, including light and heavy duty vehicles activity, from Hill et 
al., forthcoming 2018), increases in VKT are derived for the rest of the scenarios, with 
the overall trend of increasing VKT from scenario 1 to scenario 2 and scenario 3, as 
well as an increasing trend from 2025 to 2050. This results in increases of 5%, 10%, 
15% and 30%. 
As a result, estimates for freight transport are given in Table 11. 
Table 11. Changes of VKT per scenario - freight transport 
 
CHANGES OF VKT PER SCENARIO - FREIGHT TRANSPORT 
2015-2025 2015-2050 
Baseline +16% +46% 
Scenario 1. 
Low uptake 
(= Baseline) 
+16%  
(= Baseline) 
+46%  
Scenario 2. 
Medium uptake 
5% + 16% =  
+21% 
15% + 46% =  
+61% 
Scenario 3. 
High uptake 
10% + 16% = 
+26% 
30% + 46% = 
+76% 
Source: Own elaborations. 
The next step of the calculations is to convert VKT estimates into vehicle sales estimates. 
In the case of passenger transport, VKT estimations are translated into vehicle sales 
changes by using the following formula, which accounts for the shared mobility trend: 
Change in Vehicle Sales = Change in VKT*(100% IO share + 30% MaaS share) 
IO and MaaS shares are taken from the assumed rates in Table 3, section 2.2.3, for each 
of the scenarios. The multiplying value of 30% in the MaaS component is resulting from 
the assumption that, even though new mobility service models will increase vehicle usage 
intensity (a 75% usage increase is stated in Schoettle and Sivak, 2015 or a 10 times 
increase in Arbib and Seba, 2017), the resulting decreased vehicle ownership will drive a 
                                           
(82) European Commission’s Mobility and Transport website on Road Driving time and rest periods, available at: 
https://ec.europa.eu/transport/modes/road/social_provisions/driving_time_en (last accessed 2 May 2018).  
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downwards trend in vehicle sales. Specifically, the 30% of MaaS share represents the 
possibility that less number of vehicles would satisfy the demand for MaaS and that the 
vehicles used in a shared mobility setting would be replaced more frequently than today 
given the more intense use of these vehicles. Precisely: 
— Assuming that the reduction in the number of vehicles leads to 10% of vehicles able to 
satisfy the demand for MaaS. 
— But assuming that these vehicles are replaced 3 times more frequently. 
— Thus, from 100% to 10% and finally, to 30%. 
The resulting changes in passenger vehicle sales are shown in Table 12. 
Table 12. Changes in vehicle sales per scenario - passenger transport 
 
CHANGES IN VEHICLE SALES PER SCENARIO - PASSENGER 
TRANSPORT 
2015-2025 2015-2050 
Baseline (83) +9% +30% 
Scenario 1. 
Low uptake 
+18% +47% 
Scenario 2. 
Medium uptake 
+31% +51% 
Scenario 3. 
High uptake 
+39% +33% 
Source: Own elaborations. 
In the case of freight transport, vehicle sales are in line with the corresponding VKT % 
increases, ignoring any effect from MaaS (i.e. using VKT increases of 0-30% as in Table 
11). However, the starting point in this case is the baseline vehicle sales (taken from the 
modified baseline scenario of the EU Reference Scenario 2016, Hill et al., forthcoming 
2018) and not the baseline travel demand projections for freight transport, from which the 
various scenarios/timeframes are calculated. 
As a result, estimates for freight vehicle sales are given in Table 13. 
Table 13. Changes in vehicle sales per scenario - freight transport 
 
CHANGES IN VEHICLE SALES PER SCENARIO - FREIGHT 
TRANSPORT 
2015-2025 2015-2050 
Baseline +19% +38% 
Scenario 1. 
Low uptake 
(= Baseline) 
+19% 
(= Baseline) 
+38% 
Scenario 2. 
Medium uptake 
5% + 19% = 
+24% 
15% + 38% = 
+53% 
Scenario 3. 
High uptake 
10% + 19% = 
+29% 
30% + 38% = 
+68% 
Source: Own elaborations. 
                                           
(83) Considering the already on-going MaaS trend and its expected growing evolution in the future without 
accounting for any automation trend, we consider these figures to be subject to possible reductions. 
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The total number of motor vehicles registered in the EU in 2015 was 15,781,465 vehicles 
(84). Of these, 13,696,221 were passenger vehicles and 2,039,268 were commercial 
vehicles, including light, medium and heavy commercial vehicles.  
An additional consideration in the estimations of the passenger vehicle effects is the 
following. We have estimated the turnover effects on the automotive sector based on two 
different baseline figures of number of passenger vehicles, namely: 
— The first calculation builds on the number of passenger cars registered in the EU in 
2015 (i.e. 13.7 million passenger vehicles in 2015). This figure is used as an 
approximation of the final demand for passenger cars in the EU. It represents the 
situation in which the European market behaves as if it was an autarky (therefore as a 
closed economy that does not engage in international trade with other countries). 
— The second calculation builds on the number of passenger cars produced in the EU in 
2015 (i.e. 16 million vehicles in 2015). It represents the situation where Europe 
assumes global leadership and internalizes all the benefits of the global value chain, 
i.e. all inputs are produced within the EU, the domestic demand is entirely satisfied and 
the residual vehicles are exported. Anyhow, it is relevant to note that this figure 
represents production, which is normally slightly higher than sales. It could thus imply 
a certain degree of overestimation in the calculations. 
These calculations can be found in Table 14 and Table 15. Similar considerations have not 
been judged necessary for freight transport. The reasons for this are the following. On the 
one hand, the available data on commercial vehicles import/export shares, production and 
registration all come from different databases, which use different definitions and 
aggregations. These differences would compromise the reliability of any assumption that 
aims to reflect similar situations to the Autarky and Global leadership ones used in the 
passenger transport. On the other hand, the production and registration figures are very 
similar, and likewise, the import and export data are comparable. The effects of trying to 
reflect different market situations would then cancel each other. Therefore, for freight 
transport, just the 2 million commercial vehicles figure has been considered (Table 16).  
In order to provide effects on sector turnover, an average price per passenger vehicle of 
27,496 euros has been considered (from Hill et al., forthcoming 2018). For freight 
transport, average vehicle prices are taken from different sources and applied in 
accordance to the fleet distribution in 2025 and 2050. Specifically, using the following 
average vehicle prices for Light, Medium and Heavy Duty Vehicles respectively: 30,238 
euros (from Hill et al., forthcoming 2018), 60,233 euros (average of 7.5, 12 and 18 Tonne 
vehicle prices from Lastauto Omnibus-Katalog, 2017) and 100,000 euros (rough average 
price of 4*2 and 6*2 HDVs considering Lastauto Omnibus-Katalog, 2017) and their relative 
shares in 2025 (according to 2015 data from ACEA Consolidated registrations by country 
Statistics (84)) and 2050 (baseline of DIONE fleet impact model, Thiel et al., 2016).  
For both passenger and freight transport, the simplified assumption that prices are kept 
constant over time is made at this stage. It is also important to highlight that the additional 
cost of automation is not considered in this cost calculation but left for the section dealing 
with electronics and software (3.2.2).  
The following charts (Figure 8, Figure 9, Figure 10 and Figure 11) show the effects on VKT 
and vehicle sales corresponding to the different scenarios of the present study, both for 
passenger and commercial vehicles. For passenger transport, the Autarky situation has 
been chosen to be represented. Specifically, in Figure 9, it is possible to observe long-term 
lower vehicle sales on scenario 3 as a result of a dominant MaaS-based travel. This is not 
the case of freight transport, where a growing trend can be observed in all scenarios, both 
in VKT and sales (see Figure 10 and Figure 11; to note that baseline and scenario 1 are 
superimposed in both figures). 
                                           
(84) EU-28 except Cyprus and Malta for which data is not available, according to ACEA Consolidated registrations 
by country Statistics from 2015, available at: 
http://www.acea.be/statistics/tag/category/by-country-registrations (last accessed 25 March 2018). 
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Figure 8. Passenger transport activity (VKT, in Gvkm) for the different study scenarios (Autarky) 
 
Source: Own elaborations. 
Figure 9. Passenger vehicle sales (in million vehicles) for the different study scenarios (Autarky) 
 
Source: Own elaborations. 
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Figure 10. Freight transport activity (VKT, in Gvkm) for the different study scenarios 
 
Source: Own elaborations. 
Figure 11. Commercial vehicle sales (in million vehicles) for the different study scenarios 
 
Source: Own elaborations. 
The two calculations for passenger transport (Autarky versus Global leadership) are given 
in Table 14 and Table 15, and freight transport calculations are shown in Table 16. In brief, 
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As a result, this could be the range of possible effects for passenger transport: 
Table 14. Potential effects of AVs in the automotive sector - passenger transport (Autarky) 
Effects of AVs on the 
automotive industry – 
passenger transport 
Baseline Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 
2015 2025 2050 2025 2050 2025 2050 2025 2050 
Change in new vehicle sales with 
respect to 2015 (%) 
- +9% +30% +18% +47% +31% +51% +39% +33% 
Number of new vehicles sold 
(million vehicles) 
13.7 14.93 17.81 16.17 20.14 17.95 20.69 19.04 18.22 
Change in new vehicle sales with 
respect to the baseline scenario 
(million vehicles) 
- +1.23 (85) +4.11 (85) +1.24 +2.33 +3.02 +2.88 +4.11 +0.41 
Revenues from new vehicle 
sales (billion euros) (86) 
380 (87) 410 490 445 555 495 570 525 500 
Changes in revenues from new 
vehicle sales with respect to the 
baseline scenario (billion euros) 
- +30 (85) +110 (85) +35 +65 +85 +80 +115 +10 
Changes in revenues from new 
vehicle sales with respect to the 
baseline scenario (%) 
- +8% (85) +29% (85) +9% +13% +21% +16% +28% +2% 
Source: Own elaborations. 
  
                                           
(85) The figure represents the change with respect to 2015. 
(86) Revenue figures are rounded for simplification and in accordance to their actual meaning. 
(87) This figure is just an estimate of the revenues in new passenger vehicle sales by 2015 and does not correspond to the actual value. It has been calculated in order to 
understand the change in revenues for the different scenarios. 
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Table 15. Potential effects of AVs in the automotive sector - passenger transport (Global leadership) 
Effects of AVs on the 
automotive industry – 
passenger transport 
Baseline Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 
2015 2025 2050 2025 2050 2025 2050 2025 2050 
Change in new vehicle sales with 
respect to 2015 (%) 
- +9% +30% +18% +47% +31% +51% +39% +33% 
Number of new vehicles sold 
(million vehicles) 
16.0 17.4 20.8 18.9 23.5 21.0 24.2 22.2 21.3 
Change in new vehicle sales with 
respect to the baseline scenario 
(million vehicles) 
- +1.4 (88) +4.8 (88) +1.4 +2.7 +3.5 +3.4 +4.8 +0.5 
Revenues from new vehicle sales 
(billion euros) (89) 
440 (90) 480 570 520 645 575 665 610 585 
Changes in revenues from new 
vehicle sales with respect to the 
baseline scenario (billion euros) 
- +40 (88) 
+130 
(88) 
+40 +75 +95 +95 +130 +15 
Changes in revenues from new 
vehicle sales with respect to the 
baseline scenario (%) 
- +8% (88) 
+29% 
(88) 
+9% +13% +21% +16% +28% +2% 
Source: Own elaborations. 
  
                                           
(88) The figure represents the change with respect to 2015. 
(89) Revenue figures are rounded for simplification and in accordance to their actual meaning. 
(90) This figure is just an estimate of the revenues in new passenger vehicle sales by 2015 and does not correspond to the actual value. It has been calculated in order to 
understand the change in revenues for the different scenarios. 
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And this could be the range of possible effects for freight transport: 
Table 16. Potential effects of AVs in the automotive sector - freight transport 
Effects of AVs on the 
automotive industry – freight 
transport 
Baseline Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 
2015 2025 2050 2025 2050 2025 2050 2025 2050 
Change in new vehicle sales with 
respect to 2015 (%) 
- +19% +38% +19% +38% +24% +53% +29% +68% 
Number of new vehicles sold 
(million vehicles) 
2 2.38 2.76 2.38 2.76 2.48 3.06 2.58 3.36 
Change in new vehicle sales with 
respect to the baseline scenario 
(million vehicles) 
- 
+0.38 
(91) 
+0.76 
(91) 
+0.00 +0.00 +0.10 +0.30 +0.20 +0.60 
Revenues from new vehicle sales 
(billion euros) (92) 
80 (93) 95 115 95 115 100 130 100 145 
Changes in revenues from new 
vehicle sales with respect to the 
baseline scenario (billion euros) 
- +15 (91) +35 (91) +0 +0 +5 +15 +5 +30 
Changes in revenues from new 
vehicle sales with respect to the 
baseline scenario (%) 
- 
+19% 
(91) 
+44% 
(91) 
+0% +0% +5% +13% +5% +26% 
Source: Own elaborations. 
                                           
(91)  The figure represents the change with respect to 2015. 
(92) Revenue figures are rounded for simplification and in accordance to their actual meaning. 
(93) This figure is just an estimate of the revenues in new commercial vehicle sales by 2015 and does not correspond to the actual value. It has been calculated in order to 
understand the change in revenues for the different scenarios. 
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3.2.2 Electronics and software 
3.2.2.1 Scope and size 
Under the electronics and software sector, we have included four specific Eurostat NACE 
Rev. 2 sectors: manufacture of computers and peripheral equipment, manufacture of 
consumer electronics, manufacture of instruments and appliances for measuring, testing 
and navigation and computer programming, consultancy and related activities. While these 
sectors cover a broader set of activities than the ones strictly related to motor vehicle 
equipment and software, further level of detail is unavailable. In the framework of this 
study, the electronics and software sector is closely linked to the automotive one. 
Detailed figures corresponding to this sector in Europe are given below (Table 17). 
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Table 17. Indicators of the electronics and software sector  
Sector  Subsector  Description  Indicators Value 
Electronics and 
software 
C26.20 
Manufacture of computers 
and peripheral equipment 
Number of persons employed 80,318 
Turnover (million euros) 135,935.3 
Number of enterprises  5,607.0 (94) 
Personnel costs (million euros) 3,637.6 
Value added (million euros) 4,163.6 (95) 
% Persons employed 0.04% 
% GVA 0.04% 
C26.40 
Manufacture of consumer 
electronics 
Number of persons employed 55,835 
Turnover (million euros) 21,500.9 
Number of enterprises  2,776.0 
Personnel costs (million euros) 1,945.5 
Value added (million euros) 3,300.4 
% Persons employed 0.03% 
% GVA 0.03% 
C26.51 
Manufacture of 
instruments and 
appliances for measuring, 
testing and navigation 
Number of persons employed 394,769 
Turnover (million euros) 78,444.2 
Number of enterprises  11,000.0 
Personnel costs (million euros) 22,130.5 
Value added (million euros) 31,242.5 
% Persons employed 0.18% 
% GVA 0.33% 
  
                                           
(94) EU-28 value not available; calculated as the sum of the available countries (missing one: Ireland).  
(95) EU-28 value not available; calculated as the sum of the available countries (missing ones: Estonia, Ireland, France, Luxembourg, Netherlands). 
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Sector  Subsector  Description  Indicators Value 
Electronics and 
software        
(continued) 
J62 
Computer 
programming, 
consultancy and related 
activities 
Number of persons employed 3,379,005 
Turnover (million euros) 549,508.4 
Number of enterprises  694,851.0 
Personnel costs (million euros) 170,786.1 
Value added (million euros) 255,628.0 
% Persons employed 1.57% 
% GVA 2.07% 
 Total   
Number of persons employed  3,909,927  
Turnover (million euros)  785,389  
Number of enterprises   714,234  
Value added (million euros)  294,335  
% Persons employed 1.82% 
% GVA 2.47% 
Source: Own elaborations (based on Eurostat data from 2015). 
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3.2.2.2 Challenges and opportunities 
With cars increasingly becoming computers on wheels, this sector is understood to hold a 
significant relevance in the future smart mobility. The software in one of the latest 
Mercedes S-class vehicle models contains approximately 15 times more lines of code than 
the software in a Boeing 787 (Mosquet et al., 2015) and it is estimated that vehicles in 
2020 will have 100-150 million lines of code (Ganguli et al., 2016 as cited in Asselin-Miller 
et al., 2017; Gillespie, 2016). In terms of processing power, a vehicle today processes up 
to 25GB/hour (Mohr et al., 2014). NVIDIA has estimated that the computing demands of 
an AV can be 50-100 times more intensive than those currently placed on the most 
advanced cars available (Boucherat, 2018). 
A 2015 study has predicted that by 2025, there could be 14.5 million vehicles (mostly with 
partially automated driving functionality, but including 600,000 fully automated vehicles; 
accounting for 12-13% of global vehicle sales) out of a total of 111 million new vehicles 
and that by 2035, there will be 18 million partially automated vehicles and 12 million fully 
automated ones (accounting for 25% of vehicle sales) out of 122 million new vehicles in 
total (Mosquet et al., 2015). Therefore the combined market for partial and full automation 
will develop gradually until it reaches 25% of new vehicle sales, which can take 15-20 
years (around 2035) (Mosquet et al., 2015). Market estimates for 2025 and 2035 are $42 
billion and $77 billion respectively, with 14.5 million and 30 million AVs sold at each 
respective point in time (Mosquet et al., 2015). Another source points at CAV sales reaching 
$95 billion by 2030 and $260 billion by 2035 (Römer et al., 2016). It is estimated that 5% 
of annual vehicle sales by 2025 will be related to fully automated vehicles, following first 
commercially viable solutions in 2019, of which 80% will be from self-driving add-on 
packages (such as a more advanced version of the RP-1 product by Cruise) and 20% from 
fully automated vehicles themselves (World Economic Forum, 2016b). 
We explore below how automation and connectivity can affect the activities of this sector. 
Software versus hardware 
In the automotive value chain, software will gain a predominant role while hardware will 
decrease its share (the latter dropping from 90% to 40% of the vehicle value, and the 
former increasing from 10% to 40%, as indicated in Clements and Kockelman, 2017; 
Römer et al., 2016). By 2030, the market for this new software is estimated to reach $10-
20 billion, as a function of the business models used (Asselin-Miller et al., 2017).  
In this context, a recent study indicated that 57% of automotive executives predict opening 
their software/API (Application Programming Interface) to third parties or external 
software developers (Wee et al., 2015). AImotive, a European company specialized in 
autonomous driving software, has recently raised funding to keep on developing its 
proprietary self-driving technology and is already working with automotive manufacturers 
such as PSA or Volvo (Takahashi, 2018). 
Hardware components for automated driving 
Whereas software will become progressively crucial, the market for autonomous driving 
hardware components will also grow (Asselin-Miller et al., 2017). OEMs and a core group 
of Tier 1 suppliers will most likely continue to be the providers of equipment such as 
cameras, sensors, lidar, actuators and communication systems. It is estimated that by 
2030 the entire market for new components will be around $30-40 billion (Roland Berger, 
2014 as cited in Asselin-Miller et al., 2017). Another reference points at a global market 
increase for these components from US$ 0.4 billion in 2015 to US$ 4 billion by 2020, US$ 
20 billion by 2025 and US$ 40 billion by 2030 (Statista, 2018). It has also been estimated 
that the annual market for special equipment, including on board control, guidance and 
communication systems, will be $103 billion by 2030 and $189 billion by 2035 (Römer et 
al., 2016).  
In particular, the global market for automotive radar will reach almost US$ 9 billion by 
2024 from almost US$ 2 billion in 2015 (Statista, 2018). Also, the market for autonomous 
 59 
driving chips has been estimated to grow by a factor of 36 along the period between 2017 
and 2025 (from around $0.2 billion to $7.2 billion) (Poletti, 2016 as cited in Asselin-Miller 
et al., 2017). It has also been projected that the opportunity for semiconductor providers 
will reach about US$ 96 billion by 2040 (Statista, 2015a). 
After 2030-2035, revenues from special equipment will decrease as technology starts to 
become a commodity and content, software and services will surpass revenues from special 
equipment (Römer et al., 2016). With software and contents becoming the most significant 
part of a CAV’s value (40% and 20% as indicated by Römer et al., 2016), the highest profit 
margins are expected for providers of these two elements. Römer et al. (2016) anticipates 
that technology companies are the most likely candidate actors to lead this sector. Tier 1 
suppliers could also become key players in this area by specializing in software and the 
components that support it (Römer et al., 2016).  
Connected vehicle market 
According to Transparency Market Research (2013), global connected car market (which 
is segmented into infotainment, navigation, and telematics) will reach US$ 131.9 billion by 
2019, from US$ 41.3 billion by 2015. In particular, navigation is projected to account for 
45% of the market by 2019. In line with this estimate, a global economic potential of 120 
billion euros revenue per year is estimated for the connected vehicles equipment (including 
both hardware and software) (96). Infotainment advances are expected to add $65 billion 
of operating profits to the overall automotive value chain, of which $41 billion will be 
coming from sales of infotainment hardware (growing at a Compound Annual Growth Rate 
- CAGR of 4% from 2016 to 2025), $14 billion from OEM-driven applications and services 
and $10 billion from mobile-based and third-party applications from outside the automotive 
industry (World Economic Forum, 2016b). 
Connected car market players hold a unique opportunity with the advent of AVs. A 
significant growth is expected in the connected car market for passenger vehicles, where 
a global economic potential of 120 billion euros revenue per annum has been estimated, 
specifically linked to connected car equipment (including both hardware and software) 
(European Commission, 2017l). Over 90% market penetration of telematics packages is 
expected to be reached by 2020 (European Commission, 2017l). OEMs and digital players 
are engaging in co-opetition projects that combine cooperation and competition (see 
multiple examples in European Commission, 2017l). Another estimate points at 48 million 
connected car shipments by 2018, that are expected to almost double by 2020 (Statista, 
2017). Market segments in the connected car market include automotive infotainment and 
navigation technologies, EV services, car safety systems, electronic tolling, fleet 
relationship management, insurance services and fleet management. Thus, the connected 
car market could also be related to the data services sector and other sectors like freight 
transport or insurance. This denotes the difficulty in separating the effects for each of these 
sectors individually.  
The cost of CAV technology 
Vehicle manufacturers need to make considerable investments in hardware components 
like sensors (e.g. radar, lidar) and processors, software and Information Technology - IT 
(e.g. ECU - Electronic Control Unit, maps), systems integration and assembly (Mosquet et 
al., 2015). The R&D investments needed are estimated to be at $1 billion per OEM over 
the next decade (Mosquet et al., 2015). Some references from the literature on prices of 
full automation are given in Box 2. 
                                           
(96) European Commission Digital Transformation Monitor Autonomous Cars website:  
https://ec.europa.eu/growth/tools-databases/dem/monitor/category/autonomous-cars (last accessed 3 
April 2018). 
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Box 2. Full automation premiums 
Specifically, the additional equipment on board CAVs ranges from GPS systems to lidars, 
video cameras, ultrasonic sensors, odometry sensors, computing systems, and 
connectivity features, adding to the cost of the conventional vehicles (Wadud, 2017). Prices 
of CAV components are very volatile, because of differences in their technical 
specifications, scale of production and maturity (Mosquet et al., 2015). One example is the 
lidar technology that can range from $90 to $8,000 (Mosquet et al., 2015). 
Bansal and Kockelman (2017) have indicated significant CAV premiums, namely US$ 
30,951 and US$ 23,950 for 2020 and 2025 respectively, which Wadud (2017) judges as 
too high for any commercial success. Vehicle manufacturers would likely absorb some of 
these additional costs in order to obtain an initial share of the market (Wadud, 2017). 
Volvo has declared the intention to produce vehicles for the luxury market segment where 
the automated driving functionality would be adding US$ 10,000 to the vehicle cost 
(Naughton, 2016 as stated in Asselin-Miller et al., 2017), but it remains unclear if it refers 
to both hardware and software, as another estimate by Volvo points at self-driving software 
making up an additional $10,000 in the vehicle selling price (Burke, 2016 as cited in 
Wadud, 2017). Tesla currently offers its Autopilot for an additional purchase cost of US$ 
4,000, without including the costs from sensors and hardware (5,600 euros, for a basic 
Autopilot functionality in Europe (97)). Mosquet et al. (2015) estimates that highway 
autopilot with lane changing and urban autopilot could be priced at $5,000 - $6,000, and 
that, as a consequence, fully automated vehicles could be expected to add a cost of 
$10,000 to the vehicle price. For freight vehicles, premiums related to CAV technologies 
could range between approximately US$ 16,000 and US$ 25,000 for small rigid trucks and 
between roughly US$ 17,500 to US$ 26,600 for larger trucks (1.4 change applied to 
convert pounds into US dollars, from prices indicated in Wadud, 2017).  
After the market launch of these components, the cost is expected to decrease at a 
compound annual rate of 4-10% over 10 years (a 10% learning rate is assumed by Wadud, 
2017). The premium market segment will thus probably be the first where CAV 
technologies will be implemented, as vehicle prices are expected to be fairly high at the 
beginning (Mosquet et al., 2015). The high prices of CAV technologies will probably slow 
the pace of adoption, in spite of the advantages brought to end consumers. It is also true 
that, despite the initially large costs of CAVs, distributing its cost over the vehicle lifetime 
(via depreciation), the annual additional costs of CAV technologies are not dramatically 
high (Wadud, 2017). 
3.2.2.3 Estimated effects for different scenarios 
The revenues in this sector will be strongly linked to vehicle production and sales. Each 
year European automotive suppliers make 75% of each of the 18 million vehicles produced 
and they represent on average 80% of the added value of a vehicle (98). We recall herein 
the figures used in the automotive sector, namely: total number of motor vehicles 
registered in the EU in 2015 of approximately 15.7 million vehicles (13.7 million passenger 
vehicles and 2 million commercial vehicles). For passenger vehicles, the figure of 16 million 
vehicles has also been used to reflect the Global leadership situation (13.7 representing 
the Autarky situation). On the basis of these present vehicle sales and the future 
projections of new vehicles sold per scenario (taken from the calculations made in the 
automotive sector, section 3.2.1), the revenues linked to automated driving hardware and 
software technologies are estimated for both passenger and freight vehicles.  
For this purpose, it becomes necessary to identify possible prices of automated driving 
technologies. This is a challenging task at the moment, given that the cost of automation 
is too uncertain at present and therefore subject to significant changes. Our calculations 
are based on an assumed cost of full automation (level 4/5) for passenger vehicles of 
                                           
(97) According to Tesla Model S quotation in: https://www.tesla.com/it_IT/models/design?redirect=no  (last 
accessed 3 April 2018). 
(98) CLEPA website: https://clepa.eu/who-and-what-we-represent/business-leader/ (last accessed 3 April 2018). 
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around $10,000 by 2025 (from Mosquet et al., 2015), which is also used in Wadud’s TCO 
analysis (2017). Though it could represent a lower bound estimate when compared to other 
sources (e.g. Bansal and Kockelman, 2017). For trucks, £15,000 is used (average of the 
estimated prices for different types of trucks indicated in Wadud, 2017). It could also 
represent a lower bound estimate. Thus, in euros, the cost of full automation is 8,091 and 
16,870 for passenger vehicles and heavy duty vehicles respectively. With a learning rate 
of 10% in the first years that then decreases to 5% and up to 2.5%, prices for full 
automation in 2050 decrease down to 2,406 and 5,016 euros respectively. Level 4 
technologies are assumed to have a similar price to level 5, given that it is believed that 
these two levels of automated driving share hardware and software components. Estimated 
prices for levels 4/5 automation in passenger and commercial vehicles are given in Table 
18 and Table 19 respectively. 
Although it would be logic to assume that a stronger technological development leads to a 
reduction in prices, the uncertainty linked to the quantification of these potential reductions 
on the basis of already uncertain prices has made us assume that prices for AV technologies 
remain the same across different scenarios. 
Table 18. Prices of high/fully automated driving technologies per scenario - passenger transport 
 
PRICES OF LEVEL 4/5 AV TECHNOLOGIES PER 
SCENARIO - PASSENGER TRANSPORT 
2015-2025 2015-2050 
Baseline - - 
Scenario 1. Low 
uptake 
8,091 euros 2,406 euros 
Scenario 2. Medium 
uptake 
8,091 euros 2,406 euros 
Scenario 3. High 
uptake 
8,091 euros 2,406 euros 
Source: Own elaborations. 
Table 19. Prices of high/fully automated driving technologies per scenario - freight transport 
 
PRICES OF LEVEL 4/5 AV TECHNOLOGIES PER 
SCENARIO - FREIGHT TRANSPORT 
2015-2025 2015-2050 
Baseline - - 
Scenario 1. Low 
uptake 
16,870 euros 5,016 euros 
Scenario 2. Medium 
uptake 
16,870 euros 5,016 euros 
Scenario 3. High 
uptake 
16,870 euros 5,016 euros 
Source: Own elaborations. 
Other estimations are made for lower levels of automation. For levels 1, 2 and 3 used in 
passenger vehicles, the following reference data are considered: 
— For level 1: 1,000 euros (according to current ADAS packages offered by some 
manufacturers, KIA, 2018). 
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— For level 2: price is based on the currently available Autopilot from Tesla, which is 
5,600 euros in 2018 (see 97). 
— At this stage, level 3 is assumed to be an average between the price of level 2 and level 
4/5 technologies. 
These prices are assumed to be valid for 2025, in spite of the plausible decreases in prices 
that could be expected in the future. Similar learning rates to the ones applied to level 4/5 
technologies are then applied to estimate the 2050 prices. In particular, level 1 
technologies are assumed to have zero cost by 2050. As assumed in the case of level 4/5 
automation, the same prices are kept throughout the different scenarios. Estimated prices 
for levels 1/2/3 automation in passenger vehicles are given in Table 20. 
Table 20. Prices of levels 1, 2 and 3 automated driving technologies per scenario - passenger 
transport 
 
PRICES OF LEVEL 1/2/3 AV TECHNOLOGIES PER SCENARIO 
- PASSENGER TRANSPORT 
2015-2025 2015-2050 
Baseline - - 
Scenario 1. Low 
uptake 
Level 1: 1,000 euros 
Level 2: 5,600 euros 
Level 3: 6,846 euros 
Level 1: 0 euros 
Level 2: 1,665 euros 
Level 3: 2,035 euros 
Scenario 2. 
Medium uptake 
Level 1: 1,000 euros 
Level 2: 5,600 euros 
Level 3: 6,846 euros 
Level 1: 0 euros 
Level 2: 1,665 euros 
Level 3: 2,035 euros 
Scenario 3. High 
uptake 
Level 1: 1,000 euros 
Level 2: 5,600 euros 
Level 3: 6,846 euros 
Level 1: 0 euros 
Level 2: 1,665 euros 
Level 3: 2,035 euros 
Source: Own elaborations. 
Prices are assumed to be higher for commercial vehicles, as they normally require a higher 
amount of sensors and components that can be more costly than the ones used for 
passenger vehicles. For instance, Roland Berger estimates that trucks would require 
between $4,000 and $7,000 per each automated driving level (99). In the absence of a 
valid representation of possible prices for this vehicle category and given that there is a 
broad variety of vehicle types covered in it, we are providing someway conservative 
estimates of our own for levels 1, 2 and 3, as follows: 
— For level 1: 2,000 euros. 
— For level 2: 8,000 euros. 
— At this stage, similar to the passenger vehicle assumptions, level 3 is assumed to be 
an average between the price of level 2 and level 4/5 technologies. 
Similarly to the passenger vehicle case, learning rates are applied to level 4/5 technologies 
to estimate the 2050 prices and prices are kept the same throughout the different 
scenarios. As for passenger cars, level 1 technologies are assumed to add no cost by 2050. 
Estimated prices for levels 1/2/3 automation in commercial vehicles are given in Table 21. 
                                           
(99) Which excludes the $5,000 premium for a fully-automatic or Automated Mechanical Transmission (AMT) 
needed to make a truck self-driving (Kilcarr, 2015). 
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Table 21. Prices of levels 1, 2 and 3 automated driving technologies per scenario - freight 
transport 
 
PRICES OF LEVEL 1/2/3 AV TECHNOLOGIES PER SCENARIO - 
FREIGHT TRANSPORT 
2015-2025 2015-2050 
Baseline - - 
Scenario 1. 
Low uptake 
Level 1: 2,000 euros 
Level 2: 8,000 euros 
Level 3: 12,435 euros 
Level 1: 0 euros 
Level 2: 2,379 euros 
Level 3: 3,697 euros 
Scenario 2. 
Medium uptake 
Level 1: 2,000 euros 
Level 2: 8,000 euros 
Level 3: 12,435 euros 
Level 1: 0 euros 
Level 2: 2,379 euros 
Level 3: 3,697 euros 
Scenario 3. 
High uptake 
Level 1: 2,000 euros 
Level 2: 8,000 euros 
Level 3: 12,435 euros 
Level 1: 0 euros 
Level 2: 2,379 euros 
Level 3: 3,697 euros 
Source: Own elaborations. 
With the indicated prices of AV technologies (both for passenger and commercial vehicles), 
market shares of AV technologies in each scenario are considered. For this purpose, vehicle 
travel shares by Nieuwenhuijsen et al. (2018) are used as market penetration rates in the 
context of this sector. Given that the corresponding market shares would necessarily be 
higher than the provided travel estimates, we are adopting a more conservative approach 
by assuming these figures to be market estimates. The resulting calculations are given in 
Table 22, Table 23 and Table 24, corresponding to passenger transport (autarky and global 
leadership situations) and freight transport respectively. 
As a conclusion from these analyses, total revenue increases from the sector caused by 
CCAM could amount to approximately 180 billion euros by 2025 for both passenger and 
freight AVs. It is important to highlight that the results from the freight transport sector 
might be overestimated, as the prices of automation might differ significantly among 
different types of commercial vehicles (having considered the price of an AV truck 
technology for all freight transport vehicles in these calculations). Also, the volatile prices 
of CAV technologies make it necessary to warn of the need to interpret these calculations 
with caution. 
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As a result, this could be the range of possible effects for passenger transport: 
Table 22. Potential effects of AVs in the electronics and software sector - passenger transport (Autarky) 
Effects of AVs on the 
electronics and software 
industry – passenger 
transport 
Baseline Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 
2015 2025 2050 2025 2050 2025 2050 2025 2050 
Change in new vehicle sales (%) - +9% +30% +18% +47% +31% +51% +39% +33% 
Number of new vehicles sold 
(million vehicles) 
13.7 14.93 17.81 16.17 20.14 17.95 20.69 19.04 18.22 
Change in new vehicle sales 
(million vehicles) 
- 
+1.23 
(100) 
+4.11 
(100) 
+1.24 +2.33 +3.02 +2.88 +4.11 +0.41 
Revenues per year in self-driving 
software and hardware linked to 
new vehicle sales (billion euros)  
- - - 65 40 110 50 135 45 
Source: Own elaborations. 
  
                                           
(100) The figure represents the change with respect to 2015. 
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Table 23. Potential effects of AVs in the electronics and software sector - passenger transport (Global leadership) 
Effects of AVs on the 
electronics and software 
industry – passenger 
transport 
Baseline Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 
2015 2025 2050 2025 2050 2025 2050 2025 2050 
Change in new vehicle sales (%) - +9% +30% +18% +47% +31% +51% +39% +33% 
Number of new vehicles sold 
(million vehicles) 
16.0 17.4 20.8 18.9 23.5 21.0 24.2 22.2 21.3 
Change in new vehicle sales 
(million vehicles) 
- 
+1.4 
(101) 
+4.8 
(101) 
+1.4 +2.7 +3.5 +3.4 +4.8 +0.5 
Revenues per year in self-driving 
software and hardware linked to 
new vehicle sales (billion euros) 
- - - 75 45 125 60 160 50 
Source: Own elaborations.  
                                           
(101) The figure represents the change with respect to 2015. 
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And this could be the range of possible effects for freight transport: 
Table 24. Potential effects of AVs in the electronics and software sector - freight transport 
Effects of AVs on the 
electronics and software 
industry – freight transport 
Baseline Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 
2015 2025 2050 2025 2050 2025 2050 2025 2050 
Change in new vehicle sales with 
respect to 2015 (%) 
- +19% +38% +19% +38% +24% +53% +29% +68% 
Number of new vehicles sold 
(million vehicles) 
2 2.38 2.76 2.38 2.76 2.48 3.06 2.58 3.36 
Change in new vehicle sales with 
respect to the baseline scenario 
(million vehicles) 
- 0.38 (102) 0.76 (102) 0.00 0.00 0.10 0.30 0.20 0.60 
Revenues per year in self-driving 
software and hardware linked to 
new vehicle sales (billion euros) 
- - - 20 10 30 15 40 15 
Source: Own elaborations. 
 
                                           
(102) The figure represents the change with respect to 2015. 
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3.2.3 Telecommunication, data services and digital media 
3.2.3.1 Scope and size 
This section gathers three specific sectors that are closely interrelated. The 
telecommunication sector is composed of: construction of utility projects for electricity and 
telecommunications, electrical installation and telecommunications. The data services 
sector comprises information services activities. Finally, the digital media one relates to 
retail sales, radio broadcasting and television programming and broadcasting activities, i.e. 
contents such as music, video, games, radio and tv, news, but also interlaced areas such 
as advertising and e-commerce. They are thus highly connected to the data industry.  
Detailed figures corresponding to this sector in Europe are given below (Table 25). 
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Table 25. Indicators of the telecommunication, data services and digital media sectors  
Sector Subsector Description Indicators Value 
Telecommunication 
F42.22 
Construction of utility projects 
for electricity and 
telecommunications 
Number of persons employed 206,661 
Turnover (million euros) 30,486.7 
Number of enterprises  10,839.0 
Personnel costs (million euros) 7,373.6 
Value added (million euros) 9,691.4 
% Persons employed 0.10% 
% GVA 0.10% 
F43.21 Electrical installation 
Number of persons employed 1,535,307 
Turnover (million euros) 160,607.2 
Number of enterprises  372,628.0 
Personnel costs (million euros) 44,324.5 
Value added (million euros) 64,144.0 
% Persons employed 0.71% 
% GVA 0.63% 
J61 Telecommunications 
Number of persons employed 1,046,223 
Turnover (million euros) 390,000.0 
Number of enterprises  46,055.0 (103) 
Personnel costs (million euros) 59,967.6 
Value added (million euros) 170,000.0 
% Persons employed 0.49% 
% GVA 1.33% 
 Total   
Number of persons employed  2,788,191  
Turnover (million euros)  581,094  
Number of enterprises   429,522  
 
                                           
(103) EU-28 value not available; calculated as the sum of the available countries (missing one: Malta). 
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Sector Subsector Description Indicators Value 
 
Total  
(continued) 
 
Value added (million euros)  243,835  
% Persons employed 1.30% 
% GVA 2.06% 
Data services J63 Information service activities 
Number of persons employed 580,338 
Turnover (million euros) 71,067.4 (104) 
Number of enterprises  130,000.0 
Personnel costs (million euros) 21,581.7 (105) 
Value added (million euros) 40,000.0 
% Persons employed 0.27% 
% GVA 0.32% 
Digital Media 
G47.91 
Retail sale via mail order 
houses or via Internet 
Number of persons employed 530,798 
Turnover (million euros) 139,435.5 
Number of enterprises  187,260.0 
Personnel costs  (million euros) 12,127.3 
Value added (million euros) 21,520.1 
% Persons employed 0.25% 
% GVA 0.19% 
J60.10 Radio broadcasting 
Number of persons employed 58,984 
Turnover (million euros) 6,771.7 
Number of enterprises  6,243.0 
Personnel costs (million euros) 2,707.6 
Value added (million euros) 4,744.9 
% Persons employed 0.03% 
% GVA 0.05% 
 
                                           
(104) EU-28 value not available; calculated as the sum of the available countries (missing ones: Ireland, Luxembourg).  
(105) EU-28 value not available; calculated as the sum of the available countries (missing ones: Ireland, Luxembourg).  
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Sector Subsector Description Indicators Value 
Digital Media   
(continued) 
J60.20 
Television programming and 
broadcasting activities 
Number of persons employed 185,582 
Turnover (million euros) 62,603.7 
Number of enterprises  5,416.0 
Personnel costs (million euros) 11,575.4 
Value added  (million euros) 32,305.0 
% Persons employed 0.09% 
% GVA 0.34% 
 Total   
Number of persons employed  775,364  
Turnover  (million euros)  208,811  
Number of enterprises   198,919  
Value added  (million euros) 58,570 
% Persons employed 0.36% 
% GVA 0.58% 
Source: Own elaborations (based on Eurostat data from 2015). 
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3.2.3.2 Challenges and opportunities 
The telecommunication sector has entered the CAV landscape in Europe through the High 
Level Round Table discussions on CAD held since September 2015, as well as through the 
establishment of the European Automotive – Telecom Alliance (EATA) (ACEA, 2016a), 
whose main objective is to promote the wider deployment of CAVs, with a first focus on a 
pre-deployment project for testing CCAM in real settings (ACEA, 2017a). EATA comprises 
6 sectorial associations: ACEA, CLEPA, ETNO, ECTA, GSMA and GSA, which represent 38 
leading European companies, including telecom operators, vendors, automobile 
manufacturers and automotive suppliers. 
It is very difficult to predict how data services will affect the automotive value chain. 
McKinsey&Company (Mohr et al., 2014) predicts that the total cost per VKT will not change 
much but that car data will increase competition in car maintenance and other services, 
thereby creating downward price pressure and reduced value added in these services. The 
question then is how data services will lead to a shift in value-added per VKT, from 
traditional services to data services. With the platformisation of data services we can 
already observe a lot of shifts in value added to data providers in many non-automotive 
related sectors and the same is thus likely to happen in the automotive domain (an on-
going JRC study on car data markets points in this direction, Martens and Müller-Langer, 
forthcoming 2018). In fact, it is expected that 30–40% of the value added in the 
automotive value chain will shift from traditional car manufacturers towards digital 
platforms in the near future (106). European digital platforms are not at scale due to market 
fragmentation and the advance of the key US digital platforms (European Commission, 
2017l). The creation of European digital platforms could be enhanced by ensuring the 
availability of enabling and supporting conditions and a regulatory framework that 
guarantees a level playing-field for businesses (EESC, 2017). The free flow of data is 
identified as a crucial element to avoid problems associated with accessibility, 
interoperability and transfer of data, as well as to secure the right data protection and 
privacy. Access to transport and infrastructure-related mass data from the public sector is 
considered to be important for all users.  
We explore below the growing in-vehicle connectivity trend and data exchanges, linking to 
opportunities for data monetization and value propositions for consumers. 
Vehicle connectivity 
The oncoming application of the eCall Regulation (EU) 2015/758 will clearly accelerate the 
vehicle connectivity trend, as SIM cards will be included in every new vehicle sold from 
April 2018 to serve the emergency-call functionality (107). Connectivity will thus serve as 
support of both safety applications (including automated driving) and new functionalities 
and features for drivers and passengers. There will be more than 28.1 billion connected 
devices by 2020 (World Economic Forum, 2016b) and more than 90% of cars sold by 2020 
will be connected (World Economic Forum, 2016b). Other estimates point at a 75% of new 
vehicles having internet-connected devices by 2020, and to a worldwide 20% of all vehicles 
on the road having some form of wireless connectivity by 2020 (Gillespie, 2016). 
Connectivity features will become a key functionality in future vehicles, which could be 
responsible for vehicle brand changes among future vehicle buyers. This stands on the 
result from Mckinsey&Company, who found that 20% of all new car-buyers would have 
switched car brands for better connectivity features (Mohr et al., 2014). At a global level, 
significant increases in revenues from connectivity are expected, namely, from 
approximately 30 billion euros in 2014 to 170-180 billion euros in 2030 (Mohr et al., 2014). 
Revenues from connectivity features and services are expected to increase from 4% of car 
                                           
(106) European Commission Digital Transformation Monitor Automotive website, available at:  
https://ec.europa.eu/growth/tools-databases/dem/monitor/category/automotive (last accessed 3 April 
2018). 
(107) More information on the interoperable EU-wide eCall can be found in the European Commission Mobility and 
Transport Intelligent Transport Systems website, available at: 
https://ec.europa.eu/transport/themes/its/road/action_plan/ecall_en (last accessed 3 April 2018). 
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life cycle revenues at 2014 to approximately 7% by 2020 in the European premium car 
segment (Mohr et al., 2014). In spite of the global connected car market growth, the overall 
car life cycle revenues are expected to remain stable. Automation has the potential to 
further fuel connectivity-related business models, given the fact that it enables the 
possibility of doing non-driving tasks while travelling. 
The value of data 
Data transmissions are expected to grow substantially (a 12% annual growth to 2030 is 
reported in Leech et al., 2015), as vehicles are becoming part of a complex ecosystem 
where communication is an essential part (Landau, 2017). Upcoming 5G networks, which 
are expected to become available from 2020, will allow for a reliable, robust and pervasive 
wireless network to unlock the true potential of automated driving. These 5G networks will 
be essential in supporting the estimated 4,000 GB of data per day that an AV could 
generate, and that will need to be shared with other vehicles, infrastructure, the network 
and eventually, data centres. The global market for V2X technologies in 2030 is projected 
to reach around 14.8 billion dollars and will be more than 30 billion dollars from 2035 
onwards (Statista, 2015b). 
The development of a data economy comes as a result of the digital transformation of the 
automotive industry, which is one of the most data generation-intensive industries across 
the world (second only after the utilities sector) (World Economic Forum, 2016b). Both 
commercial and social benefits are expected from it. In particular, by 2025, data exchanges 
are estimated to create $36 billion of operating profits for OEMS, mainly from third-party 
monetisation and reduced cost of data acquisition (World Economic Forum, 2016b). 
However, monetizing the massive amount of car generated data is still in its nascent stages 
(Bertoncello et al., 2016). 
Data holds significant monetisation potential, whether it is in-motion data (like speed, tire 
pressure, etc.) or data regarding customer opinions and moods and driving experiences 
(European Commission, 2017l). McKinsey&Company envisages the car data market could 
generate as much as $750 billion in revenues by 2030 (ranging precisely from $450 to 
$750 billion as stated in Bertoncello et al., 2016). A rough estimation for EU based on 
global shares (according to the 19% EU share of global passenger cars registrations/sales 
in 2015 from ACEA, 2016b) leads to a range of approximately 70-120 billion euros in 
revenues from monetization of car data in 2030. 
Consumer MaaS represents the largest revenue opportunity in the Passenger Economy 
valued at US$ 3.7 trillion, with services evolving from currently emerging business offerings 
like on-demand transport, work-commute sharing or event/theme-optimized vehicles 
(Lanctot, 2017). Businesses will expand by creating “mobile stores” that deliver goods and 
services directly to the consumer, eliminating the costly elements of staff and place (Peters, 
2017). The second largest revenue source of the Passenger Economy is based on business 
use of MaaS (Lanctot, 2017). Long-haul trucks and other commercial transport solutions 
based on smaller trucks or vans for local delivery will be used. A third smaller portion of 
Passenger Economy revenues will be coming from new consumer and B2B services and 
applications, e.g. experience pods from General Motors and Lyft or pod fleet management 
services (Lanctot, 2017). 
Revenues from pay-per-use services are expected to surpass the revenues from optional 
on board equipment from 2025 onwards (Römer et al., 2016). Technology companies like 
Google or Apple might follow a model based on pay per use, fees, flat subscription prices 
or licensing, and their profit margins could reach 10-15% or even 20-22%. Important 
revenue sources could be (Römer et al., 2016): 
— Giving consumers value-adding services like city guides, local deals, automated 
parking, etc. in exchange for their personal data 
— Monetizing customer data through a network of third-party content and service 
providers. 
 73 
Digital features and mobile services are growing into key factors for customer 
differentiation, at the same time that hardware increasingly becomes a commodity. Unique 
customer experience provides for additional differentiation (European Commission, 2017l). 
OEMs, suppliers and digital players can act as digital enablers, digital augmented product 
providers, digital service providers or aggregators of data and audiences (European 
Commission, 2017l). 
Mobile apps for V2V telematics and V2X communication will reach $86 billion by 2030 and 
$109 billion by 2035 (Römer et al., 2016). The importance of the connected vehicle market 
was already emphasized in the previous section 3.2.2. 
Value of travel time 
A recent estimate indicates that 1.9 trillion minutes will be freed up for users travelling as 
passengers in an AV by 2030, a figure that would increase up to 5.1 trillion minutes by 
2035 (Römer et al., 2016). The average amount of 20 minutes that users spend online 
every day at present (2.4 billion people, 800 million hours per day, ACEA, 2016c) could 
increase in consideration of a future automated driving scenario. Clements and Kockelman 
(2017) hypothesize, on the basis of a Mckinsey&Company study (Lienert, 2015), that $14 
billion could be generated annually linked to online shopping, if only 5% of the average 
commuting time is spent on digital media in a future CAV. It is also important to note that 
the opportunity cost of time in cars may change and open up possibilities for other 
activities, much of which will not necessarily be related to media.   
For instance, in the UK, a driver spends 274 h/year driving. If this time could be used to 
improve individual productivity, economic benefits of £20 billion could be gained for the 
whole UK (Leech et al., 2015 as cited by Wadud, 2017). The value of travel time, which is 
one of the largest components in the full generalized cost of travel, is expected to reduce 
significantly in level 4/5 vehicles, as drivers can engage in useful non-driving tasks (Wadud 
et al., 2016). The Value of Travel Time Saved (VTTS) increases as a function of trip purpose 
(business-related trips have the highest VTTS of all trips) as well as a function of income 
(the higher the income, the higher the VTTS) (Wadud, 2017). For passenger cars, VTTS 
reductions have been estimated at a 25%, 40% and 60% for pessimistic, baseline and 
optimistic scenarios respectively (Wadud, 2017). 
Connectivity-enabled features hold a great potential to generate significant redistribution 
of revenues (European Commission, 2017b). A CAGR of 24.3% is estimated in the period 
from 2017 to 2022 covering product and service packages related to safety, autonomous 
driving and connected services (Baker et al., 2016). Total revenues could amount to $155.9 
billion by 2022, from $35.5 billion in 2015. Within these revenues, the share corresponding 
to autonomous driving is expected to surpass that of connected services by 2022. With 
increasing opportunities, competition also becomes greater with new entrants from non-
automotive sectors. 
A future where mobility is offered for free could become real (Bertoncello et al., 2016; 
Arbib and Seba, 2017) offering the possibility of higher brand exposure and sales as well 
as better customer experiences (Bertoncello et al., 2016). 
A main challenge is to face the cybersecurity risk of connected vehicles, which can 
compromise the privacy of users’ data, as well as their safety. In this context, the 
reputation of AVs and their manufacturers/suppliers is at stake, should a cybersecurity 
attack become real, affecting users’ trust on AV technologies. 
Finally, some references on the willingness of users to share data and use/pay for in-vehicle 
services are given in Box 3. 
Box 3. The users’ perspective 
Users’ willingness to share data is growing over time but the concern on which use is made 
on the data is also increasing (European Commission, 2017m). An initial pre-condition is 
to provide customers with value propositions that they find worth the cost, on the basis of 
the benefits they bring.  
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In particular, McKinsey&Company identified 30 use cases with car data monetization 
potential, some of which are enabled by a fully automated driving (e.g. movies or games), 
others that increase their value thanks to it (e.g. using the car as a platform for selling 
features or products) and others whose value decrease as a result of full autonomy (e.g. 
suggestions about driving style). McKinsey&Company (Bertoncello et al., 2016) found that 
users are in general mostly interested in data services that contribute to make mobility 
safer or more convenient, as well as in those that help them save time or money. If safety 
or convenience advantages are linked to a given service, a great majority of users are 
willing to share personal data. Age seems to be a relevant factor, with young people being 
more open to adopt data services (in line with Dungs et al., 2016). The same holds true 
for users that travel often (more than 20 h/week), compared to occasional drivers.  
Monetization can take place either integrated in the vehicle price, as a one-time purchase 
after the vehicle purchase, through a subscription or rechargeable credit or free of charge 
in exchange of receiving advertising (Bertoncello et al., 2016). Some important economic 
considerations around multi-sided markets in digital car data can be found in Martens and 
Müller-Langer (forthcoming 2018). In-vehicle technologies, supported by infrastructural 
technologies and back-end processes are the main enablers of car data monetization, 
without forgetting the use of other devices like smartphones or tablets (Bertoncello et al., 
2016). Data management capabilities are required, which can represent a significant 
challenge for incumbent players like OEMs and Tier-1 suppliers (Bertoncello et al., 2016). 
The players in this field range from technology companies and start-ups to alternative 
mobility operators, data management service providers, insurers, roadside assistance 
providers and infrastructure operators (Bertoncello et al., 2016). In this context, strategic 
partnerships become increasingly necessary. 
Similar to Bertoncello et al. (2016), a 2015 user survey identified 21 value-added services 
covering communication, productivity, basic requirements, well-being, information and 
entertainment needs (Dungs et al., 2016).                                                                                                                                                                       
The survey study concluded that a noteworthy majority of users (75% on average across 
3 regions, including Germany, US and Japan) are prepared to pay in order to organize their 
time freely in the car through the use of value-added services (Dungs et al., 2016). The 
average monthly amount that users would be willing to pay across all needs ranges 
between approximately 150 euros and 190 euros depending on the usage scenario.  
Factors such as personal mileage, user’s vehicle segment, or age of the user will affect the 
willingness to pay for these new services (Dungs et al., 2016). For instance, drivers of mid-
sized or high-end vehicles are more willing to pay for services than drivers of small cars 
and younger users are prepared to pay more than their old counterparts.  
There are also regional differences pointing at e.g. a higher acceptance of services among 
Japanese users compared to German ones, which can partially be explained by their 
tendency to be more open to new technologies (Dungs et al., 2016). Users from the US 
demonstrated the highest willingness to pay for these services, which correlates with daily 
travel time spent in the car (the higher the time spent travelling, the higher the willingness 
to play; although even in short trips, users exhibited willingness to pay for value-added 
services).  
Also, the types of services differ according to the time spent in the car (Dungs et al., 2016). 
Given this correlation, the study concludes that the services offered have to be adapted to 
the usage time in the respective market. The value of travel time gives a clear indication 
of how much an extra hour of free time in a day is worth in monetary terms to an individual 
and depends on the country, age group, income and vehicle segment of a user. This study 
found that the value of travel time is highest among German respondents (i.e. 18 euros), 
young people (i.e. 29 euros for users in the 18-25 years old group), high earners (i.e. 23 
euros for users earning between 75,000 and 99,999 euros a year) and drivers of sport cars 
(who give a value of time of 22 euros). 
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Conclusion 
Overall, the effects of CCAM on the telecommunication, data services and digital media 
sectors are expected to be positive. Although specific estimations have not been made for 
this sector, it would be possible to draw a preliminary approximation to the potential effects 
from current literature. This way, according to McKinsey&Company projections (Bertoncello 
et al., 2016), it is possible to identify an upper bound of 120 billion euros in revenues from 
monetization of car data by 2030 in Europe. If the McKinsey&Company projections hold 
true, the telecommunication, data services and digital media sectors could potentially face 
a significant increase in turnovers in the future, in the case these sectors will benefit from 
the mentioned increase, i.e. if they will retain the property of the gathered data. But 
competition for car data is clearly strong and regulation aspects will play a significant role 
in influencing the market competition. The effects in these sectors are understood to be 
mostly dependent on the connectivity trend, but we could expect a reinforcement effect 
from vehicle automation, i.e.: the higher the level of automation, the higher the driving 
time that is freed to perform non-driving activities (and thus, to demand for new services). 
3.2.4 Freight transport 
3.2.4.1 Scope and size 
Within the freight transport sector, we have considered freight rail transport, freight 
transport by road, removal services, sea and coastal freight water transport, inland freight 
water transport, renting and leasing of trucks. While the focus of our study is put on road 
transport, the other modes are also taken into account, given the potential shifts in modal 
choices that can occur following the automation of road transport. 
With the whole transport and storage services sector employing around 11 million people 
and accounting for near 5% of total GVA in the EU-28 in 2015 (European Commission, 
2017a), the sector plays an important role in the global economic activity and has a large 
impact on growth and employment. Specifically, EU data suggests that more than 3 million 
people work for the freight sector (considering the freight transport sector, as we have 
defined it for the purpose of this study), and that it accounts for approximately 1.4% of 
EU-28 GVA. In 2015, 3,516 billion tonne-kilometre (tkm) were transported in EU-28 (intra-
EU air and sea transport included, transport activities between the EU and the rest of the 
world excluded) (European Commission, 2017a). Road transport was the predominant 
mode of transport, accounting for 49% of the total, followed by maritime transport, with a 
share of 31.6%. Rail transport, inland waterways and air transport accounted respectively 
for 11.9%, 4.2% and 3.3%. During the last ten years the modal split pattern has not 
changed, road and maritime transport have remained the modes of transport mainly used 
for moving freight in Europe, even though the increase registered, in billion tkm, is much 
higher for road transport, 33.7%, than for maritime transport, 19.5%. 
Detailed figures corresponding to this sector in Europe are given below (Table 26).
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Table 26. Indicators of the freight transport sector  
Sector  Subsector  Description  Indicators Value 
Freight transport 
H49.2 Freight rail transport 
Number of persons employed 137,530 
Turnover (million euros) 19,546.3 
Number of enterprises  638.0 
Personnel costs  (million euros) 4,477.0 
Value added (million euros) 5,857.1 
% Persons employed 0.06% 
% GVA 0.06% 
H49.41 Freight transport by road 
Number of persons employed 2,991,227 
Turnover (million euros) 328,129.8 
Number of enterprises  558,745.0 
Personnel costs  (million euros) 69,876.6 
Value added (million euros) 110,986.5 
% Persons employed 1.39% 
% GVA 1.05% 
H49.42 Removal services 
Number of persons employed 70,000 
Turnover (million euros) 6,000.0 
Number of enterprises  11,226.0 (108) 
Personnel costs  (million euros) 1,996.0 
Value added (million euros) 2,461.0 (109) 
% Persons employed 0.03% 
% GVA 0.02% 
  
                                           
(108) EU-28 value not available; calculated as the sum of the available countries (missing ones: Ireland, Spain).  
(109) EU-28 value not available; calculated as the sum of the available countries (missing ones: Estonia, Ireland, Spain).  
 77 
Sector  Subsector  Description  Indicators Value 
Freight transport 
(continued) 
H50.2 
Sea and coastal freight 
water transport 
Number of persons employed 89,881 
Turnover (million euros) 92,844.7 
Number of enterprises  5,515.0 
Personnel costs  (million euros) 6,121.2 
Value added (million euros) 16,940.2 
% Persons employed 0.04% 
% GVA 0.19% 
H50.4 
Inland freight water 
transport 
Number of persons employed 20,324 (110) 
Turnover (million euros) 5,673.4 
Number of enterprises  5,800.0 
Personnel costs  (million euros) 612.1 
Value added (million euros) 803.5 (111) 
% Persons employed 0.01% 
% GVA 0.01% 
N77.12 
Renting and leasing of 
trucks 
Number of persons employed 24,408 (112) 
Turnover (million euros) 8,444.6 (113) 
Number of enterprises  6,694.0 
Personnel costs  (million euros) 802.0 (114) 
Value added (million euros) 4,032.5 (115) 
% Persons employed 0.01% 
% GVA 0.04% 
  
                                           
(110) EU-28 value not available; calculated as the sum of the available countries (missing ones: Denmark, France, Luxembourg, Austria, Portugal, Slovenia, Finland). 
(111) EU-28 value not available; calculated as the sum of the available countries (missing ones: Denmark, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Austria, Portugal, Slovenia, Finland).  
(112) EU-28 value not available; calculated as the sum of the available countries (missing ones: Czech Republic, Ireland, Spain, Luxembourg, Malta, Austria).  
(113) EU-28 value not available; calculated as the sum of the available countries (missing ones: Czech Republic, Ireland, Spain, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Austria).  
(114) EU-28 value not available; calculated as the sum of the available countries (missing ones: Czech Republic, Ireland, Spain, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Austria).  
(115) EU-28 value not available; calculated as the sum of the available countries (missing ones: Czech Republic, Ireland, Spain, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Austria).  
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Sector  Subsector  Description  Indicators Value 
 Total   
Number of persons employed  3,333,370  
Turnover (million euros)  460,639  
Number of enterprises   588,618  
Value added (million euros)  141,081  
% Persons employed 1.55% 
% GVA 1.37% 
Source: Own elaborations (based on Eurostat data from 2015). 
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3.2.4.2 Challenges and opportunities 
Vehicle autonomy can act as a transformational technology by reducing operating costs 
and improving the reliability of deliveries (World Economic Forum, 2016a). This will be 
extremely relevant given the significant road travel increases in this sector (116). An 
additional advantage is that truck drivers could be more productive by e.g. handling 
logistics and maintenance issues that currently constitute a dangerous distraction while 
driving (World Economic Forum, 2016a). CAV technologies could impact last-mile deliveries 
to consumers but especially, B2B logistics (World Economic Forum, 2016a). 
Truck platooning, which seems to be a near future application of CAV technologies (e.g. 
Peloton, Volvo as indicated in BI Intelligence, 2017), has the potential to produce many 
positive effects in the transport sectors, which may impact traffic management, operational 
transport features and transhipment operations (Tavasszy and Janssen, 2016). Traffic 
could be reduced due to a decrease of congestion, increasing crossings capacity and 
improved visibility due to automation. The transport activities could be affected positively 
due to fuel reduction, longer distance covered and alternative tasks allocated to drivers. 
On the transhipment activities, the effects could be an increase in efficiency in container 
terminal and distribution centres planning, together with the employment of platooning for 
inter-terminal transport. Additional positive effects of platooning on the transport sector 
are also included in Krause et al. (forthcoming 2018) as well as other possible fuel efficiency 
mechanisms linked to automation and expected to be observed by 2050, like smoothening 
speed, reduction of urban parking search and increase in the freight system coordination. 
We explore below some effects of truck automation on commercial vehicles operation. 
Fuel/energy consumption and emissions 
The two most costly elements in commercial vehicles operation are fuel and drivers, both 
of which can be reduced through truck automation (Gundermann et al., 2015). When it 
comes to fuel savings, truck platooning could decrease fuel consumption by 2-8% for the 
leading vehicle and 8-13% for the following vehicle (SARTRE, 2014, as cited in Janssen et 
al., 2015). Platooning has the potential to decrease fuel consumption by up to 12% (World 
Economic Forum, 2016a; (117)) or even 20% (Chu, 2016) thanks to reduced aerodynamic 
drag. Peloton found that a two-truck convoy improved the fuel efficiency of the lead truck 
by 4.5%, while the rear truck saw a 10% boost (BI Intelligence, 2017). Fuel savings 
between 5% and 15% are indicated in another source (CLEPA, 2017). 
Moreover, if both the use of alternative energy sources and platooning are considered, a 
30% cut in energy consumption is expected to be achieved (Römer et al., 2016). 
Besides, based on the assumption that autonomous trucks will be sold in developed 
markets from 2020 and will attain a market penetration of 5% on new truck sales in 
developed markets by 2025, societal benefits in the form of a reduction of 25 million metric 
tons in emissions have been accounted by the WEF (World Economic Forum, 2016a). The 
reductions of CO2 emissions due to platooning deployment have been calculated in the 
SARTRE Project, where the reduction of CO2 emissions could range from 7% up to 16% 
from the trailing vehicles and from 1% up to 8% from the lead vehicle (SARTRE, 2014). In 
line with the SARTRE Project, ERTRAC experts expect the CO2 emissions decrease due to 
the introduction of platooning to be in the range of 5% to 12% in 2050 for trucks above 
12 tons on highways (Krause et al., forthcoming 2018). Platooning is therefore beneficial 
for the environment (Janssen et al., 2015). 
 
                                           
(116) E.g. as discussed in 3.2.1 and as indicated for instance by ITF, the volume of road freight transport will 
almost quadruple from 2010 to 2050, available at: https://www.itf-oecd.org/global-trade-international-
freight-transport-quadruple-2050 (last accessed 12 April 2018); see also the data from the EU Reference 
Scenario 2016 in Annex 2.  
(117) Platooning – automated driving site from Scania, available at: 
https://www.scania.com/group/en/platooning-automated-driving-for-fuel-savings/  (last accessed 4 April 
2018) 
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Labour costs 
Overall operational costs could be decreased by 28% in 2025, compared to the 2016 
situation (Nowak et al., 2016). Among three categories of cost (fixed, variable and driver 
costs), the driver’s cost is the one that would experience the greater decrease (Nowak et 
al., 2016). An analysis of the labour costs savings linked to different platooning business 
cases is given in Box 4. 
Box 4. Platooning business cases 
An analysis of possible cost/benefits deriving from platooning introduction in three real-life 
business cases has been undertaken in Janssen et al. (2015), where, according to carriers’ 
own estimations and authors validation, an estimation of possible savings has been made, 
which would lead to up to 32,300 euros per truck/year.  
In their analysis, the labour cost of the drivers has been considered looking at two 
platooning scenarios, which foresee an initial situation with two drivers and a more 
advanced stage with only one driver for two trucks. In the case of two drivers, one is 
assumed to rest while the truck drives autonomously, the two trucks would change position 
periodically, hence the resting time would be reduced comparing to the current situation. 
In their business case, according to the information collected by interviewed carriers, 45 
minutes of resting times could be saved per driver per workday. In the case of only one 
driver, and considering that still some other tasks need to be performed, e.g. 
loading/unloading, the estimation that they provide is that about 15% to 25% of the labour 
time could be saved.  
According to their estimation and, clearly, to the level of implementation of the technology, 
this would potentially lead to an increase in the utilization of the truck. The trucks could be 
used more efficiently and drive for more kilometres; the time gained in resting time could 
be then used for additional operational employment of the truck.  
A recent study by Andersson and Ivehammar (2018) found positive effects for self-driving 
trucks both in 2030 and 2050, with driver cost savings being the most important benefit. 
Benefits increase over time, given the expected larger shares of AVs and the reduction in 
capital costs. 
As it is also confirmed in Wadud (2017), driver salaries represent a large share of direct 
costs in commercial vehicle operations. A 60% reduction in salary costs is assumed for 
autonomous trucks, given that the remaining 40% is expected to be required for 
loading/unloading at origin and destination (Wadud, 2017). Automation can lead to labour 
cost reduction according to its stage of implementation. Starting from increase in 
productivity and strain reduction, at the early stage of implementation, up to the possibility 
to accomplish other tasks when reaching higher level of automation (Securing America’s 
Future Energy, 2017). 
The role of a professional driver can be radically transformed in the future (starting with 
early platooning applications), gradually undertaking other duties than driving and possibly 
turning into a more technical role (Clements and Kockelman, 2017). To which extent this 
will lead to a reduction in the number of drivers needed still remains an unanswered 
question that deserves careful attention. It is also important to stress that CAV 
technologies could help to compensate the shortage of long-haul drivers (Lanctot, 2017), 
as e.g. Germany is expecting to lose around 250,000 drivers who will retire in the next 10 
to 15 years (Hollis, 2016). Effects of CCAM on truck driver jobs are further discussed in 
the employment section below (section 3.3.1). 
Other benefits 
The positive effects of platooning introduction are expected to be seen also in safety. As 
the human error effect would be reduced, it is expected to have a reduction in accidents. 
(Janssen et al., 2015). It is uncertain thought, due to the lack of quantitative estimation 
of the impact of platooning in safety, how important the effect could be. 
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According to the same authors, the introduction of platooning could also lead to an 
optimization of the road capacity due the reduction in distance between the trucks. In their 
calculation, the length of road occupied by two platooning trucks could decrease by 46% 
compared to the current situation without platooning. This would possible imply longer 
road’s life and also investment in road projects could be postponed. 
These benefits would justify the idea that this sector becomes one of the early adopters of 
CAV technologies (Wadud, 2017) considering, nonetheless, that technical and legislative 
constraints will contribute to define the pace at which this phenomenon will maximise social 
benefits and minimize risks (Securing America’s Future Energy, 2017).  
The potential for increases in road travel as a result of commercial vehicles automation 
remains largely unknown, but the range of positive effects underlined above would seem 
valid arguments to expect a more intensified freight transport activity by road in future 
CCAM scenarios (see calculations made for the automotive sector, section 3.2.1). 
Conclusion 
To sum up, the effects of CCAM in the freight transport sector are expected to be positive, 
following the identified savings (e.g. fuel, labour) and other benefits (efficiency, safety). 
These positive effects will be clearly linked to the automation levels, with most of the 
benefits expected to be materialised in scenarios where full automation is reached. 
3.2.5 Passenger transport 
3.2.5.1 Scope and size 
The passenger transport sector is a combination of the following economic sectors: 
passenger rail transport, passenger land transport (including taxi), passenger air transport 
and car rental/leasing. Different modes of transport have been selected in order to reflect 
possible modal shifts in the context of automation in driving, having knowledge of the 
relevance of each respective sector. 
Total EU-28 passenger transport activities, in 2015, are estimated to account for 6,602 
billion passenger-kilometre (pkm) (including intra-EU air and sea transport but not 
transport activities between the EU and the rest of the world) (European Commission, 
2017a). The great majority of the people moved with cars, accounting for 71.5% of the 
total. Intra-EU air transport contributed for 9.8%, followed by buses and coaches, 8.2% 
and railways accounting for 6.7% of the total. During the last ten years, passengers cars 
increased by 20.9%, leading to a slightly decrease in the modal split, while air transport, 
saw an increase of 86.5% and maritime transport is the only mode of transport less 
frequently chosen in Europe, which registered a decrease equal to 29.7% during the same 
period. 
Detailed figures corresponding to this sector in Europe are given below (Table 27). 
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Table 27. Indicators of the passenger transport sector  
Sector  Subsector  Description  Indicators Value 
Passenger Transport 
H49.10 
Passenger rail transport, 
interurban 
Number of persons employed 358,917 
Turnover (million euros) 54,566.5 
Number of enterprises  290.0 
Personnel costs  (million euros) 18,912.6 
Value added (million euros) 25,490.7 
% Persons employed 0.17% 
% GVA 0.24% 
H49.31 
Urban and suburban 
passenger land transport 
Number of persons employed 895,780 
Turnover (million euros) 79,161.7 
Number of enterprises  14,885.0 
Personnel costs  (million euros) 33,167.4 
Value added (million euros) 47,583.1 
% Persons employed 0.42% 
% GVA 0.45% 
H49.32 Taxi operation 
Number of persons employed 614,055 
Turnover (million euros) 22,827.1 
Number of enterprises  306,765.0 
Personnel costs  (million euros) 6,599.4 
Value added (million euros) 13,408.3 
% Persons employed 0.29% 
% GVA 0.13% 
H49.39 
Other passenger land 
transport not elsewhere 
classified (n.e.c.) 
Number of persons employed 546,527 
Turnover (million euros) 37,818.5 
Number of enterprises  49,885.0 
Personnel costs  (million euros) 13,875.3 
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Sector  Subsector  Description  Indicators Value 
Passenger Transport 
(continued) 
H49.39 
(continued) 
Other passenger land 
transport not elsewhere 
classified (n.e.c.)          
(continued) 
Value added (million euros) 20,489.7 
% Persons employed 0.25% 
% GVA 0.19% 
H51.10 Passenger air transport 
Number of persons employed 344,455 
Turnover (million euros) 134,026.1 
Number of enterprises  4,000.0 
Personnel costs  (million euros) 23,325.1 
Value added (million euros) 31,720.8 
% Persons employed 0.16% 
% GVA 0.30% 
N77.11 
Renting and leasing of 
cars and light motor 
vehicles 
Number of persons employed 148,297 
Turnover (million euros) 66,028.4 
Number of enterprises  35,142.0 
Personnel costs  (million euros) 4,974.5 
Value added (million euros) 36,265.5 
% Persons employed 0.07% 
% GVA 0.38% 
 Total   
Number of persons employed 2,908,031  
Turnover (million euros)  394,428  
Number of enterprises   410,967  
Value added (million euros)  174,958  
% Persons employed 1.35% 
% GVA 1.69% 
Source: Own elaborations (based on Eurostat data from 2015). 
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3.2.5.2 Challenges and opportunities 
Long-term personal travel patterns show that the time spent travelling has remained stable 
over the last 50 years, at around an hour a day, following also the so called Marchetti’s 
constant of one hour commuting per day (Marchetti, 1994). Whereas trips and time spent 
travelling have not changed much along this period, distance travelled has increased 
meaningfully (namely by 71% since 1965) (UK Department for Transport, 2015). Car 
availability of households has also increased, with a large growth in multi-car households: 
from 5% of households that had two or more cars/vans in 1965 to 32% in 2014.  
Vehicle ownership varies across the EU Member States, but in recent years, at least a 50% 
of households own at least one car (ACEA, 2017b). 
Modes of travel have also changed, showing a rise in the use of the car over other modes 
such as bus or bicycle. With a growing demand for mobility, new attitudes to it are also 
emerging. 
We explore below how automation might impact mode choice in the future, including shifts 
from taxi, public transport, train, walking or cycling towards AVs. 
Modal shifts 
In Fraedrich et al. (2016), the users perspective on possible implications of AVs in mobility 
behaviour was captured through interviews conducted with a sample of transport users. 
The respondents were asked how they would think that the introduction of AVs could affect 
their mode choice. The transport means considered were: taxi, public transport, train and 
foot/bike. The biggest decline in usage was foreseen for taxi, as it would be expectable, 
while the less affected could be walking and biking. In their analysis, the authors pointed 
out that a possible increase in car usage could be seen for inexperienced, insecure or 
elderly drivers leading to growth in car ownership and decline in public transport modes. 
In the end, a shared automated taxi trip could be so economic that it would compete with 
public transport and offer door-to-door mobility. 
According to the POLIS document of road automation in cities (POLIS, 2018; specifically 
the studies from ITF and city of Amsterdam-commissioned study Impact of self-driving 
vehicles on the city of Amsterdam), the increased use of autonomous cars would be on 
detrimental to more sustainable modes, such as public transport, walking and cycling 
leading to an increase of kilometres travelled, hence causing congestion increase and 
possible negative effects on public health. According to the study, since price would not 
play anymore a key role in car ownership, the automation option would be chosen more 
frequently due to the possibility to use the driving time for other activities. 
A decline in transit demand is also observed in the study by Levin and Boyles (2015), as a 
result of the avoidance of parking costs through the option of a drop-off and return trip 
enabled by AVs. A reduction in public transport cost sufficient to be competitive against 
the avoidance of parking fees (just the additional fuel consumption of a round trip) seems 
difficult to achieve. The authors point at road congestion issues that will appear as a result 
of the additional trips but the enhanced capacity features enabled by AVs seem to offset 
potential network problems. Since higher congestion also means higher fuel consumption, 
lower Value-of-Time (VOT) travellers may have an incentive to use transit. 
Operating costs and user preferences 
How autonomous cars will affect other modes of transport will change also according to 
the operating costs and users preferences linked to the different options. According to 
estimations provided in Litman (2018), operational costs will be relatively higher in AVs 
than human driven cars, but less costly compared to taxis. In the future, it would be 
cheaper to share AVs than use taxis or human car-sharing. A few considerations about the 
expected costs of operation of different transport modes is given in Box 5. 
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Box 5. Changes in operational costs of different transport modes with automation and 
MaaS 
Cars as a service could offer the same level of service than the one offered by car ownership 
but at a much reduced cost, namely 10 times cheaper (Arbib and Seba, 2017). The asset 
utilisation will increase manifold from a roughly 4% (as vehicles are parked 96% of the 
time) to around 90% of the time. 
It can also be argued that, even if costs are likely to decrease in a MaaS mobility scenario 
as a result of higher vehicle utilization, by making prices more transparent, travelling by 
car can appear to be more expensive (Gruel and Stanford, 2016). 
The cost of conveying one passenger-mile by robo-taxi would be 35% less than using a 
conventional taxi at an average taxi occupancy rate of 1.2 passengers and will compete 
with owning a private vehicle when occupancy rate is 2 (Mosquet et al., 2015). This could 
affect vehicle sales and reduce the number of vehicles. Robo-taxis could even reach a price 
of $1 per mile or less, competing with public transport (Römer et al., 2016). 
In case of autonomous taxis, as referred in Wadud (2017), professional driver costs could 
be significantly reduced but not completely, as it will still be required to consider operations 
such as back office infrastructure, additional equipment in vehicles for ensuring safety, etc. 
Thus between 20% and 40% of today’s salary costs would at least be required.   
A reduction of fuel consumption would also contribute to lowering operational costs. Wadud 
(2017) conservatively estimates fuel savings with AVs to be between 5% and 10% of 
current fuel consumption (Wadud, 2017).  
Operational cost is just one factor affecting transport demand, which is also influenced by 
other components such as changing user preferences, improved travel options, 
demographic trends, price changes, planning innovations and ITS (Litman, 2018). 
In the context of pursuing an enhanced multimodal mobility, it becomes clear that users’ 
choices will be influenced by the increased road automation. 
Conclusion 
To conclude, changes in the shares of use of different transport modes could seem likely 
in a future CCAM scenario, although it is not possible to quantify those at the present stage. 
Price is identified as an important factor affecting users’ decision making, but other factors 
like users’ preferences, among others, would also play a key role.   
3.2.6 Insurance 
3.2.6.1 Scope and size 
In the context of this study, the insurance sector is formed of two main economic activity 
groups: non-life insurance and reinsurance. About half million people work in these 
industries, making up a 0.8% of the total EU-28 GVA. 
Detailed figures corresponding to this sector in Europe are given below (Table 28). 
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Table 28. Indicators of the insurance sector  
Sector  Subsector  Description  Indicators Value 
Insurance 
K65.12 Non-life insurance 
Number of persons employed 470,835 
Turnover (million euros) 348,938.3 
Number of enterprises  2,257.0 
Personnel costs (million euros) 29,243.5 
Value added (million euros) 53,030.7 
% Persons employed 0.22% 
% GVA 0.68% 
K65.2 Reinsurance 
Number of persons employed 14,282 
Turnover (million euros) 82,851.4 
Number of enterprises  91.0 
Personnel costs (million euros) 2,905.2 
Value added (million euros) 10,677.2 
% Persons employed 0.01% 
% GVA 0.09% 
 Total   
Number of persons employed  485,117  
Turnover (million euros)  431,790  
Number of enterprises   2,348  
Value added (million euros)  63,707.9 
% Persons employed 0.23% 
% GVA 0.77% 
Source: Own elaborations (based on Eurostat data from 2015). 
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3.2.6.2 Challenges and opportunities 
The insurance sector is said to face a significant disruption with the advent of CAVs. While 
CAVs may reduce the premiums linked to motor vehicle insurance, they will also create 
new insurance opportunities in relation to product liability or cybersecurity. The need for 
changing and adapting insurers’ business models has already been recognised (e.g. Karp 
et al., 2017). 
We explore below some of the main impacts from an increased vehicle automation and 
connectivity to the insurance sector. 
Improved road safety 
Road safety improvements are already taking place, especially as a result of ITS, assistance 
technologies and the corresponding policy and legal changes that have occurred in the last 
decade (e.g. ITS Directive 2010/40/EU (118)). In this context, the potential of different 
driving assistance systems and CAVs to reduce accidents has been extensively mentioned 
in the literature and media (Anderson et al., 2014; Kyriakidis et al., 2015b). In particular, 
Römer et al. (2016) indicate a 70% traffic accidents decrease with AVs, supported by 
interviews with industry experts. Another study indicates a crash rate decrease from 4.2 
accidents per million miles (corresponding to average human driving) to 3.2 accidents per 
million miles (Blanco et al., 2016 as cited in European Commission, 2017b), which 
corresponds to a 24% decrease. However, assuming 0% fatalities for CAVs does not seem 
realistic at this point in time, as certain types of accidents will hardly be avoided (e.g. 
jaywalking pedestrians, brake failure) (Sivak and Schoettle, 2015). In addition, during the 
transition period where mixed traffic will share the roads, safety may actually worsen, at 
least for conventional vehicles that lack eye contact feedback with CAV vehicles and will 
have certain expectations of other vehicles’ behaviour (Sivak and Schoettle, 2015). These 
authors also note that it cannot be taken for granted that CAVs would ever perform safer 
than an experienced middle-age driver.  
The expectation is that a reduction in the number of accidents and associated fatalities and 
injuries will lower insurance premiums. For instance, a 10% reduction of the insurance 
premium is already offered by the UK insurance industry for cars that have a collision 
avoidance system (Palmer, 2015 as cited in Wadud, 2017). Nevertheless, discounts are 
not offered across all Europe in a harmonised way, but just in some specific countries. This 
is linked to the difficulties in identifying in a systematic way the specific technologies that 
are equipped in a vehicle and the safety benefits associated to them.  
Higher value of CAV technologies 
Another aspect of relevance is that the higher value of a CAV will lead to additional 
premiums, that are to be applied to the corresponding share of premium (at present, a 
30% of the insurance premium is for the car and 70% for the person, Miller, A., 2015 as 
cited in Wadud, 2017). Wadud (2017) estimates a 20% reduction of the insurance premium 
in early stages of fully automated vehicles deployment. No changes in insurance costs for 
commercial vehicles are estimated, as the reduction in the premium linked to the safety 
improvements can be offset by an increase in the premium due to the higher cost of an 
automated heavy-duty or light-duty vehicle. Another source (Römer et al., 2016) expects 
a 15% decrease in insurance liability as a result of autonomous driving technologies.  
The costs of the claims (including property damage and bodily injury claims) could increase 
in the future, both as a result of inflation and as a consequence of more costly technologies 
(e.g. sensors) (Albright et al., 2017). The long-term trend though would be towards a 
reduction in costs, given that economies of scale would drive the price of technologies 
down and the damages from accidents involving AVs are expected to be less severe. 
Different insurance scenarios are analysed by Albright et al. (2017). 
                                           
(118) European Commission’s Mobility and Transport website on Intelligent transport systems Action Plan and 
Directive, available at: https://ec.europa.eu/transport/themes/its/road/action_plan_en (last accessed 2 May 
2018). 
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The value of data 
Insurers can make use of data to improve profitability, e.g. by offering unique selling 
propositions that rely on customer segmentation, new value-added services and customer 
loyalty (Römer et al., 2016). Telematics are widespread in the insurance industry, offering 
incentives to drivers on a voluntary basis, according to their driving behaviour (e.g. speed 
limits compliance). This is part of the so called Usage-Based Insurance (UBI) or Pay-As-
You-Drive (PAYD) insurance policies.  
Incentivizing a better driving behaviour is already identified to have the potential to 
generate $381 billion in economic benefits to consumers and society from lower premiums 
and reduced amount of crashes by 2025 (World Economic Forum, 2016b).  
The adoption of UBI services is expected to increase from 4% in 2016 to 30% in 2025 
(World Economic Forum, 2016b). As a result, discounts of 10-15% in the insurance 
premium can be expected, linked to a potential decrease of 5% in the number of crashes. 
A 9% reduction in crashes could also be expected from ADAS and Electronic Stability 
Control (ESC) by 2025, potentially lowering the insurance premium by 5% (World 
Economic Forum, 2016b). Consequently, more than $1 trillion in economic benefits to 
consumers and society over the next 10 years could be expected (World Economic Forum, 
2016b).  
Changes in liability 
The automation trend in driving will probably imply a change in legal responsibility in the 
event of an accident, with liability shifting from the driver to the car’s manufacturer, 
software designer, device maker, map producer, etc. (World Economic Forum, 2016b; Karp 
et al., 2017; Albright et al., 2017). Some manufacturers, like Volvo, Mercedes and Google, 
have stated that they will accept liability for accidents involving their AVs in the future 
(Albright et al., 2017). The insurance business will thus move from personal insurance 
policies towards commercial vehicle and product liability policies (Albright et al., 2017). In 
this context, there is potential for new revenues, as detailed in Box 6. 
Box 6. New insurance business lines for CAVs 
Product liability for both CAVs hardware and software will actually constitute a source of 
new revenues in the future, as well as cyber security risks (e.g. criminal or terrorist 
hijacking of vehicle controls, identity theft) and infrastructure risks (e.g. malfunction in 
cloud servers, communication problems), that can amount to $15 billion in new revenues 
by 2025 (Karp et al., 2017). New insurance revenues will generate at least $81 billion in 
the US along the period from 2020 and 2025. 
Karp et al. (2017) have found that vehicle insurance premiums will start decreasing by 
2025 and will reach $25 billion in revenue loss by 2035, exceeding the gains from new 
insurance lines (i.e. cyber risk, product and infrastructure).  
Last, there is also a potential market share sifting from traditional insurance players 
towards vehicle manufacturers, who offer both insurance and maintenance services to their 
customers Karp et al. (2017). But in such a case, OEMs are just acting as a distribution 
channel, in partnership with the insurance companies, who are the ones writing the actual 
insurance policies. 
3.2.6.3 Estimated effects for different scenarios 
The insurance sector could be disrupted by the expected drastic reduction in the number 
of road accidents. Our analysis is mostly focusing on the assumption that the improved 
road safety conditions might imply significant discounts in motor vehicle premiums. On the 
basis of discounts currently applied to vehicles equipped with collision avoidance systems 
(Palmer, 2015, as cited in Wadud, 2017), our estimations indicate potential decreases in 
insurance premiums of 10-30% in 2025 and 15-40% in 2050 compared to today (see Table 
29).   
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Table 29. Changes in insurance premiums for each scenario 
 
CHANGES OF INSURANCE PREMIUMS PER 
SCENARIO 
2015-2025 2015-2050 
Baseline - - 
Scenario 1. Low uptake -10% -15% 
Scenario 2. Medium 
uptake 
-15% -20% 
Scenario 3. High uptake -30% 40% 
Source: Own elaborations. 
These % reductions are applied to the revenues linked to motor vehicle insurance policies 
in 2015, namely: 133 billion euros (Insurance Europe, 2015). The resulting estimates are 
given in Table 30.  
According to these projections, losses could represent up to 53 billion euros in 2050. With 
an eventual 90% accident decrease in the future (as Albright et al., 2017 estimates), these 
reduction ranges in motor vehicle insurance premiums could be larger (as also noted in 
Albright et al., 2017).  
It is important to mention that new revenues from new insurance categories (e.g. cyber 
security, product liability for software and hardware) are not considered in these 
calculations. Another significant consideration in this sector is the possibility for some 
double counting with other sectors, given that a large part of insurance costs is spent on 
car repair after accidents, health costs and legal costs.  
At this stage, the analysis is done without specifically distinguishing between passenger 
and commercial vehicles. 
As a result, the range of possible effects is summarized in Table 30. 
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Table 30. Potential effects of AVs in the insurance sector 
Effects of AVs on the 
insurance industry 
Baseline Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 
2015 2025 2050 2025 2050 2025 2050 2025 2050 
Change in insurance 
premiums with respect to 
2015 (%) 
- - - -10% -15% -15% -20% -30% -40% 
Revenues per year from 
motor vehicle premium 
(billion euros) (119) 
130 - - 120 115 115 105 95 80 
Change in motor vehicle 
premium revenues with 
respect to 2015 (billion 
euros) 
- - - -10 -15 -15 -25 -35 -50 
Source: Own elaborations. 
 
                                           
(119) Revenue figures are rounded for simplification and in accordance to their actual meaning. 
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3.2.7 Maintenance and repair 
3.2.7.1 Scope and size 
This sector has a direct correspondent in the Eurostat NACE Rev. 2 database, covering 
specifically the activities related to the maintenance and repair of motor vehicles. The EU-
28 data suggests that more than 1.5 million people work in this sector, which represents 
approximately 0.4% of the total EU GVA. 
Detailed figures corresponding to this sector in Europe are given below (Table 31). 
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Table 31. Indicators of the maintenance and repair sector  
Sector  Subsector  Description  Indicators Value 
Maintenance and 
repair 
G45.20 
Maintenance and repair of 
motor vehicles 
 
Number of persons employed 1,521,382 
Turnover (million euros) 140,000.0 
Number of enterprises  469,141.0 
Personnel costs  (million euros) 28,000.0 
Value added (million euros) 44,541.2 (120) 
% Persons employed 0.71% 
% GVA 0.41% 
Source: Own elaborations (based on Eurostat data from 2015). 
  
                                           
(120) EU-28 value not available; calculated as the sum of the available countries (missing one: Malta).  
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3.2.7.2 Challenges and opportunities 
The effects of full automation on maintenance and repair, including tyres, are not clear 
(Wadud, 2017). In the long-term, lower acceleration/deceleration could be thought to lead 
to reductions in maintenance costs. But in early stages of deployment, these potential 
reductions could be offset by higher labour and equipment costs of repair (Wadud, 2017). 
It could also be expected that a longer vehicle utilisation linked to increases in overall VKT 
(either in an individual mobility or a MaaS setting) would incur higher maintenance costs, 
e.g. tyres. Still, given the high uncertainty in these effects and their probably low relative 
effect in the overall potential economic effects of CCAM, these effects could be ignored at 
the present stage. Other factors like a reduction of crashes would lead to a lower demand 
for vehicle repairs. 
We explore below some of these potential changes brought in by CAVs to the maintenance 
and repair sector. 
Improved road safety 
Maintenance and repair sectors will likely be strongly affected by safer driving conditions 
that CAVs would enable, similar to what has been explained for the insurance sector. This 
is, the reduced amount of crashes would lower the demand for repairs of crashed vehicles 
and thus the revenues linked to them (Thierer and Hagemann, 2015). Repairers could also 
be challenged by the higher complexity of AVs (e.g. electronics and communication 
technologies) (European Commission, 2017i).  
The relevance of data 
Data access would constitute a challenge for maintenance and repair stakeholders 
(European Commission, 2017d). OEMs could control the dynamic vehicle data generated 
while driving, which could well reduce the opportunities for maintenance and repair shops 
(predictive maintenance). Some considerations in this regard are given in Box 7. 
Box 7. Increased competition in vehicle maintenance 
The identification of a correlation between data from multiple sources and different types 
of failures and repair needs will enable to improve predictive maintenance, therefore 
reducing the repair frequency and overall maintenance costs, as well as to improve quality 
and customer satisfaction (European Commission, 2017b). Gathering such amounts of data 
allows both car manufacturers and dealers to optimise quality and supply chain processes 
as well as to minimise warranty costs (European Commission, 2017m).  
Telematics-enabled remote diagnostics are expected to add $60 billion of profits for OEMs, 
suppliers and telematics service providers (World Economic Forum, 2016b). The OEM’s 
privileged access to car sensor data would make them be well-positioned in this type of 
offerings (Mohr et al., 2014). Competition in car maintenance would be higher, thereby 
creating downward price pressure and reduced value added in these services.  
Dealers and independent service centres could lose $44 billion in operating profits over the 
next 10 years (World Economic Forum, 2016b). In this context, a potential shift of $105 
billion over the next decade could go from independent service centres and small 
dealerships to high-end, authorised service centres (World Economic Forum, 2016b). 
Remote servicing could imply a loss of business with potential value in auto servicing 
operating profits of $6 billion (World Economic Forum, 2016b).  
Those parts retailers that wish to capitalize on digital channels for customer engagement 
could capture around $26 billion of operating profits but there is the risk of losing $2 billion 
of operating profits as a result of weaker pricing versus offline channels (World Economic 
Forum, 2016b).  
Another possible effect in this context is that the used-car market could be benefited from 
vehicle usage monitoring and scoring, reducing the cost of certifying a used vehicle and 
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allowing resellers to sell those vehicles that are in better conditions at higher prices 
(Bertoncello et al., 2016). 
New revenues 
A potential source for new revenues in this sector is linked to the increased need for 
cleaning and repair in a shared mobility scenario (Bösch et al., 2018). Although difficult to 
quantify, it can constitute an important element in MaaS that cannot be neglected.  
Conclusion 
Taking into account these different elements, the overall effect of CCAM on the 
maintenance and repair sector is expected to be negative. Even if no quantification is made 
for the study scenarios, it is possible to link them with possible qualitative effects. That is 
to say, the effects are expected to be stronger with higher levels of automation (significant 
improvement effect on safety), i.e. in scenarios 2 and 3, compared to scenario 1. However, 
eventual data restriction effects are understood to be independent of the level of 
automation. Also, it is possible to relate the cleaning and repair effects which could come 
associated to on-demand mobility services with scenario 3 by 2050 in particular. 
3.2.8 Power 
3.2.8.1 Scope and size 
CCAM can have an indirect impact on the power system, since most CAVs can be expected 
to be electric cars (McCauley, 2017). Electricity production and grid management are 
important economic activities. Therefore the effects of CCAM on this sector need to be 
analysed. 
Detailed figures corresponding to this sector in Europe are given below (Table 32). 
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Table 32. Indicators of the power sector  
Sector  Subsector  Description  Indicators Value 
Power D35.1 
Electric power generation, transmission 
and distribution 
Number of persons employed 941,130 
Turnover (million euro) 1,203,380 
Number of enterprises  90,000 
Personnel costs (million euro) 55,048.9 
Value added (million euro) 180,686.7 
% Persons employed 0.44% 
% GVA 1.54% 
Source: Own elaborations (based on Eurostat Database, 2015). 
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3.2.8.2 Challenges and opportunities 
EVs are emerging in the market, in competition with Internal Combustion Engine (ICE) as 
well as other technologies (mainly electricity hybrids ICE, compressed natural gas and 
hydrogen). The TCO is favourable to EVs when they are heavily used, thanks to their lower 
fuel and maintenance costs compared to ICE, which compensate for the higher cost of 
acquisition. CCAM can be provided by thermal vehicles or EVs. The ability to operate a CAV 
fleet allows for a higher use of a given vehicle than for IO vehicles. The same car can be 
used by more individuals, thus amortizing better the investment costs through more 
kilometres travelled.  
Figure 12. Impact of automating and sharing vehicles on the EV competitiveness  
 
Source: Own elaborations (121). 
The development of ICE or EV (partly) depends on the expected mileage of the vehicle. As 
shown in Figure 12 the electric mobility is expected to be generally more competitive for 
CCAM applications. The mere fact of sharing a vehicle, being automated or not, increases 
the EV advantage. While automation levels 0 to 3 do not allow much behaviour change, 
automation levels of 4 or 5 imply self-driving vehicles, which could lead to higher VKT 
especially when the vehicle is shared (robo-taxis). The combination of automation and car-
sharing would drastically enhance the competitiveness of EVs. Of course, the learning rate 
of this relatively new technology would further decrease EV costs. 
Ride-sharing would reduce the overall VKT by reducing the number of needed vehicles, but 
not necessarily the kilometres travelled by each vehicle. Therefore it would have no specific 
impact on the market share of EVs. 
We explore below several implications for the power sector of this additional development 
of EV due to CCAM. The impacts range from total electricity consumption and load shape, 
to power sector emissions and integration of renewable energy, and to grid planning and 
grid services. 
  
                                           
(121) Arrow sizes qualitatively indicate the purchase preferences of individuals and fleet-owners. Green (as 
opposed to red) indicates a higher (as opposed to lower) demand of a given vehicle technology. (ICE: Internal 
Combustion Engine vehicle; EV: Electric Vehicle; IO: Individually Owned; AV: Automated Vehicles; SAV: 
Shared Automated Vehicles; L0 to L5: levels of automation 0 to 5).  
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Electricity sales 
As presented in section 3.2.1, vehicle automation can increase the vehicle transport 
demand due to a reduced cost of driver's time and the emergence of new users. Sharing 
vehicles seems to increase the total kilometres driven (Schaeller, 2017) compared to a 
scheme of IO vehicles (although the uncertainty is still strong at this early stage), possibly 
because of a lower cost of CCAM leading to a rebound effect, with a displacement by CCAM 
of public transport demand, walking or cycling (ITF, 2015). This means that MaaS may not 
be more efficient than today's mobility system in terms of energy use. On the other hand, 
some efficiency gains are expected through automated driving (less braking, optimized 
speed, etc.). The vehicles developed for CCAM could also be more adapted to specific 
needs; for example, smaller and low-speed vehicles could be developed for urban CCAM. 
This would improve the energy efficiency and lower the electricity demand relatively to IO 
EVs. 
Since on top of this trend of increasing energy consumption, the share of EVs would be 
higher under a CCAM system, the electricity sales would clearly increase. A study by De 
Gennaro et al. (2014) finds that in the two areas under study (provinces of Modena and 
Firenze), the electrification of 8-28% of the urban car fleet implies an increase of below 
5% of the total electricity sales (and below 20% of the domestic electricity demand). 
Peak power consumption and load curve 
Electricity has to be balanced at all times and large-scale storage is costly, so the impact 
of CCAM on the power system depends on the time of consumption, i.e. the charging load 
curve of CAVs. It can potentially lead to a higher usage of existing plants or to additional 
(less used) capacity needs. The risk is that the user preferences do not align with the 
electricity system optimum. The current low penetration of EVs means very little actual 
measurements of real EV-owner practices exist, although some studies extrapolate several 
charging strategies to the conventional fleet usage (De Gennaro et al., 2014) and others 
look at the benefits of managing the EV load (Babrowski et al., 2014). An illustrative 
example from Weiss et al. (2017) of an aggregated charging pattern is shown in Figure 13. 
Figure 13. Illustrative charging patterns of IO EVs, without considering any remote-control 
allowed by CCAM 
 
Source: Weiss et al. (2017) (Copyright © 2017 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved). 
The "default" load pattern of IO vehicle charging, without any load management, can 
increase strongly the evening electricity peak consumption. The power drawn from the grid 
between 7pm and 10pm could lead to increased peak power, with higher risks of curtailed 
load (by lack of generation or grid constraints). On the other hand, the controllability of 
CAVs gives the opportunity to manage their load and charge during times of low demand. 
This would allow existing plants to be more used, without increasing the peak power 
demand.  
The resulting load curve of CAVs may become crucial information for electricity utilities and 
grid managers. While the charging times of an individual car may be unpredictable, a 
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pattern can emerge when averaging over the CAVs fleet or the country. A tentative 
illustration suggested by Weiss et al. (2017) is shown in Figure 14 (other charging profiles 
are extrapolated by De Gennaro et al. (2014) depending on the pre-defined strategy 
applied). 
Figure 14. Illustrative charging patterns of CCAM with modest use (left) and CCAM with high use 
and distributed fast-charging (right) 
 
Source: Weiss et al. (2017) (Copyright © 2017 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved). 
The load will probably be lower during hours of highest transport needs (commuting times 
of the morning and evening). The charging times will be situated outside these hours, but 
will also depend on the availability and locations of the charging infrastructure. If the 
shared vehicles are highly used, ultra-fast charging (hence high voltage) will be more 
valuable to fleet-owners, leading to spikier and more unpredictable load curves at the local 
level and potential local grid congestions. At the national level the aggregated load curve 
might show small peaks before and after each commuting time. However, one may expect 
a relatively flatter load curve for CAV than IO vehicles (Weiss et al., 2017).  
Emissions and renewable energy integration 
Peak residual load can be defined as load minus non-dispatchable production (as are wind, 
solar, or run-of-river hydro). It is equal to the maximum load to be covered by dispatchable 
plants (like thermal plants, hydro lake or storage).  
Peaking power plants usually have a higher content of greenhouse gas and air pollutants, 
as they are often fossil-fuelled and of low efficiency. A badly managed CAV fleet may 
increase the power sector emissions by charging at times of high marginal emissions like 
peak residual load. An adequate management of a fleet of CAVs allows charging preferably 
in hours of low electricity-related emissions.  
It can also help improving the integration of renewable energy sources in the system. For 
instance, CAVs could avoid additional investments in dispatchable plants by not charging 
at times of peak residual load (i.e. high demand and low renewable energy availability). 
They could also avoid some curtailment of surplus non-dispatchable production by charging 
more at times of low demand and high renewable energy production (e.g. solar production 
peaks). Therefore, CCAM can increase the value of non-dispatchable energy sources like 
wind or solar. 
Charging infrastructure needs  
In a context of high use of CCAM, the main concern becomes to minimize the car 
unavailability during charging. The charging power will likely increase (Weiss et al., 2017) 
(current individual charging power reaches 350 kW). The development of the mobility 
infrastructure could favour centralized charging situated in mobility nodes. Ideally these 
would match with electricity nodes, so that the grid reinforcements are easier. However, 
the impact on the grid infrastructure strongly depends on where the vehicles are charged: 
city centre, suburbs, rural, closeness to a low-voltage feeder or to a high-voltage 
transformer. A geographical analysis like the one performed in De Gennaro et al. (2014) 
is needed to identify the infrastructure bottlenecks in order to allow higher shares of EVs, 
although they also depend on the charging strategy chosen. A UK study (Brandmayr et al., 
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2017) shows that even low penetrations of EVs could cause congestions on the distribution 
grid and local load curtailment; a high CCAM development could exacerbate these grid 
challenges. 
An intermediary storage station could relieve the grid. Acting as a buffer, it would adapt 
better to the grid capacity. The cars could be charged from the stationary storage plant, 
although this incurs additional costs, efficiency losses and potentially some waiting time. 
Another (faster) option is to swap the car batteries at a stationary storage site, which 
power draw could then be constant or optimized on the prices seen by the storage actor. 
Sensitivity to electricity price 
The electricity price paid for charging the vehicles will impact the charging strategy. The 
vehicles will be much more responsive if charged at the wholesale price than if charged at 
the retail rates. Even more than IO EVs, CAVs fleet-owners will want to optimize their 
electricity tariffs and may be interested in variable rates in order to minimize their costs 
by implementing charging strategies.  
As they have an almost zero marginal cost, the renewable energy production will push 
wholesale prices downwards, thus favouring a synchronous CAV charging. Conversely, 
when renewable electricity production is scarce and fossil-fuel plants are most needed, 
prices will be higher and CAV may be discouraged to charge. Some even foresee that the 
battery spare capacity of unused parked cars can be discharged (in Vehicle-to-grid mode, 
V2G) and valued in the electricity market. 
If the load curve is controlled via price signals at the national level, a threshold effect might 
occur where a big proportion of the vehicles would want to benefit of the same electricity 
price, leading to load spikes. This could be mitigated by delaying or spreading the charging 
profiles.  
More generally, CAV operators will maximize revenues, so the minimization of charging 
costs is only one aspect. The optimal use of their fleet, as well as the opportunity costs 
due to the time spent for vehicle charging, may potentially lead fleet-owners to charge the 
vehicles outside of the cost-optimal strategy.  
The general logic of the tariff design should aim at representing both short- and long-term 
signals. In particular, CAVs should see an incentive to charge when energy is plentiful (low 
variable cost of production, i.e. short-term impact) but also where/when it is most 
compatible with the infrastructure, thus accounting for the high costs of an infrastructure 
upgrade, whether grid lines or production plants (i.e. long-term impact). This last element 
could be defined in cooperation with transmission and distribution operators that know 
best the (national and local) grid constraints.  
Services to the grid 
CAV batteries connected to the grid could provide ancillary services (frequency reserve, 
balancing services, voltage support). V2G can also improve the profitability of CAV by 
providing a peaking capacity on the energy or capacity markets. On a more decentralised 
scale, CAV could also absorb congestions or avoid load curtailment. These grid services 
may be easier to implement for a CAV operator than for IO EVs. They are beneficial for the 
electricity system but must be compared to their opportunity cost. They may complement 
other flexible technologies and compete with them: stationary storage, grid 
interconnections or other demand side management options (industry, heating, cooling 
and refrigeration). 
3.2.8.3 Estimated effects for different scenarios 
The structure of the vehicle fleet is described based on the assumptions of Table 3 (section 
2.2.3) and shown in the table below (Table 33). 
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Table 33. Distribution of the fleet per scenario - passenger transport 
 
DISTRIBUTION OF THE FLEET PER SCENARIO - PASSENGER 
TRANSPORT 
2025 2050 
IO  
L0-3 
IO 
L4-5 
Shared 
L0-3 
Shared  
L4-5 
IO  
L0-3 
IO 
L4-5 
Shared 
L0-3 
Shared 
L4-5 
Baseline 100% - - - 100% - - - 
Scenario 1. 
Low uptake 
80% - 20% - 69% 1% 27% 3% 
Scenario 2. 
Medium 
uptake 
57% 3% 28% 12% 5% 35% 7% 53% 
Scenario 3. 
High uptake 
35% 5% 7% 53% - 10% - 90% 
Source: Own elaborations. 
In each segment, the penetration of EVs is evaluated, with the following logic: 
 IO vehicles with low automation (L0-3) are assumed to follow the baseline 
assumptions of EU Reference 2016 (precisely, the updated baseline EU Reference 
Scenario 2016 by Hill et al., forthcoming 2018). 
 Vehicles with high automation level (L4-5) tend to be more often electric, since they 
are able to drive more (self-driving) than vehicles with low automation.   
 Shared vehicles are preferably electric, since they can drive more.  
 EVs get more developed with time (we assume 40% less 'availability' (consumer 
preference, purchasing price) in 2025 than in 2050).  
These considerations are translated into assumptions shown in Table 34. 
Table 34. EV share of total travel - passenger transport 
 
2025 2050 
IO  
L0-3 
IO 
L4-5 
Shared 
L0-3 
Shared  
L4-5 
IO  
L0-3 
IO 
L4-5 
Shared 
L0-3 
Shared 
L4-5 
Assumptions: 
EV share  
of total VKT 
1% 30% 42% 57% 7% 50% 70% 95% 
Source: Own elaborations. 
The resulting EV share of total VKT is shown in Table 35.  
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Table 35. EV share of total travel - passenger transport 
 
EV SHARE OF TOTAL VKT 
2025 2050 
Baseline 1% 7% 
Scenario 1. Low uptake 9% 27% 
Scenario 2. Medium uptake 20% 73% 
Scenario 3. High uptake 35% 91% 
Source: Own elaborations. 
The data used (from the updated baseline EU Reference Scenario 2016 by Hill et al., 
forthcoming 2018) indicates 2,900 Gvkm travelled in 2015 and an energy consumption of 
20 kWh per 100 km, decreasing to 13 and 11 kWh in 2025 and 2050 (in these estimations 
we only consider the part of passenger transport that corresponds to private cars). The 
scenarios consider the impacts identified in the automotive section (3.2.1) due to baseline 
projections (+9% in 2025 and +30% in 2050), reduced cost of driver’s time and new 
users; we do not change the occupancy rate. The combination of share of EV on VKT, VKT 
and electricity consumption per kilometre gives the total electricity consumption of private 
cars (see Table 36 below). 
Table 36. Potential effects of AVs in the power sector - passenger transport 
 
ELECTRICITY SALES TO EV PRIVATE CARS PER SCENARIO – 
PASSENGER TRANSPORT 
2025 2050 
Baseline 
4 TWh 
(1%*2,900 Gvkm*1.09*0.13 
kWh/km) 
29 TWh 
(7%*2,900 Gvkm*1.3*0.11 kWh/km) 
Scenario 1. 
Low uptake 
43 TWh 
(9%*2,900 Gvkm*1.21*0.13 kWh/km) 
140 TWh 
(27%*2,900 Gvkm*1.6*0.11 kWh/km) 
Scenario 2. 
Medium 
uptake 
110 TWh 
(20%*2,900 Gvkm*1.43*0.13 kWh/km) 
440 TWh 
(73%*2,900 Gvkm*1.88*0.11 kWh/km) 
Scenario 3. 
High 
uptake 
230 TWh 
(35%*2,900 Gvkm*1.67*0.13 kWh/km) 
540 TWh 
(91%*2,900 Gvkm*1.88*0.11 kWh/km) 
Source: Own elaborations. 
This additional electricity consumption due to the accelerated electrification of private cars 
is significant but remains below 7% of the total European electricity generation in 2025 
(estimated at around 3,400 TWh) and reaches 13% in 2050 (compared to a total of around 
4,000 TWh). Since the electricity consumption for EV in the baseline scenario is an order 
of magnitude smaller, most of the power consumption is due to the assumptions on the 
development of CCAM, with an uncertainty range given by the three scenarios. The 
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additional uncertainty on the occupancy rate of the vehicles is not accounted here. Overall, 
the impact of CCAM on the development of EV is really noticeable in 2050, and perhaps as 
soon as 2025 if it develops fast (scenarios 2 and 3). 
Moreover, the estimations of consumption per kilometre in future vehicles can appear 
optimistic. We show in Table 37 what would be the consumption if the driving consumption 
was the same as today (0.20 kWh/km).  
Table 37. Potential effects of AVs in the power sector without improvements of consumption per 
kilometre- passenger transport 
 
ELECTRICITY SALES TO EV PRIVATE CARS PER SCENARIO – 
PASSENGER TRANSPORT 
Constant consumption per kilometre 
2025 2050 
Baseline 
6 TWh 
(1%*2,900 Gvkm*1.09*0.2 kWh/km) 
53 TWh 
(7%*2,900 Gvkm*1.3*0.2 kWh/km) 
Scenario 1. 
Low uptake 
64 TWh 
(9%*2,900 Gvkm*1.21*0.2 kWh/km) 
250 TWh 
(27%*2,900 Gvkm*1.6*0.2 kWh/km) 
Scenario 2. 
Medium uptake 
170 TWh 
(20%*2,900 Gvkm*1.43*0.2 
kWh/km) 
790 TWh 
(73%*2,900 Gvkm*1.88*0.2 
kWh/km) 
Scenario 3. 
High uptake 
340 TWh 
(35%*2,900 Gvkm*1.67*0.2 
kWh/km) 
980 TWh 
(91%*2,900 Gvkm*1.88*0.2 
kWh/km) 
Source: Own elaborations. 
The impact of electric vehicles would then be much higher in a scenario with high uptake 
of CCAM, up to a quarter of the expected total electricity produced in Europe.  
The impacts of CCAM on oil products and electricity sales can also be considered in 
economic terms. For electricity expenditures, the modified baseline of the EU Reference 
Scenario 2016 considers an average retail price (with taxes) of electricity of 250 €/MWh 
(euros of 2015 per megawatt hour) for 2025 and 240 €/MWh for 2050. For the non-
electricity fuelled cars (diesel, gasoline, biofuels, gas, hydrogen), it gives a weighted 
average of retail prices of 1.8 million €/ktoe (million euros of 2015 per thousands of tonnes 
of oil equivalent) in 2025 and 2.0 million €/ktoe in 2050, with a corresponding weighted 
energy efficiency of 50 ktoe/Gvkm in 2025 and 38 ktoe/Gvkm in 2050 (62 ktoe/Gvkm in 
2015 in the no efficiency improvement case). When applied to the travel demand not 
covered by EV, it gives the non-electricity expenditures in the private car sector. 
The effects are shown in Table 38, with decreasing or constant consumption per kilometre.  
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Table 38. Potential effects of AVs on the fuel expenditures of private cars, with and without improvements of consumption per kilometre - passenger 
Transport 
 
FUEL COSTS OF PRIVATE CARS PER SCENARIO – PASSENGER TRANSPORT 
Decreasing consumption per km Constant consumption per km 
2025 2050 2025 2050 
Baseline 
290 billion euro 
0.4% being elec. 
(4 TWh*250 €/MWh + 
99%*2,900 Gvkm*1.09*50 
ktoe/Gvkm*1.8 M€/ktoe) 
280 billion euro 
2% being elec. 
(29 TWh*240 €/MWh + 
93%*2,900 Gvkm*1.3*38 
ktoe/Gvkm*2.0 M€/ktoe) 
360 billion euro 
0.4% being elec. 
(6 TWh*250 €/MWh + 
99%*2,900 Gvkm*1.09*62 
ktoe/Gvkm*1.8 M€/ktoe) 
450 billion euro 
3% being elec. 
(53 TWh*240 €/MWh + 
93%*2,900 Gvkm*1.3*62 
ktoe/Gvkm*2.0 M€/ktoe) 
Scenario 1. Low 
uptake 
Baseline +5%, 
4% being elec. 
(43 TWh*250 €/MWh + 
91%*2,900 Gvkm*1.21*50 
ktoe/Gvkm*1.8 M€/ktoe) 
Baseline +6%, 
11% being elec. 
(140 TWh*240 €/MWh + 
73%*2,900 Gvkm*1.6*38 
ktoe/Gvkm*2.0 M€/ktoe) 
Baseline +6%, 
4% being elec. 
(64 TWh*250 €/MWh + 
91%*2,900 Gvkm*1.21*62 
ktoe/Gvkm*1.8 M€/ktoe) 
Baseline +7%, 
12% being elec. 
(250 TWh*240 €/MWh + 
73%*2,900 Gvkm*1.6*62 
ktoe/Gvkm*2.0 M€/ktoe) 
Scenario 2. 
Medium uptake 
Baseline +15%, 
8% being elec. 
(110 TWh*250 €/MWh + 
80%*2,900 Gvkm*1.43*50 
ktoe/Gvkm*1.8 M€/ktoe) 
Baseline -22%, 
48% being elec. 
(440 TWh*240 €/MWh + 
27%*2,900 Gvkm*1.88*38 
ktoe/Gvkm*2.0 M€/ktoe) 
Baseline +17%, 
10% being elec. 
(170 TWh*250 €/MWh + 
80%*2,900 Gvkm*1.43*62 
ktoe/Gvkm*1.8 M€/ktoe) 
Baseline -18%, 
51% being elec. 
(790 TWh*240 €/MWh + 
27%*2,900 Gvkm*1.88*62 
ktoe/Gvkm*2.0 M€/ktoe) 
Scenario 3. High 
uptake 
Baseline +20%, 
16% being elec. 
(230 TWh*250 €/MWh + 
65%*2,900 Gvkm*1.67*50 
ktoe/Gvkm*1.8 M€/ktoe) 
Baseline -39%, 
76% being elec. 
(540 TWh*240 €/MWh + 
9%*2,900 Gvkm*1.88*38 
ktoe/Gvkm*2.0 M€/ktoe) 
Baseline +24%, 
19% being elec. 
(340 TWh*250 €/MWh + 
65%*2,900 Gvkm*1.67*62 
ktoe/Gvkm*1.8 M€/ktoe) 
Baseline -34%, 
78% being elec. 
(980 TWh*240 €/MWh + 
9%*2,900 Gvkm*1.88*62 
ktoe/Gvkm*2.0 M€/ktoe) 
Source: Own elaborations. 
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Generally, fuel expenditures are increased by 2025 (+15% to +17% depending on the 
consumption of future vehicles), mainly because we estimate an increased driving activity, 
while electrification of transport (which has lower fuel costs than ICE) arrives more 
progressively. At the 2050 horizon, however, electrification has taken off and fuel 
expenditures could decrease by around a fifth in Scenario 2.  
Finally, an additional calculation is made in Box 8 for what concerns the extra electricity 
consumption resulting from AVs sensors and computing power. 
Box 8. Electricity consumed for sensors and computing power needed for automated 
driving 
The miniaturization of computing capabilities and the evolution in sensor technologies 
(radars, LIDARs, cameras) lead to different estimations of the energy consumed for 
autonomous driving. Although some prototypes use around 2.5 kW of electricity, gains in 
the design of processors are expected to slash this consumption. As an example of the 
possible impact of these elements on the consumption of an AV, we assume 750 W of 
power used when driving autonomously (L4-5) in 2025 and 500 W in 2050, with an average 
speed of 60 km/h. Only the cars of L4-5 autonomy are considered here (assumptions 
identical to Table 3). This leads to the estimations of Table 39. 
The additional consumption due to sensors and computing power needed for autonomous 
driving adds around 8% to the EV consumption (reaching 15% in scenario 3 in 2025), or 
around 5% if the consumption per kilometre stays as of today. This additional consumption 
would reduce the range of electric vehicles and increase the cost of operation. 
Table 39. Potential effects of AV sensors and computing power on the power sector - passenger 
transport 
 
ELECTRICITY CONSUMED FOR AUTOMATING PRIVATE CARS PER 
SCENARIO – PASSENGER TRANSPORT 
2025 2050 
Scenario 1. 
Low uptake 
0 TWh 
(0%*2,900 Gvkm*1.21/60 km.h-1 
*750 W) 
2 TWh 
(4%*2,900 Gvkm*1.6/60 km.h-1 
*500 W) 
Scenario 2. 
Medium 
uptake 
8 TWh 
(15%*2,900 Gvkm*1.34/60 km.h-1 
*750 W) 
40 TWh 
(88%*2,900 Gvkm*1.88/60 km.h-1 
*500 W) 
Scenario 3. 
High uptake 
35 TWh 
(58%*2,900 Gvkm*1.67/60 km.h-1 
*750 W) 
45 TWh 
(100%*2,900 Gvkm*1.88/60 km.h-1 
*500 W) 
Source: Own elaborations. 
The estimations above indicate an impact of up to a quarter of the expected electricity 
production (with a high uncertainty, especially on the consumption per kilometre), which 
can be managed easily if the production capacities are well managed. The constraints on 
the peak power remain relevant, however. Concerning impacts of CCAM other than total 
electricity sales, they depend on the strategy used for operating the car fleet. Some 
strategies would benefit the power system (for example by optimizing the existing plant 
use or the grid management), thus reducing the overall power system cost. Other 
strategies may minimize the greenhouse gas emissions. But the operators of shared 
vehicles will certainly pay attention to the opportunity cost due to the electricity charging 
time. The customer needs and comfort will probably impact strongly the behaviour of most 
fleet-owners. Some customer segments may express preferences aligned with some of the 
previous goals (e.g. a commercial argument of green electricity used in their mobility 
service). However, a further alignment to these goals will need policy action in the fields 
of tariff design and infrastructure planning. 
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On the governance aspect, the organisation of the sector is yet unclear. Who could operate 
the car fleet, who should pay for the infrastructure and where should it be developed? The 
main actors involved are car owners, car users, distribution grid operators, but also local 
governments, new actors (fossil energy retailers, technology companies like Google or 
Apple), power producers, retailers or all involved intermediaries. 
3.2.9 Other sectors 
Apart from the sectors that have been covered in previous sections, we have identified 
other businesses or activities that might be affected by CCAM in the future. Among these, 
there are the following: construction of roads and motorways, oil and gas, legal, or public 
services (such as traffic police, land development, education or medical). The effects of 
CCAM on these sectors can seem too distant (because of the association to full autonomy) 
or unclear at the moment of writing this report, and thus, they are just briefly covered in 
this section. 
As far as the construction of roads and motorways is concerned, one possible 
assumption is that there will be a reduced need to construct new roads if CAVs provide 
capacity improvements. For instance, the capacity of a lane at 100 km/h could increase 
from 2,869 cars/h to 4,103 or even 10,730 cars/h thanks to CAV technologies (Peterson, 
2014). Similarly, the enhanced vehicle control capabilities and shorter inter-vehicle 
distances could enable reductions in lane width in a distant future. As the infrastructure 
increasingly progresses towards digitalisation, a long-term vision where all vehicles on the 
road are automated and connected could also imply that there will be less need for physical 
signs (thus, where the digital infrastructure moves from being a complement to being an 
alternative for traditional infrastructure). Most of these effects are linked to a dominant 
CAV-enabled mobility, and thus do not seem feasible in mixed traffic conditions. 
In terms of land development, one significant effect would be the one related to parking. 
The underlying reason is the possibility that CAVs will allow for a more extensive usage 
(either on a privately-owned basis or as part of shared fleets of vehicles) that reduces the 
need for parking or allows for distant parking. Public parking spaces could decrease from 
300 to 60 (Peterson, 2014) and the new available space could be dedicated to alternative 
uses, or to transform current individual and public transport systems (Fraedrich et al. 
2016). It will also lead to a reduction in parking fees. In such a setting, it is also plausible 
that the savings coming from reduced/zero-fees parking enabled by CAVs, could partially 
be offset by an additional fuel consumption linked to empty-vehicle running up to the 
parking location (Wadud, 2017). Parking garage owners will have to reduce cost to remain 
competitive against the cost of additional fuel consumption in the case of AVs running 
empty instead of being parked (Levin and Boyles, 2015). Apart from these effects linked 
to parking, the changes in value of travel time could also affect land development patterns. 
Users might accept longer commuting distances and choose to live in the suburbs, or in 
more remote, rural areas, while working in the city (Cyganski 2015, Heinrichs 2015, as 
cited in Fraedrich et al., 2016). A few implications in this regard are discussed in this article 
(Razin, 2018). 
The oil and gas (extraction and distribution) industries could also be affected by CCAM, 
in different ways. On the one hand, there is the possibility that future vehicles become 
larger and heavier to accommodate new features and increased comfort. (Wadud et al., 
2016) estimates that 240 kg could be added to the weight of the average new vehicle by 
2050, which is then associated to a potential increase of about 11% in fuel consumption. 
On the other hand, vehicles could become lighter as a consequence of the improved road 
safety, thus leading to reductions in fuel use. The transition towards an electrified mobility 
would also represent a challenge for this sector. 
In a long-term future, it would seem feasible that driving permits would not be needed 
anymore. This would affect the education sector, specifically driving schools where 
training for different types of licences can be obtained. There will certainly be incremental 
adaptations in driving schools in the short to medium term, responding to new types of 
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permits and prerequisites for more skills from drivers (Römer et al., 2016). More demand 
for ICT-related education could also be expected in the future. 
Savings linked to the medical sector are also expected, in line with a reduced amount of 
road accidents. For instance, a reduction of 5% of traffic accidents has been associated to 
benefits in the order of 7 billion euros annually (Asselin-Miller et al., 2017). This is 
decomposed in: 2.38 billion euros in fatalities, 3.66 billion euros in serious injuries and 
1.17 billion euros in minor injuries. Estimates of costs per fatality, severe and slight injuries 
are given in (McCarthy et al., 2017), namely: 1.2 million euros per person for fatalities, 
272,000 euros per seriously injured person and 13,600 euros per each slightly injured 
person. It would then be possible to link these figures with estimates in accidents reduction, 
such as the one from Leech et al. (2015) that points at 2,500 lives saved and 25,000 
serious accidents prevented in the period from 2014 to 2030 as a result of CAV 
technologies. Peterson (2014) also presented some estimations of the expected reductions 
in road fatalities and injuries, specific for Germany and giving a lower and upper bound 
estimate: from 3,338 fatalities in 2013 to a range between 1,669 and 334 fatalities, and 
from 366,000 traffic injuries to a range between 183,000 and 36,600 people injured. No 
timeframe is given for these decreases though. 
3.2.10 Concluding remarks on the economy 
Figure 15 shows the current state of the sectors that are most likely to be affected by 
CCAM, namely their VA, persons employed and share of GVA in the total EU-28.  
A summary of the main potential impacts for these sectors is given below.  
Figure 15. Current state of the main sectors affected by CCAM, showing VA, persons employed 
and share of GVA in the total EU-28 (the latter indicated at the centre of each bubble as %) 
 
Source: Own elaborations (based on 2015 data from Eurostat SBS and NA databases). 
As far as the automotive sector is concerned, CAVs may reinforce vehicle sales in line 
with travel activity increases. The higher the level of automation, the stronger the effect 
on VKT, mostly as a result of a reduction in driving costs (including changes in the value 
of travel time) and new users like young people, elderly or disabled (as cited in e.g. Wadud, 
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2016). Even though new mobility service models (MaaS) will increase vehicle usage 
intensity (a 75% usage increase is stated in Schoettle and Sivak, 2015 or a 10 times 
increase in Arbib and Seba, 2017), the resulting decreased vehicle ownership will 
considerably impact vehicle sales. Our scenario estimations provide ranges of passenger 
vehicle sales increases from 18% to 39% during the period 2015-2025 and from 33% to 
51% in the period 2015-2050. Specifically, in scenario 3, it is possible to observe long-
term lower vehicle sales as a result of a dominant MaaS-based travel. Using current 
average vehicle prices, total revenues from passenger vehicle sales could exceed 550 
billion euros by 2050. It is also expected that the sales of heavy commercial vehicles will 
increase in response to a more intense road travel activity in the future, which could be 
further reinforced by a more efficient operation of automated trucks. In this case, a growth 
of 19-29% could be expected in the period 2015-2025 and 38-68% in the 2015-2050 
period. Total revenues from commercial vehicle sales could almost reach 150 billion euros 
in 2050. 
The electronics and software sector would clearly benefit from the production and sale 
of new components and systems needed for automated driving (including hardware and 
software components). Whereas software will gain a more dominant role with regard to 
today (from a 10%-90%-0% to a 40%-40%-20% for software, hardware and contents 
respectively, as stated in Römer et al., 2016), the market for CAVs’ hardware components 
like cameras, lidar, etc. Will also grow (Asselin-Miller et al., 2017). With the previously 
mentioned vehicle sales projections, total revenues from the sector could almost reach 180 
billion euros by 2025 for both passenger and freight automated vehicles. 
The telecommunication, data services and digital media sectors are also expected to 
experience significant growth, as in-vehicle connectivity increases and becomes pervasive. 
Upcoming 5G networks will support the exchange of massive amounts of data generated 
by a future CAV. The monetization of car data holds a great potential (McKinsey&Company 
states it could generate from $450 to $750 billion in revenues by 2030, Bertoncello et al., 
2016) and users are already demonstrating willingness to pay for services built around this 
data (Dungs et al., 2016). Considering the current 19% EU share of global passenger cars 
registrations/sales in 2015 (ACEA, 2016b), the European part of these projections could 
be around 120 billion euros in revenues from monetization of car data by 2030. 
Vehicle automation will act as a transformational technology in the freight transport 
sector by diminishing operating costs and allowing more efficient logistics (World Economic 
Forum, 2016a). These benefits would justify the idea that this sector becomes one of the 
early adopters of CAV technologies (Wadud, 2017). The two most costly elements in 
commercial vehicles operation are fuel and drivers, both of which can be reduced through 
truck automation (Gundermann et al., 2015). When it comes to fuel savings, truck 
platooning could decrease fuel consumption by 2-8% for the leading vehicle and 8-13% 
for the following vehicle (SARTRE, 2014, as cited in Janssen et al., 2015). The role of a 
professional driver can be radically transformed in the future (starting with early platooning 
applications), gradually undertaking other duties than driving and possibly turning into a 
more technical role (Clements and Kockelman, 2017). To which extent this will lead to a 
reduction in the number of drivers needed still remains an unanswered question that 
deserves careful attention. It is also important to stress that CAV technologies could help 
to compensate the shortage of long-haul drivers (Lanctot, 2017), as e.g. Germany is 
expecting to lose around 250,000 drivers who will retire in the next 10 to 15 years (Hollis, 
2016). Effects of CCAM on truck driver jobs are further discussed in the employment 
section below (section 3.3.1). 
For what concerns the passenger transport sector, AVs use could be detrimental for 
more sustainable modes, such as public transport, walking and cycling (POLIS, 2018). 
According to Litman (2018), operational costs will be relatively higher in AVs than 
conventional cars, but less costly compared to taxis. Thus, it seems plausible that CAVs 
will take some users from other modes, e.g. taxis, buses, trains, also reducing vehicle 
ownership. 
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The insurance sector could be disrupted by the expected drastic reduction in the number 
of road accidents. The improved road safety conditions might imply significant discounts 
in motor vehicle premiums. On the basis of discounts currently applied to vehicles equipped 
with collision avoidance systems (Palmer, 2015, as cited in Wadud, 2017), our estimations 
indicate potential decreases in insurance premiums of 10-30% in 2025 and 15-40% in 
2050 compared to today. These losses could represent up to 53 billion euros in 2050.  
A lower crash rate would also drive a large part of the changes expected in the 
maintenance and repair sector, with revenues decreasing as a result of a lower demand 
for crash-related repairs (Thierer and Hagemann, 2015). Although a lower 
acceleration/deceleration could also lead to reductions in maintenance, this potential 
decrease could be offset by higher labour and equipment costs of repair (Wadud, 2017). 
Telematics will enable predictive maintenance applications that would also lead to lowering 
repair frequency and overall maintenance costs (European Commission, 2017b). The OEM’s 
privileged access to car sensor data would make them be well-positioned in this type of 
offerings (Mohr et al., 2014). Competition in car maintenance would be higher, thereby 
creating downward price pressure and reduced value added in these services. One potential 
factor leading to a growth in revenues in this sector could be linked to the cleaning and 
repair activities that could be needed for shared vehicles (Bösch et al., 2018). 
CCAM can have an indirect impact on the power system, since most CAVs can be expected 
to be electric cars (McCauley, 2017). The estimated effects indicate increases in electricity 
sales with time and growing levels of automation. 
An overview of the expected direction of change (and, in some cases, a quantified effect) 
in each of the sectors is given in Table 40. 
Table 40. Main economic effect per sector in 2025 and 2050 (revenues change in billion euros or 
as a qualitative indication of the expected direction of change with respect to baseline scenario) 
Industries 
Baseline Effects in 2025 - 2050 scenarios (122) 
2025 2050 2025 2050 
Automotive (123) 505 605 540-625  645-700  
Electronics and 
software (123, 124) 
- - 85-175  50-65  
Telecommunication, 
data services and 
digital media 
- -   
Freight transport - -   
Passenger transport - -   
Insurance (125) - - 95-120 80-115 
Maintenance and 
repair 
- -   
Power sales for 
private cars 
1 7 11-57 33-130 
Source: Own elaborations. 
                                           
(122) Figures on total revenues are given for the sectors where detailed estimations have been elaborated, 
indicating a range of effects in consideration of the different scenarios (Green text represents a positive effect 
and Red text represents a negative effect). For the rest of sectors, arrows are provided to indicate the 
expected trend:  shows a positive effect,  shows a negative effect.     
(123) For the automotive and electronics and software sectors, figures represent the sum of passenger transport 
(autarky situation) and freight transport.  
(124) The effects in this sector are considered to be in addition to current revenues of the sector.  
(125) For the insurance sector, the reference figure is 133 billion euros from motor vehicle insurance policies in 
2015.  
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A few concluding remarks are made below: 
— The economic impacts presented in this study can be classified as either price effects 
(increase of costs), quantitative effects (sales of cars) or structural effects (increase of 
telecommunication services and reduction of insurance expense). However, at this 
stage, the estimations have mostly addressed quantitative effects. 
— Specific effects on the different EU Member States have not been considered in the 
present study. However, a few considerations on some possible differences in the 
national socio-economic effects can be already anticipated. On the one hand, some 
sectors like the automotive or the electronics and software ones will mainly have an 
impact on the countries where car manufacturing industries are located. Other 
heterogeneous effects concern for instance the freight transport sector, which might 
lead to a significant reorganisation of the European transport sector, given the fact that 
labour costs are a significant cost factor. On the other hand, sectors like 
telecommunication, insurance or maintenance and repair will affect EU Member States 
in a more homogeneous way. 
— Comparing our estimations with the current state of the respective sectors, it is possible 
to note that the automotive sector, in spite of holding a prominent position in terms of 
VA, employment and GVA, will face lower impacts from CCAM than other sectors, like 
e.g. electronics and software. 
— The most relevant economic effect has to be expected for the sector electronics and 
software. Considering the change of turnover of 180 billion euros, CCAM leads to a 
noteworthy increase of ca. 25% of the sector output (note this is to be interpreted as 
an additional turnover of electronics and software linked to AV sales in 2050 versus the 
total turnover of the electronics and software sector in 2015; also, to be noted that the 
sector turnover might suffer from some double counting as the same good might be 
counted in the turnover of several sub-sectors). However, the EU faces a significant 
competition in this sector, with relevant global players like Google, Apple or others. 
— Even if concrete figures have not been presented, the sectors telecommunication, data 
services and digital media will benefit significantly from CCAM. Taken into account that 
these sectors will be influenced by the overall technological development (e.g. 
development of AI, deep learning, block chain, etc.) the sector could face a capacity 
problem. In addition, the need for important infrastructure investments is anticipated. 
— Considering that we are at the beginning of a substantial mobility transformation, the 
effects from CCAM have to be compared to the already on-going shifts and cannot be 
isolated from other emerging trends like electrification of transport or MaaS. 
— The increase in power sales due to CCAM should be seen in light of the decrease of 
other fuel expenditures (mainly oil products). The total of these fuel expenditures 
(electricity and non-electricity) increases from 290 billion euros in 2025 in the baseline 
to 300-350 billion euros in the CCAM scenarios, whereas by 2050 the impact of CCAM 
is mainly a decrease (from 280 billion euros in the baseline to 170-300 billion euros in 
the scenarios). The development of CCAM goes hand-in-hand with EVs and modifies 
the structure of fuel usage in cars. Therefore the power retailers emerge as winners 
and the oil product retailers as losers of this transition. 
— In this challenging context, it is of paramount importance to highlight that the losses 
for the European economy can well exceed the range of potential benefits indicated. 
The international competition, mainly in the automotive and electronics and software 
sectors, could lead to a significant reduction of international EU market shares. This 
can only be avoided if the EU follows the worldwide CCAM trend and aims at 
becoming a leader of it. A political support is needed in respect of regulations 
(licences for AVs, insurance law), infrastructure development (roads and 
telecommunication) and education. Furthermore, the CCAM development goes hand 
in hand with the development of AI, big data and robotic. A loss of technological skills 
and market share can result in significant economic losses.   
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3.3 Dedicated review on employment and skills 
3.3.1 Effects of AV technologies on employment 
The concerns on job destruction by machines can be dated back to the first industrial 
revolution. Already in the 16th century in England and Ireland, a stocking-knitting machine 
worried Queen Elizabeth I about mass unemployment (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012 as 
cited in ITF, 2017). Later in the early 1800s, in the Luddite Riots in England highly-skilled 
artisans protested by destroying looms and machinery against mass production that 
threatened their business (The White House, 2016; Autor, 2015; Mokyr et al., 2015). In 
the short run, the deployment of new efficient technologies had a negative impact on 
workers (The White House, 2016) but in the long run, technology advancements eventually 
led to higher job creation (ITF, 2017). This was due to so-called capitalization effect 
(Aghion and Howitt 1994 as cited in Arntz et al., 2016): an increase in productivity 
encourages more firms to enter the market and raise the number of job openings. 
The technologies introduced in the 19th century could replicate routine and codifiable tasks 
that were at the time performed by highly skilled workers. Machines opened new job 
opportunities for low-skilled workers who did not previously have the capabilities to 
produce manufacturing goods and new profitable investments in productivity for the capital 
owners. This kind of innovation is called unskill-biased technical change as it favours the 
productivity of lower-skill workforce (The White House, 2016). However, in the 20th 
century, highly skilled workers with problem-solving skills, adaptability, and creativity 
acquired relevant skills to change occupation and gain comparative advantage with the 
machine aid (Autor, 2015). This process is called skill-biased technical change as it favours 
the productivity of higher-skilled workforce (The White House, 2016). With the advent of 
AVs, drivers are potentially at risk because the current driving task does not require major 
training and it is performed by workers with a lower educational background (ITF, 2017). 
Mechanics will, for example, progressively need more knowledge to be able to handle the 
repair of new, complex vehicles, lawyers will face higher labour competition with the 
reduction of traffic cases to solve but software engineers will face a lower competition due 
to a larger market for their capabilities. In all cases, the sectors will experience skill-biased 
technical change. The whole economy will experience higher productivity gains but it is 
important to individuate the European regions and segments of the European population 
who will be mostly affected by the autonomous driving technology so to act pre-emptively 
with welfare redistributing policies. 
Predicting the effects on employment is however filled with conceptual challenges, most 
importantly, caused by the fact that labour market adjusts towards general equilibrium. 
Firms determine wages according to production costs and labour supply function they face. 
Profit-maximizing firms (Autor et al., 2003 as cited in Arntz et al., 2016) will not substitute 
workers whose net value is higher than the vehicles because it would not be profitable 
(Arntz et al., 2016). If AVs are too expensive or workers have a low reservation wage, 
employees will retain their work position in transport-intensive activities. Hence, the 
reasoning hereby presented is based on the current state of the world, as future prices are 
indeed too volatile and uncertain to estimate. In order to deliver the main message, we 
make the assumption that AVs will be commercially viable and potentially able to substitute 
for labour. 
Christidis et al. (2014) provide a list of factors and gaps that are shaping the future 
transport labour market in Europe. 
Productivity gains 
AVs can replicate the same historical trend of the previous technological innovations. Most 
notably, they will increase firms’ labour productivity on the hypothesis that higher 
investments in autonomous driving technology will drive a decline in its usage cost, 
following the so called Moore’s law on the basis of which the cost of computing halves 
every second year (Saam et al., forthcoming 2018). The decline in technology’s user cost 
and the labour substitution is expected to lead to higher labour productivity and lower 
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production costs of goods. Then, these lower unit production costs allow firms the 
possibility to reduce output prices and to make higher profits (mark-ups), which results in 
higher disposable incomes within the society. A consequent increasing product demand 
thereby increases the demand for labour for their production (Arntz et al., 2016; Gregory 
et al., 2016). By way of example, Bessen (2015) examined employment and branch data 
in US retail banking after the introduction of 400,000 Automatic Teller Machines (ATMs) 
which were substituting for tasks previously done by human staff. He found that the 
operating and labour cost reductions encouraged banks to open more branches and total 
retail banking employment stayed steady (ITF, 2017).   
According to Manyika et al. (2017), consumer income will be the largest source of job 
creation up to 2030 in the world economy. Gregory et al. (2016) estimated a labour 
demand model at the level of Europe (estimated at region level: NUTS-2 level of detail 
(126)) and found a decrease in labour demand of 9.6 million jobs as technologies substitute 
for labour in routine tasks. However, the price drop and a consequent increased product 
demand led to a net increase in total labour demand of 11.6 million jobs across Europe 
among the years 1999-2010 due to new technologies. Similarly, Saam et al. (forthcoming 
2018) found in their study on the sectorial impact of digitisation of the economy that the 
annual change in labour market demand was positive in the ICT-producing sectors and ICT 
service sectors (NACE sectors C26 and C27, a positive effect of around 4%) in the period 
2000-2021. On the contrary, the annual change in labour market demand between years 
2000 and 2021 seemed to be negative in other sectors (with an effect lower than 0.5% 
though). The aggregate effect is close to neutral. In terms of Full-Time Equivalents (FTE), 
this study estimates a total job loss of 15 million FTE employees in the non-ICT sectors 
while 30 million jobs are estimated to be created in the ICT-related sectors (C26, C27 and 
J). Nevertheless, these results need to be considered with caution, given the fact that the 
observed employment change in sectors C26 and C27 is negative in all countries except 
China. The study covers 12 countries, of which nine are European (namely, Austria, 
Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Spain, Sweden and United Kingdom), and 
three non-European countries (US, China and Japan). 
Graetz and Michaels (2015) also found that automation at the sector level increased both 
labour productivity and wages for workers in 17 countries (14 of which are European) over 
the period 1993‐2007 including for transport equipment industry, where the authors 
actually found a greater effect. However, it had a negative but not significant effect on 
hours worked for low/middle skilled workers. 
MaaS companies may reduce the monetary cost of commuting for people that could share 
a ride with other passengers and wouldn’t pay the price of ownership of the vehicle. 
Autonomous driving would reduce the non-monetary cost of driving. Already De Jong and 
Gunn (2001 as cited in Litman, 2017) estimated an elasticity for car trips with respect to 
time travelled for commuting in Europe ranging from -0.36 to -0.58 for the Netherlands, 
Belgium, and Italy confirming the value of -0.41 obtained from the literature. This means 
that a 10% increase in commuting time decreases the number of commuting trips made 
by car to 4.1%, which suggests a dislike for driving. Reducing the cost (both monetary and 
non-monetary) of commuting drives employee-employer joint surplus up. Firstly, it allows 
for a better job match: firms have broader geographical area where they can recruit from 
because workers are more willing to commute longer distances (Litman, 2018). Secondly, 
by increasing the quality of commuting, connected and automated mobility services 
decrease employees’ disutility from working and thus, increase their net utility. Employers 
can either set a lower nominal wage, becoming more profitable and therefore, allowing to 
hire more people (Arnzt et al., 2016) or potentially experience a productivity boost because 
employees’ time  spent  on  other commitments decreases and the time available for work 
increases (Gibbons and Machin, 2006). Also, AVs would allow for a better job match, i.e., 
firms would have broader geographical area where they can recruit from because workers 
would be more willing to commute longer distances than at present (Litman, 2018). 
                                           
(126) An overview of NUTS-2 (Nomenclature des Unités Territoriales Statistiques) classification is available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/nuts/background (last accessed 9 April 2018). 
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Autonomous cars would then be more appealing for a larger segment of the population 
and would grant them a larger range of employment possibilities outside their geographical 
residence location. 
Labour Supply (Education and Demographics) 
Expectations play a significant role on labour supply. Information over labour market 
returns determine early career choices of younger people. Routine jobs are gradually 
offering lower salaries and conversely, abstract jobs are more rewarding. Because of this, 
younger generations invest in education and are sheering away from professions that are 
expected to be replaced by automation. ITF (2017) already found a stronger aging trend 
among truck drivers than among other occupations. Their baseline projections predict a 
drivers shortage in Europe (as also noted in Todd and Waters, 2018) that is however 
reversed to drivers surplus by the potential introduction of driverless technologies which 
drive the labour demand lower than labour supply. The authors estimate three different 
labour supply scenarios where new entrants in truck-driving profession are proportionally 
decreasing on expectations over driverless technology implementations. Because of this 
educational adjustment from expectations, deviations from equilibrium in the labour 
markets are most welfare damaging when unpredictable. As the level of automation 
increases, new tasks that ask for higher educational background and good learning 
capabilities are required from truck drivers. Truck manufacturer companies know it and 
are already investing in both research and development of technology and employees 
training (Salvetti, 2017) to ensure a profitable and efficient use of both human capital and 
technological factors. Potential rewards for workers increase and so will do job conditions. 
However, few will invest in relevant skills if the technological change is too abrupt because 
people will not be aware of these rewards at the time of their education investment. 
Currently, the truck-driving profession attracts a residual part of total labour supply (it 
holds a disadvantaged position on the average job search order) due to bad working 
conditions offered (Industry Today, 2013; Christidis et al., 2014). If this state persists for 
long and the technology pick-up causes a shock, the industry will be potentially short on 
qualified labour supply. This will put truck transport in the first places of their job search if 
the gap is accurately advertised. The problem is that most of the future truck drivers are 
aging and have a relative low level of education (Beede et al., 2017; Christidis et al., 2014; 
ITF, 2017) and the same happens to other on-the-job drivers (Beede et al., 2017). This 
leads to a shortage of qualified young people but if the implementation is gradual, future 
expectations will be more accurate and people will have the time to invest on their 
education accordingly. Firms are less willing to invest in aging and lower-educated workers 
because they have a shorter time frame to reap benefits of their training and because they 
are less motivated and capable of learning (Lallemand and Rycx, 2009). On this topic, the 
most effective training solution is contentious. Brynjolfsson and McAfee (2014 as cited in 
ITF, 2017) emphasise improving education in formal schooling while Ford (2015 as cited 
in ITF, 2017) advocates for a clever use of vocational training.  
A Stanford report (Stone et al., 2016) states that education, re-training, and inventing new 
goods and services may mitigate the negative employment effects only in the short run. 
In the longer term, the labour market disruptions caused by the development of AI 
technology will increasingly require governments to evolve into efficient universal social 
services. The ITF (2017) also stresses the role of government intervention with two 
complementary strategies influencing the speed of uptake of driverless technology and 
ensuring adequate support is available to those displaced drivers. 
On top of this, government can redistribute welfare gains to the damaged part of the 
society. Thanks to AVs it is possible to design solutions that grant greater transport 
efficiency (Litman, 2018) and thus, greater social welfare. A simulation done in Manhattan 
(Burns et al., 2013) using current taxi travel data, suggests for example the possibility of 
replacing the current fleet of 13,000 taxi with 9,000 self-driving cars at 12.5% of the 
current cost per mile.  
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Labour Demand (Task change and Labour productivity) 
The occupations directly impacted by AVs can be summarized in four different categories 
drivers, visitors, hosts, and teams (see Table 41, based on Miller, J., 2015). The categories 
distinguish if driving is the primary or secondary activity in the current occupation and if 
automation would substitute or complement human work. Besides, workers whose 
occupation does not require driving (like mechanics) will likely change the way they 
perform their work (because they need to stay updated with the latest technological 
progress) so that they can retain their workplace as long as they acquire the necessary 
skills to deal with the advancements.  
Table 41. Potential impacts of AVs on employment 
 Substitute Complement 
Primary Driver: The worker can add 
value to the business only 
through the driving activity in 
transit but none at destination. 
Example: Truck driver 
Hosts: The worker may add additional 
value to the business in transit if relieved 
from the driving activity but does not add 
value at destination. 
Example: School bus drivers 
Secondary Visitors: The worker adds 
value to the business at the 
worksite destination but none 
in transit. 
Example: Pest control workers 
Teams: The worker adds value to the 
business at the worksite destination but 
can potentially add value also in transit if 
relieved from the driving activity. 
Example: Emergency medical technicians 
Source: Own elaborations based on Miller, J. (2015). 
Technological advancements increasing labour productivity may enable fewer workers to 
do the job of the whole firm workforce differently for each category. It is however useful 
to remind that in general it is not clear how workers will re-qualify to this change of tasks 
in their occupations and which firms and how many of them will decide instead not to 
demand for labour support anymore (Beede et al., 2017; Center for Global Policy Solutions, 
2017). 
Drivers demand will be reduced ceteris paribus because their value added to the job is 
restricted only to their driving task. As soon as AVs are introduced, their presence would 
be regarded as unnecessary or excessively expensive.  
Visitors and Teams are likely to face higher competition due to the labour supply coming 
from all workers that could not drive before (Miller, J., 2015). Similarly, even other low-
skilled occupations could face heavier pressure on their wages due to an increased supply 
of similar, displaced drivers workers (The White House, 2016). 
AV technology could leave Hosts and Teams time to focus on other job responsibilities, 
thus, boosting their productivity and wages. For example, salespeople who currently spend 
a considerable amount of time driving could find themselves able to do other work while a 
car drives them from place to place, or inspectors and appraisers could fill out paperwork 
while their car drives itself (The White House, 2016).  
These effects are likely to cause income inequality and job polarization (Manyika et al., 
2017), a trend that Europe is already experiencing (Goos et al., 2009; Goos et al., 2014). 
In the previous example, inspectors and appraisers could eat up secretaries’ comparative 
advantage and eventually displace the secretaries by performing administrative tasks while 
driving. Consequently, AVs diminish the comparative advantage of drivers, causing a 
downwards pressure on low-skilled wages and pushing upwards the wages of high-skilled 
workers. Consider for example the field sales account job, if that worker is paid three days 
a week to drive to customers for deal discussions and two days to answer emails and keep 
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sales accounting, then the employer can pay the worker only three days a week because 
he can do the latter task while the car drives itself to destination. A small team of software 
engineers will work less than drivers to deliver the same tasks but earn the profit share 
previously destined by a large number of freight drivers. Firms charging optimal wages 
take into account the disutility from working and are able to design a pay structure that 
increases both firm and worker’s profit. 
As previously mentioned, the prospects are not necessarily dismal. Autor et al. (2003 as 
cited in Goos et al., 2009) claim that even though technological progress replaces “routine” 
tasks, motor vehicles operators are already performing complementary and hardly 
automatable activities (Beede et al., 2017; Center for Global Policy Solutions, 2017) that 
limit the pure labour substitution but likely consign either the driver or the technology to 
a secondary role instead (Center for Global Policy Solutions, 2017). The President of the 
Information Technology and Innovation Foundation Rob Atkinson said: “You’re not going 
to have a robot that can sort of get out of the back of the truck and unload things and all 
that stuff, or back the truck up into a little zone” (Gamio et al., 2017) but other logistic 
managers of the same company can potentially both move objects and manage the supply 
chain while the truck is driving alone. Many other researchers, vehicle manufacturers and 
AI experts, claim that reaching the level of full automation is extremely difficult to achieve 
and not likely to happen in the short-medium period (Litman, 2018). The impact of 
driverless cars in terms of workers adjustment is more likely to affect the task change 
within occupations (Arnzt et al., 2016; Manyika et al., 2017). Many studies assume that a 
large share of the current occupations will be substituted completely. Nonetheless, there 
are different estimations in the extension of the labour substitution effect: the study of 
Frey and Osborne (2017) finds that 47% of jobs in US are at risk (Bowles, 2014 applies 
the same methodology on the EU and finds 54% of jobs are at risk) while Arntz et al. 
(2016) find that only 9% of jobs in OECD countries are at risk instead. The former 
estimates the share of jobs threatened by automation based on experts’ estimation of the 
threatened occupations. The latter uses the same methodology but with a task-based 
approach, so based on the same experts predictions but estimating the degree of their 
automation-risk predictions on the proportion of automatable task within that occupation. 
Typically no analysis has focused on new jobs that can emerge from the advent of AVs 
(Arntz et al., 2016; Beede et al., 2017; The White House, 2016; Miller, J., 2015) but the 
recent experience can provide some indications. Lin (2011) found that most new US jobs 
in the 1980-2000 were created in new technologies or in new types of personal services. 
The website Level 10 (Kaviraj, 2017) provides a list of new occupations, mostly ICT related, 
originating from AVs development. While new jobs are skewed towards high-education 
services (ITF, 2017) the final quantities of jobs created and destroyed for both education 
categories is uncertain. 
Consumer preferences play a role in labour demand too. Internet should have, for instance, 
replaced many service jobs like the travel agent because it can provide the same service 
but digitally. Instead, it created duplicates of the same service (Gordon, 2000) because of 
some customers who prefer it to be delivered physically. Similarly, there will be a demand 
for non-automated vehicles because part of the retail customers have preferences over the 
driving activity. Furthermore, non-automated vehicles are necessary to perform non-
conventional driving tasks (e.g. ambulances, police cars or vehicles for military purposes). 
The market will offer different versions (automated and not) of the same vehicle. Following 
this line of thinking, there are some jobs that are necessary as long as there exists at least 
one car which is not self-driving (e.g. traffic policemen) and occupations that include at 
least one strictly required task that is not possible to be automated (e.g. school bus drivers 
need also to care for children) or for which customers have preferences for human labour 
instead (e.g. luxury limousine service) will be re-dimensioned rather than eliminated. We 
need then to take into consideration the existence of an employment lower bound which is 
represented in our scenario, where some employers would still not choose to own an AV 
even if available due to different preferences (Center for Global Policy Solutions, 2017). 
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Jobs endangered by CAV technologies 
The White House (2016) estimates that 2.2 to 3.1 million currently existing part-time and 
full-time US jobs are endangered by autonomous driving technology.  
A 2015 analysis based on the UK concluded that CAVs could add 25,000 jobs within the 
automotive industry and create additional jobs in other sectors of the economy (e.g. 
telecommunication or digital media) estimated at 320,000 new jobs (Leech et al., 2015). 
This effect will likely be similar in proportion for other countries with higher human capital 
endowment and with similar trade intensity in the EU, like Germany. 
Our own analysis on employment effects linked to CCAM are presented next. Occupational 
data follows the International Standard Classification of Occupations ISCO-08 
(International Labour Organization, 2012). The data for economic sectors follows the 
Statistical Classification of Economic Activities in the European Community (NACE Rev. 2). 
To isolate the employee drivers we use the relevant category in the European Socio-
Economic Groups (EseG) (127). The data for education follows the International Standard 
Classification of Education - ISCED 2011 (UNESCO Institute for Statistics, 2012) instead. 
Employee drivers and mobile plant operators amount to almost 8 million, or 3.6 of the total 
EU-28 employment in 2015. 
The following graph (Figure 16) compares the educational attainment distribution of 
employee drivers and mobile plant operators with the one of the entire European Union 
(28 countries) in 2015. 
Figure 16. Education breakdown comparison EU-28 (2015) 
 
Source: Own elaborations (based on Eurostat LFS). 
A 30% of the workers in the category possess a low level of education (ISCED <2: less 
than lower secondary education) as opposed to the 18% figure in the total EU employment. 
Only 5% have a high level of education (ISCED >4: tertiary education), much lower than 
the amount in the EU (i.e. 33%). This comparison highlights a fragility of the sector to 
innovation, as lower educated workers might not have on average the proper mind-set to 
adjust to technology or work practices changes. 
                                           
(127) ESeG is a derived classification which allows the grouping of individuals with similar economic, social and 
cultural characteristics throughout the European Union. Definition available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=EU_labour_force_survey_-
_methodology&oldid=327391#European_Socio-economic_Groups_.28ESeG.29 (last accessed 6 April 2018). 
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Source: Eurostat, lfsa_eseged
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The heterogeneous education distribution across countries is depicted below in Figure 17. 
Figure 17. Education breakdown of employee drivers and mobile plant operators in percentage of 
total employment EU-28 (2015) 
 
Source: Own elaborations (based on Eurostat LFS, (128)). 
Eastern European countries such as Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Romania and Slovakia have a large share of drivers and mobile plant operators, which 
makes them more vulnerable in case of complete substitution of labour. On the other hand, 
it must be also taken into account the economic or borrowing possibilities of the countries 
to invest on the technology. 
                                           
(128) n.b. Secondary education data is not available in Eurostat for Malta and Tertiary education data from Croatia, 
Luxembourg, Malta and Portugal is also not available in Eurostat.  
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The low educational share of drivers is highest in southern European countries such as 
Portugal, Italy, and Spain, where it respectively accounts for 82.7%, 62.9%, and 59.3% 
of the entire occupations in those countries. Notably, also Iceland and Denmark present a 
large share of lower educated workers with 68.5% and 47.3%. This may represent a 
problem if current drivers would need requalification to perform other jobs in the industry.  
According to CEDEFOP (2016), employment in the land transport sector is supposed to 
shrink by around 9% by 2025 but two fifths of those to whom the labour substitution effect 
may concern will continue to work in the transport and storage sector (129). Specifically, 
12.5% will be employed in the wholesale and retail, 8% in warehouse and postal services 
and construction and 3.5% in agriculture. Employment for drivers and vehicle operators in 
EU is projected to shrink by 4.6% within the same period. The heterogeneous growth 
across member states is depicted below in Figure 18. 
Figure 18. Employment growth rate (%) of drivers and vehicle operators in the 2015-2025 period 
 
Source: CEDEFOP (130) (Copyright © CEDEFOP 1996-2018). 
                                           
(129) CEDEFOP Skills Panorama Drivers & vehicle operators website, available at: 
http://skillspanorama.cedefop.europa.eu/en/occupations/drivers-vehicle-operators (last accessed 5 April 
2018). 
(130) CEDEFOP Employment trends 2016 Skills forecast website, specific data available at: 
http://www.cedefop.europa.eu/en/publications-and-resources/data-visualisations/employment-
trends?locale=EN&dataSource=SFME&media=png&width=740&entitle=false&question=00.+GrowthRateEm
ployment&plot=euBars&countryGroup=linear&subset=OccupationsWITHIN08Plantandmachineoperatorsand
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However, the usage of broad sectors and occupations definitions make it difficult to 
separate the data of road transport vehicles from vehicles used on railroads and those used 
in specialized work environments such as forklifts and tractors, which will have a different 
adoption cost, regulations and implementation process (Beede et al., 2017).  
The category drivers and vehicle operators (ISCO code: 83) includes also locomotive 
engine drivers and related workers (831), mobile plant operators (834), and ships’ deck 
crews and related workers (835). Thus, making the anaylsis not perfectly applicable to 
road drivers. Similarly, other surveys, such as O*NET in the US, lack of precise information 
about the vehicle used (Miller, J., 2015).  
Beede et al. (2017) isolate those occupations that use motor vehicles as tools, use more 
enclosed vehicles than open and place high importance on the usage of operating vehicles 
or equipment when asked in the survey. 
Similarly, the category land transport and transport via pipelines (NACE 49) includes also 
passenger rail transport (491), freight rail transport (492), and transport via pipeline 
(495). 
In order to have an indication of the correct number of drivers in the EU economy, we 
proceed with a jobs-based approach (131). Jobs are defined as occupations in sectors, 
therefore, we crossed the workers occupational status of interest with the sector of interest 
at division level in 2012 only for EU-15 due to low availability of data. 
By doing so, Eurofound (2016) ranks drivers and mobile plant operators (ISCO 83) working 
in land transport and transport via pipelines (NACE 49) as the seventh job in Europe with 
the largest number of workers with 3.85 million (Eurofound, 2016); the figure correspond 
to 1.76% of the total EU-28 employment in 2015. CEDEFOP counts instead almost 5 million 
people working as drivers and vehicle operators (which includes also industrial vehicles 
and trains) in the transport and storage sector in EU in 2016 (132), which in total count as 
2.21% of the total EU-28 workforce. This approach highlights the improvement benefits of 
this approach, as the figures are much different to the number of 8 million workers count 
of Employee drivers and mobile plant operators in 2015 which includes the drivers in all 
sectors.  
The detailed occupations of interest which will be affected the most by AVs will probably 
be: 
— 8322 Car, taxi and van drivers, 8331 Bus and tram drivers, and 8332 Heavy truck and 
lorry drivers; 
— 7231 Motor vehicle mechanics and repairers. 
The relevant sectors we are interested in are instead: 
— H49.31 Urban and suburban passenger land transport, H49.32 Taxi operation, H49.39 
Other passenger land transport, H49.41 Freight transport by road; 
— G45.20 Maintenance and repair of motor vehicles. 
Thus, specifically, the ISCO occupations and NACE sectors we have focused on are: 
— ISCO 83: Drivers and mobile plant operators, which amounts approximately to 3.7% 
of total employment in EU-15 in 2012.  
— ISCO 72: Metal, machinery and related trades, which amounts approximately to 3.5% 
of total employment in EU-15 in 2012. 
— NACE 49: Land transport and transport via pipelines, which amounts approximately to 
2.4% of total employment in EU-15 in 2012. 
                                           
assemblers&subsetValue=08PlantandmachineoperatorsandassemblersWITHIN83Driversandmobileplantoper
ators&year=2015&yearTo=2025&onlyEU=1 (last accessed 29 April 2018).  
(131) The exact methodology can be found in Fernández-Macías et al. (2016). 
(132) Skills Panorama Drivers & vehicle operators website, see footnote (129). 
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— NACE 45: Wholesale, retail and repair of motor vehicles, which amounts approximately 
to 1.8% of total employment in EU-15 in 2012. 
The reasoning behind is that drivers are most endangered by labour substitution whereas 
mechanics and maintenance workers will require major training to continue performing 
their jobs. 
Analysing the two sectors, we found a very significant concentration of specific occupations, 
as explained next. 
The following graphs (Figure 19 and Figure 20) show the occupation (ISCO-08) distribution 
within sectors (NACE Rev. 2). For reference, ISCO-08 classification of occupations is 
specified in Table 42 below. 
In Figure 19, 65% of people employed in the land transport sector (NACE 49) are in drivers 
and mobile plant operators occupation (ISCO 83) and amount to approximately 1.5% of 
total EU-15 employment in 2012. Another 5% are numerical and material recording clerks 
(ISCO 43), 3.7% are business and administration professionals (ISCO 33) while labourers 
(ISCO 93), specialized managers (ISCO 13) or general clerks (ISCO 41) each accounts for 
2% of the occupations within the sector. 
As shown in Figure 20, almost 40% of people employed in the retail and repair sector 
(NACE 45) are in metal, machinery and related trades occupation (ISCO 72) and amount 
to 0.7% of total EU-15 employment in 2012. An 11.6% of people are in sales workers 
occupation (ISCO 52) and a big part is made by support administrative jobs, more than 
12% in form of clerical occupations (ISCO 41 to 44), and by some managerial and 
professional jobs, 6.2% in business and administration (ISCO 33), and 5.6% engineering 
associate (ISCO 31). According to 2012 data, the presence of ICT professionals (ISCO 25) 
is scarce in both sectors (NACE 45 and 49), respectively, 0.3% and 0.2%. 
Figure 19. Distribution of land transport (NACE 49) in occupations (ISCO-08) EU-15 (2012) 
Source: Own elaborations. 
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Figure 20. Distribution of retail and repair of vehicles (NACE 45) in occupations (ISCO-08) EU-15 
(2012) 
 
Source: Own elaborations. 
Table 42. Occupation classification (ISCO-08) 
Occupation classification (ISCO-08) 
Legislators, senior officials and managers 
  11 Chief executives, senior officials and legislators     
  12 Administrative and commercial managers     
  13 Production and specialised services managers     
  14 Hospitality, retail and other services managers     
Professionals 
  21 Science and engineering professionals       
  22 Health professionals         
  23 Teaching professionals         
  24 Business and administration professionals     
  25 Information and communications technology professionals   
  26 Legal, social and cultural professionals       
Technicians and associate professionals 
  31 Science and engineering associate professionals     
  32 Health associate professionals         
  33 Business and administration associate professionals   
  34 Legal, social, cultural and related associate professionals   
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Occupation classification (ISCO-08) 
  35 Information and communications technicians     
Clerks 
  41 General and keyboard clerks         
  42 Customer services clerks         
  43 Numerical and material recording clerks       
  44 Other clerical support workers         
Service workers and shop and market sales workers 
  51 Personal service workers         
  52 Sales workers           
  53 Personal care workers         
  54 Protective services workers         
Skilled agricultural and fishery workers 
  61 Market-oriented skilled agricultural workers     
  62 Market-oriented skilled forestry, fishery and hunting workers   
Craft and related trades workers 
  71 Building and related trades workers, excluding electricians   
  72 Metal, machinery and related trades workers     
  73 Handicraft and printing workers       
  74 Electrical and electronic trades workers       
  75 Food processing, wood, garment and related trades workers   
Plant and machine operators and assemblers 
  81 Stationary plant and machine operators       
  82 Assemblers           
  83 Drivers and mobile plant operators       
Elementary occupations 
  91 Cleaners and helpers         
  92 Agricultural, forestry and fishery labourers     
  93 Labourers in mining, construction, manufacturing and transport 
  94 Food preparation assistants         
  95 Street and related sales and service workers     
  96 Refuse workers and other elementary workers     
Source: International Labour Organization (2012). 
The following graphs (Figure 21, Figure 22 and Figure 23) show the sector (NACE Rev. 2) 
distribution within occupations (ISCO-08). For reference, a list of NACE Rev. 2 classification 
of economic activities is given in Table 43. 
As shown in Figure 21, a 42.4% of drivers and mobile plant operators (ISCO 83) work in 
the land transport sector (NACE 49). Therefore, there are many drivers working in other 
different sectors, such as warehousing and support (NACE 52) with 7.6%, wholesale trade 
(NACE 46) with 6.3%, construction (NACE 43) with 3.9%, or retail trade (NACE 47) with 
3.1%. 
In Figure 22, it can be observed that metal and machinery trade workers (ISCO 72) are 
even more widespread across different sectors. Manufacturing sub-sectors i.e. 25 to 29 
aggregately count for more than 40% of the sector shares while 20% are in Wholesale and 
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retail trade and repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles (NACE 45). This category is then 
clearly broader than just car repair workers and results based on this occupation must be 
taken with care. 
The share of ICT professional amount to 0.52% in land transport (NACE 49) and 0.26% in 
wholesale and retail trade and repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles (NACE 45) sector 
(see Figure 23). This highlights the low current presence of personnel able to understand 
and control this new technology and also suggests the current lack of ICT usage in both 
sectors. 
Figure 21. Distribution of drivers and mobile plant operators (ISCO 83) in sectors (NACE Rev. 2) 
EU-15 (2012) 
 
Source: Own elaborations. 
Figure 22. Distribution of metal and machinery trades (ISCO 72) in sectors (NACE Rev. 2) EU-15 
(2012) 
Source: Own elaborations. 
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Figure 23. Distribution of ICT professionals (ISCO 25) in sectors (NACE Rev. 2) EU-15 (2012) 
 
Source: Own elaborations. 
Table 43. Economic activities classification (NACE Rev. 2) 
Economic activities classification (NACE Rev.2) 
Agriculture, forestry and fishing 
  1 Crop and Animal Production, Hunting and Related Service Activities 
Manufacturing 
  10 Manufacture of Food Products       
  22 Manufacture of Rubber and Plastic Products   
  23 Manufacture of Other Non-Metallic Mineral Products 
  24 Manufacture of Basic Metals       
  25 
Manufacture of Fabricated Metal Products, Except Machinery and 
Equipment 
  26 Manufacture of Computer, Electronic and Optical Products 
  27 Manufacture of Electrical Equipment     
  28 Manufacture of Machinery and Equipment N.E.C.   
  29 Manufacture of Motor Vehicles, Trailers and Semi-Trailers 
  30 Manufacture of Other Transport Equipment   
  33 Repair and Installation of Machinery and Equipment 
Water supply; sewerage, waste management and remediation activities 
  38 Waste Collection, Treatment and Disposal Activities; Materials Recovery 
Construction 
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Economic activities classification (NACE Rev.2) 
  41 Construction of Buildings       
  42 Civil Engineering         
  43 Specialised Construction Activities     
Wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles 
  45 Wholesale and Retail Trade and Repair of Motor Vehicles and Motorcycles 
  46 Wholesale Trade, Except of Motor Vehicles and Motorcycles 
  47 Retail Trade, Except of Motor Vehicles and Motorcycles 
Transportation and storage 
  49 Land Transport and Transport Via Pipelines   
  52 Warehousing and Support Activities for Transportation 
  53 Postal and Courier Activities       
Information and communication 
  58 Publishing Activities       
  61 Telecommunications       
  62 Computer Programming, Consultancy and Related Activities 
Financial and insurance activities 
  64 Financial Service Activities, Except Insurance and Pension Funding 
Professional, scientific and technical activities 
  70 Activities of Head Offices; Management Consultancy Activities 
  71 Architectural and Engineering Activities; Technical Testing and Analysis 
Administrative and support service activities 
  78 Employment Activities       
Public administration and defence; compulsory social security 
  84 Public Administration and Defence; Compulsory Social Security 
Education 
  85 Education         
Human health and social work activities 
  86 Human Health Activities       
Source: Eurostat (2008). 
If the future occupations in driving and vehicle maintenance will change the task structure, 
it is useful to identify the skillset required to master the new job. The following graph 
(Figure 24) plots the skills level of both occupations.  
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Figure 24. Skill levels in ISCO 72 and ISCO 83 occupations 
 
Source: Own elaborations. 
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The work of drivers, represented with orange line, generally involves limited information 
processing tasks if compared to other occupations. The repetitiveness of the job is high 
and the teamwork capabilities are low. This might be a problem if managing a fleet of 
vehicles will be the responsibility of an entire group or if the new logistics of AVs will require 
mind flexibility. However, technical literacy tasks is moderately high and this might help 
drivers in building knowledge upon this skill. 
Vehicle mechanics and repairers, represented with a black line, have slightly more physical 
tasks, but also more numeracy, problem-solving, teamwork and standardization.  
Both occupations have low levels of social tasks and relatively low levels of ICT use that 
could make them struggle finding another job in the future labour market demand across 
all sectors. 
Concerns on inequality 
The major danger we incur is consolidating the rising economic inequality trend in Europe 
(Autor, 2015; Brynjolfsson and McAfee, 2014; The White House, 2016; ITF, 2017; Mokyr 
et al., 2015). The returns on high skilled labour increases over the lower skilled 
counterpart, as the former is able to generate more value added for firms because they 
need an even better training to either design, repair the vehicles and working while 
commuting. The effect on the aggregate society is contentious because housing prices and 
transport costs decline due to cheaper and more efficient transport (Moavenzadeh, 2016). 
This may allow low-income households to save a large share of their expenses. Return to 
capital also increases but firms necessitate a high initial investment cost to buy expensive 
AVs and hire qualified staff together with a substantial trade volume so to make this 
investment paying out. This necessarily will put higher pressure on small enterprises which 
will face competitive disadvantages to bigger competitors. The effect on the number of 
firms present in the market is uncertain but policymakers can expect it to decrease in the 
short-medium term. The lack of employers reduce employees bargaining power because 
the labour market is less competitive for the formers, allowing them to charge lower wages. 
The lower-skilled workers will be impacted the most, as their market is more competitive. 
The decrease in transport cost may also have a redistribution effect on employment across 
European countries. There are regions where production input factors might be less 
expensive (i.e. lower tax rate and lower wages) but with higher contracting and transport 
costs for firms that want to offshore. Such regions suffer from a market access penalty on 
their sales due to their geographical distance to bigger markets such as western-northern 
Europe which will be reduced by the implementation of AVs which can cut costs and time 
of transport. The implementation will increase Southern and Eastern Europe economic 
competitiveness, which results in higher salaries and levels of employment. European 
industries intensive in routine tasks have already seen a larger decline in their service costs 
over the period 1993-2010, they gained competitiveness due to labour-saving technologies 
and faced an increased product demand (Goos et al., 2014).  
Firms will now have higher tendency to relocate factories in those regions where production 
costs are lower. Offshoring represented for German and Austrian firms respectively almost 
47% and 17% of foreign direct investments in Eastern Europe during the period 1990-
2001 (Marin, 2006). In particular, 38% of European firms who back-shored in their home 
country reported in 2012 they did it because of transport costs (Dachs and Zanker, 2015) 
and also Marin (2006) found a negative distance effect on intrafirm trade between Eastern 
Europe and Germany which penalizes relocating production activities but found no clear 
evidence for Austria.  
It must be taken into account that EU countries endowed with lower human capital are 
endangered by the rising production automation trend for some firms, especially in the 
sector of manufacturing. Under this consideration, the cost savings in cheaper labour are 
likely not to be substantial if most of the firms off-shored do not require much labour input 
in the first place due to predominance of autonomous production. Firstly, off-shoring 
becomes less profitable even after accounting for risks and secondly, entrepreneurs and 
high-skilled workforce will reap all the benefits from this investments. 
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The resulting inequality will increase within countries but should decrease across countries 
(see Olsen, 2006 for a review on the topic and Herzer and Nunnenkamp, 2011). On one 
hand, offshoring harms the low percentile (lower skilled segment) of the richer countries 
population for the classical concept of factor price equalization (unskilled-non-differentiable 
labour price tends to equilibrium in all countries). Many manufacturing firms off-shore in 
countries where labour is cheap. This way, low skilled wages are pressured downward but 
the rewards for capital-owners increase since capital can be moved where it makes more 
profitable for them. On the other hand, Foreign Direct Investments (FDIs) make firms 
within a country to get to a critical mass enough for them to be globally competitive and 
bring profits in the country to be taxed and redistributed. Evidence from Germany also 
suggest firms are more likely to outsource rather than offshore if the production is capital-
intensive, if transport cost are higher and R&D activities lower (Marin, 2006) so that more 
profits will be retained in the host countries for firms of these characteristics. If companies 
devote greater attention to production quality with tighter production control, they will 
instead locate to higher wages countries where human capital is possibly higher to offset 
the labour cost. Distance to markets grants firms a geographical market power: inefficient 
firms can charge lower price than efficient competitors because of the lower transport costs 
they face when they sell products in nearby marketplaces. This power prevents them from 
exiting the market (Brynjolfsson and McAfee, 2014) and leads to inefficient factor 
utilization. Therefore, AVs can bring fiercer competition in all countries and thus increase 
the whole EU productivity. While the European aggregate employment balance will be 
positive (not in driving-related activities, where the conclusions are uncertain instead), the 
levels of employment differ in individual countries because it favours highly skilled labour 
in countries with higher human capital dependence and lower skilled labour in  countries 
where they are less human capital dependent. 
Some think there will be tendency for city to segregate higher income people in extra-
urban areas in larger houses (McLaughlin, 2017). The time cost paid by people commuting 
to work by car is the impossibility of performing any other activity. Therefore, autonomous 
cars advantage white-collar workers who perform knowledge work that can be performed 
while enjoying the ride and have higher opportunity cost because they earn more. Cities 
will have to expand in the extra-urban area if they wanted to provide larger accommodation 
for high income people which will be segregated. 
A detailed analysis by sector is provided next. 
Automotive (vehicle manufacturing and distribution) 
In the ranking of most important changes upcoming in the automotive sector skills 
demand, European Automotive Skills Council (EASC) partners placed automation at the 
fourth place, below advanced manufacturing, advanced materials knowledge, and 
understanding of consumers preferences (European Sector Skills Council, 2016). 
Additionally, EASC partners proposed a number of occupations that are emerging to reflect 
the changes taking place in the automotive sector. 
Currently manufacture of motor vehicles accounts for around 3.1 million jobs and 2.2 
million jobs in sales. 
CEDEFOP (2014) estimates that 213,000 new high-skilled jobs will be created from 2014 
to 2025 in R&D, design and senior roles in the manufacturing process. 
Employment in the sector is predicted to grow by 3.2% to 2025, roughly equivalent to the 
economy as a whole (see Table 1). Taking into account of a substantial need to replace 
employees leaving the sector due to retirement or for other reasons, an estimated 888,000 
automotive jobs will need to be filled from 2013 to 2025 which counts as 3.2% growth per 
year. 
The forecasts for the vehicle manufacturing sector vary significantly by country. The largest 
expansion in automotive employment is expected in Romania (an additional 48,040 jobs, 
representing a 38% increase in sector employment by 2025) and the United Kingdom (an 
additional 33,050 jobs, representing a 25.8% increase). Other countries anticipated to 
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have an above-average employment growth include Finland, Spain and Hungary. The small 
Latvian automotive sector is also expected to grow considerably. Germany dominates 
automotive employment in the EU. Its 850,650 automotive workers in 2013 represented 
37.9% of the total automotive industry in the EU. While Germany is only anticipated to 
have a small net increase in the number of automotive jobs (1.8%), this still represents 
an additional 15,160 jobs. Accounting the need to replace existing staff, it is forecast that 
35.8% of all automotive job openings in the EU up to 2025 while be in Germany (341,590 
job openings). In other countries, such as Poland, France and Italy, employment in the 
sector is expected to decline. 
If AVs are introduced, the technical requirements to build vehicles will increase and 
sectorial skills will need to shift, most notably, in the software development more than in 
the car structural development. Firms might re-locate back to countries with high human 
capital, thus, boosting employment in those regions. Back-shoring is proved in Europe to 
be most frequent in high technology sectors (Dachs and Zanker, 2015). Although the 
automotive manufacture sector will experience the larger shift in the skill demand, also the 
wholesale and retail vehicle distribution sector will require workers capable of 
understanding and communicating specific knowledge to their customers. If AVs demand 
increases then it leaves room for car manufacturers to make higher profits and employ a 
larger number of workers in aggregate. 
Manyika et al. (2017) estimates that from 60 to 70 million potential worldwide jobs will be 
demanded in the automotive industry from the increase in total disposable income over 
the period 2016-2030. 
The European Tyre & Rubber Manufacturers’ Association (ETRMA) has made a projection 
for the tyre industry. “If we consider an average growth or GDP of 2% and a normal 
fluctuation of only 3% to 4% the industry has to hire each year up to 15,000 employees. 
This is not considering an increased fluctuation due to the demographics of our workforce”. 
Electronics and software 
The employment effects for the sector are predicted to be positive. CEDEFOP (2016) 
already highlights the increasing land transport sector dependency on ICT-based and 
specialized equipment and products. As the transport sector becomes more profitable and 
productive, firms that offer complementary services (like IT support or staff at transport 
control centres) will react to the same increase in demand and will experience both higher 
profits and employment. In fact, autonomous driving technology requires advanced 
software and monitoring systems for what reason electronics and software sector plays a 
crucial part in the further development of the automated technology. 
Thierer and Hagemann (2015) emphasize the need for ICT skills in addition to the 
traditional vehicle repair skills because they predict the electronics and software 
components of vehicles will increase. In this context, a shortage of ICT professionals has 
been identified for 2020 (European Commission, 2016b). Already firms face significant 
difficulties in recruiting ICT specialists: in 2015, 41% of EU enterprises claimed to struggle 
in filling the vacancies (133). In such environment, some firms might not be demand 
autonomous technology because of their lack of qualified personnel available to handle 
complex informatics systems for vehicles navigation. Inefficient utilization capabilities will 
in general hinder the sector growth. 
Telecommunication, data services and digital media 
AVs increase the time for people to spend on digital entertainment. An increase in demand 
for this services directly translates into higher labour demand for designers of those 
products. With increasing vehicle connectivity, companies will request expertise in data 
management to handle the big supply of data collected and exchanged between different 
devices and infrastructure. Altogether, CAVs are expected to increase the demand for 
                                           
(133) As 2015 data from Eurostat Digital Economy and Society (ISOC) Database shows, available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/data/database?node_code=isoc_ske_itrcrn2 (last accessed 20 March 2018). 
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creative creation of original digital content, telecommunication, and data management and 
thus, increasing the labour demand in these sectors. 
Freight transport 
Freight transport is the sector more likely to experience adverse effects on its employment 
because the majority of the employees are drivers (workers of which primary activity is 
driving and are substituted by AV). However, the sector will experience major gains due 
to increasing efficiency, which may boost employment in logistic/management occupations 
within the industry. For instance, they will maybe shift labour demand to urban drivers or 
logistic managers due to higher workload requested on highways that necessarily leads to 
higher urban workload. Similarly, freight industries that are closely related to the land 
transport, such as air and maritime, will react to the same increase in demand and will 
experience both higher profits and employment.  
3 million European people were employed in the freight transport by road and removal 
services sector (NACE Rev. 2 H49.4) in 2015. Employment distribution differs among 
member states: large and continental countries (e.g. Germany, Poland, France) employ a 
larger amount of workers compared to small and insular countries (e.g. Greece, Cyprus, 
United Kingdom). In Figure 25, it is represented the share of employment in the sector on 
the total EU-28 employment. The employment figure in freight transport for Ireland is 
confidential so it was not possible to report it. In Figure 26, it is represented the internal 
share of employment in the sector on the total employment within that country.  
Figure 25. Distribution of people employed in the EU - freight transport by road and removal 
services (2015) 
 
Source: Own elaborations. 
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Figure 26. Percentage of total employment working in freight transport by road and removal 
services 
 
Source: Own elaborations. 
Figure 26 shows that the relative employment of freight transport sector is mainly higher 
in countries located in Continental Europe, probably due to better geographical location. 
Moreover, a large share of countries where the percentage share of employment in freight 
transport sector is higher than the European average are located in Eastern Europe (e.g. 
Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, Slovenia and Estonia). In order to draw conclusions about the 
effects of CAVs on local labour markets, the average level of education, taxation and other 
country-specific characteristics should be taken into account. However, Figure 26 indicates 
that workers in Eastern Europe are likely to be most affected by the automated driving 
technology. 
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Transport companies will increase productivity because autonomous trucks will be able to 
deliver freight 24 hours a day, seven days a week (Lanctot, 2017). Drivers in the 
occupation will be substituted by the new efficient technology. For illustrative purpose, a 
freight company that must ship 10 trucks a day will hire 15 full-time drivers that will work 
7 days out of 10. If truck platooning enables one person to drive 5 trucks, then the 
company needs now only 3 full-time employees that work 7 days out of 10. Effective labour 
market policies can affect the market outcomes through a planned system of incentives 
for firms to reduce individual employees’ working hours instead of displacing them and 
keep the same working hours for the remaining employees.  This makes it possible to 
equally share the productivity gains within the society, leading to shorter workweek and 
increased living standards (Center for Global Policy Solutions, 2017). Firms can in fact hire 
7 part-time employees that work 3 days out of 10 instead, which minimizes the social loss 
and makes the occupation attractive to women and older people as well. Even though 
productivity went up 5 times, flexible labour policies can make firms retain half of their 
workforce instead of one fifth.  
Hosts in the occupations will probably increase in number. The International Transport 
Forum (ITF, 2017) thinks that remote control rooms will be installed for fall-back driving 
performance (take control of an autonomous vehicle in emergency situations) or other fleet 
monitoring tasks. Similar centres are currently used to monitor driverless mining vehicles 
in Australia’s northwest (Somers and Weeratunga, 2015 as cited in ITF, 2017). Skilled and 
experienced drivers might change their occupations and become employed into monitoring 
and control rooms. The demand for these occupations will likely depend on the level of 
correlation between accidents (for example, a series of emergency situations originated 
from a snowfall) that will determine the simultaneous necessity of multiple operators at 
the control rooms (ITF, 2017). ICT professionals will also be demanded in the design and 
maintenance of these new tools. 
Within the period 2011-2015, the drivers employed in land transport had a negative 
employment growth of -0.7% (Fernández-Macías et al., 2016). The job is in the medium 
quantile with respect to hourly wages, in the medium-low quantile with respect to average 
educational level of job-holders and in the lowest quantile with respect to non-pecuniary 
job quality. 
ITF (2017) eventually estimates that the current 3.2 million truck-driving jobs in Europe 
may decrease to 2.3 or even up to 0.5 million by 2040 according to different scenarios.  
The market will have a mis-match between labour demand and supply increasing in the 
speed of technology uptake, ranging between 0.25 and 2.5 million of people. 
The White House (2016) place 1.35 to 1.7 million US heavy truck divers at risk from 
automation. 
For the scope of our analysis, we collected labour data of the EU from the LFS for the 
freight transport by road and removal services sector (NACE Rev. 2 H49.4) in 2015 (second 
quarter, Q2) within the current member states composition (28 countries). Below, the first 
graph (Figure 27) represents the relative age distribution of people working in the freight 
transport sector and educational distribution within the same age group. The second graph 
(Figure 28) represents instead the educational distribution in the sector among all age 
groups. The third graph (Figure 29) shows a comparison of relative age and education 
structure between 2008 (on the left side of the graph) and 2015 (on the right side) in 
percentage of the extracted sample within the same sector (134). These three types of 
graphs are also included for passenger transport and maintenance and repair sectors. 
The data extracted presents however a low level of reliability. Therefore, the elaboration 
serves only as indication and needs to be interpreted with caution. 
                                           
(134) The extraction comprises 22 European countries. Data for Belgium, Bulgaria, Denmark, Ireland, Latvia, and 
Slovenia is not available for both years’ data. Data for 2008 does not include Italy, United Kingdom and 
Cyprus. The data undisclosed due to confidentiality reasons accounts approximately to 3.5% of the 
population.  
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Figure 27. Age distribution – freight transport EU-28 (2015) 
 
Source: Own elaborations. 
Figure 28. Education distribution – freight transport EU-28 (2015) 
 
Source: Own elaborations. 
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Figure 29. Age-education distribution – freight transport EU-22 (2008-2015) 
 
Source: Own elaborations. 
Employment in freight transport shows an aging trend. Most notably, the age group 20-24 
and 25-29 lost around 5% of representation in seven years and many studies (Christidis 
et al., 2014 among the others) predict the trend to continue in the future. This puts the 
occupation at risk of labour supply shortage and lower adaptability. 
Most workers in the freight transport sector range between 35 and 50 years old and the 
age distribution is slightly skewed on the left. This might suggest working in the sector is 
strenuous and therefore, not suitable for aged workers. A 90% of the workers does not 
have a high education level (ISCED <4: Post-secondary non-tertiary education) and 28% 
of the total amount of workers have low education level (ISCED <2: less than lower 
secondary education). The proportion of highly educated workers is higher (more than 
10%) in the three youngest age groups and diminishes with age. 
Figure 30. Age-gender distribution in EU-28 land transport (Q2 2015), in thousands 
 
Source: Own elaborations. 
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Within the land transport sector, there is a great gender imbalance towards males, which 
comprises more than 85% of the employment in the sector (see Figure 30). Within different 
age groups, men are 82.7% in the 15-24 age range, 84.6% in the 25-49, 87.2% in 50-64, 
and 88.8% in 65+. This might suggest the gender employment gap is closing with 
generations but this is not particularly impressive after taking into account the higher 
fertility of women in older age groups. 
Altogether, the sector is notoriously at aging risk (ITF, 2017) and the workers employed 
typically have an educational attainment below average if compared to other sectors. Even 
if the sectors will probably experience productivity gains, if the technology will eventually 
substitute more than half of the workers in the sector, the incapability of these people to 
requalify accordingly will put them at risk. 
Passenger transport 
In 2015, 2 million European people were totally employed in the passenger transport 
sector, which is include the urban and suburban passenger land transport sector (NACE 
Rev. 2 H49.31), in the taxi operation sector (NACE Rev. 2 H49.32), and in the other 
passenger land transport n.e.c. sector (NACE Rev.2 H49.39). Figure 31 represents the 
share of employment in the passenger transport sector of the EU-28 total employment. 
The employment figure for the United Kingdom refers to 2014, the figure for Spain and 
France to 2013 and the figure for Finland to 2008 due to missing data for 2015. Data for 
Luxembourg and the Netherlands is confidential so it was not possible to report it. Figure 
32 represents the internal share of employment in the sector of the total employment 
within that country. 
Figure 31. Distribution of people employed in the EU taxi operation and urban, suburban, and 
other passenger land transport (2015) 
 
Source: Own elaborations. 
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Figure 32. Percentage of total employment working in taxi operation and urban, suburban, and 
other passenger land transport (2015) 
 
Source: Own elaborations. 
Compared to Figure 26 (Percentage of total employment working in freight transport by 
road and removal services), the relative employment in the passenger transport sector 
(Figure 31) is more equally divided across countries in the EU. No clear pattern based on 
geography can be found. Factors that may affect the size of the passenger transport sector 
and the employment in that sector are for example degree of privatization, legislation, size 
of the country and population density.  
For the scope of our analysis, we have collected labour data of the EU from the LFS for the 
passenger transport sector (NACE Rev. 2 H49.3) in 2015 (Q2) within the current member 
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states composition (28 countries). Figure 33 represents the relative age distribution of 
people working in the sector and educational distribution within the same age group. Figure 
34 represents instead the educational distribution among all age groups. As done for the 
freight transport sector, a comparison of relative age and education structure between 
2008 and 2015 is given in Figure 35. 
The data extracted presents however a low level of reliability. Therefore, the elaboration 
serves only as indication and needs to be interpreted with caution. 
Figure 33. Age distribution – passenger transport EU-28 (2015) 
 
Source: Own elaborations. 
Figure 34. Education distribution – passenger transport EU-28 (2015) 
 
Source: Own elaborations. 
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Figure 35. Age-education distribution – passenger transport EU-22 (2008-2015) 
 
Source: Own elaborations. 
Employment in passenger transport presents an older age structure compared to freight 
transport but evidence the same aging trend. Similarly, this puts the sector into an even 
higher shortage risk and lower degree of adaptability. 
Most workers in the passenger transport sector range between 40 and 60 years old and 
the age distribution is slightly skewed to the right. This puts the labour in the sector at risk 
of driver shortages after many will soon retire. Specifically, 87% of the workers do not 
have a high education level (ISCED <4: Post-secondary non-tertiary education) and 25% 
of the total amount of workers have low education level (ISCED <2: less than lower 
secondary education).  
The proportion of highly educated workers is highest in the five youngest age groups, 
ranging from 12% (in the 20-24 age range) to 21% (in the 35-39 age range). Conversely, 
the proportion of lower educated people increases with age. 
Altogether, the sector is prospected to have a lack of young labour supply to replace older 
workers once retired if the supply and demand of labour for different age groups will remain 
the same of 2015. For this reason, automation might come in help to bring equilibrium in 
the sector. However, the final employment balance might as well likely to be negative as 
much as AVs will be deployed.  
Insurance 
Vehicle insurance it is already legally mandatory so that the increasing value of vehicles 
will not have impacts on insurance demand. Little predictions can be made without knowing 
how the traffic legislation will evolve. To give an example, the legal responsibility of traffic 
accidents determine who will buy related insurance products. The demand for insurance is 
related both to consumers’ wealth and risk aversion. The reducing rate of incidents will 
affect the profitability of the sector depending on both wealth and the risk perception of 
autonomous driving. In other words, if consumers will overestimate the accident risk 
entailed in the new vehicles driving, then insurance companies have room to exploit 
people’s risk aversion and be able to sell insurance contracts with higher premiums. 
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Otherwise, if society will trust these vehicles, they might request insurance products less, 
reducing profits in the industry and consequently, decreasing labour demand and supply. 
It is possible to assume car manufacturers are risk-neutral and wealthy enough to pool 
risks and use the reducing rate of accidents to boost their profitability and reducing the 
one of insurances companies.  
There will be a shift in demand for skills than those currently requested. Insurance 
companies need to cooperate with government and car manufacturers so to have access 
to big data quantities coming from vehicle information or, otherwise, third parties might 
offer the insurance service. This may include navigator apps with much traffic data like 
Google Maps or Waze and car manufacturer themselves (Tesla is for example currently 
selling car insurance with their products) (Canaan, 2017). This way, insurance companies 
will increasingly demand workers with high data analytics skills so to ensure returns on the 
investment done. As cars will also be more endangered by informatics attacks and software 
failure, insurance firms will find themselves in need of ICT experts which can help designing 
relevant actuarial framework and models. 
Typically, jobs in insurance sector require high level of education and strong qualifications, 
both in ICT use and numeracy. Potential displaced employees might have not difficulties in 
re-qualify and change working sector. 
Maintenance and repair 
Currently 1.5 million people are employed in repair and maintenance of vehicles sector 
(NACE Rev. 2 G45.2) in 2015. Figure 36 represents the share of employment in the sector 
on the total EU-28 employment. Figure 37 represents the internal share of employment in 
the sector on the total employment within that country.  The total amount of employment 
in Bosnia and Herzegovina is not available in Eurostat, thus, the percentage figure is 
missing. 
Figure 36. Distribution of people employed in the EU maintenance and repair of motor vehicles 
(2015) 
 
Source: Own elaborations. 
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Figure 37. Percentage of total employment working in maintenance and repair of motor vehicles 
(2015) 
 
Source: Own elaborations. 
The relative share of total employment working in maintenance and repair of motor 
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the further development of the maintenance and repair of motor vehicles sector. Often 
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If autonomous cars will lower crash rate, then the demand for repair services will decline. 
Similarly, if autonomous cars will keep an optimal driving style (so without brusque breaks 
or with careful parking or keeping optimal engine rpm) that extends the lifetime of the 
vehicle, then the demand for maintenance services will decline. The maintenance and 
repair sector heavily rely on labour and part of the resulting employment decline will come 
from reduced demand and part from inability of certain workers to learn appropriate 
methods to deal with the new, complicated type of cars. However, the price of the service 
might increase because of the lower supply of qualified workforce, which would then 
receive a wage premium for their services over the unqualified mechanics, which goes 
along the inequality trend Europe is experiencing. Another dimension in which inequality 
will probably increase is in the profit share between car manufacturers and mechanics. If 
the large quantity of car data will end up in the hands of the car manufacturers, they can 
elaborate algorithms able to calculate the individual best moment to begin a pre-emptive 
maintenance procedure and communicate this to the driver. These procedures are likely 
carried out by mechanical centres under the supervision of the car manufacturer which will 
retain higher profits from the service offered due to their algorithm ownership and will 
leave workers with lower wages. Independent mechanics will experience then a lower 
demand and thus, lower salaries. Both channels improve market- and labour negotiation 
power of large car manufacturers firms, which necessarily increase inequality.  
Overall, Manyika et al. (2017) predicted a decline of minimum 25% of developed countries 
general mechanics in 2030 but a slight increase of maximum 5% of specialized mechanics 
and repair. 
For the scope of our analysis, we collected labour data of the European Union from the LFS 
for the repair and maintenance of vehicles sector (NACE Rev. 2 G45.2) in 2015 (Q2) within 
the current member states composition (28 countries). The first graph (Figure 38) 
represents the relative age distribution of people working in the sector and educational 
distribution within the same age group. The second graph (Figure 39) represents instead 
the educational distribution among all age groups. The third graph (Figure 40) shows the 
2008-2015 comparison of age-education distribution in the sector. 
The data extracted presents however a low level of reliability. Therefore, the elaboration 
serves only as indication and needs to be interpreted with caution. 
Figure 38. Age distribution in maintenance and repair, EU-28 (2015) 
 
Source: Own elaborations. 
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Figure 39. Education distribution – maintenance and repair EU-25 (2015) 
 
Source: Own elaborations. 
Figure 40. Age-education distribution – maintenance and repair EU-22 (2008-2015) 
 
Source: Own elaborations. 
The aging trend in the maintenance and repair sector is more moderate than in the 
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the younger generations. 
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Most workers in the maintenance and repair sector range between 30 and 45 years old but 
the age distribution is balanced. This puts the labour in the sector safe from aging trend if 
there will be perfect generation replacement, so, if the job will keep the same 
attractiveness to young people and if the work conditions will not worsen for elder 
professionals. An 89% of the workers do not have a high education level (ISCED <4: Post-
secondary non-tertiary education) and 27% of the total amount of workers have low 
education level (ISCED <2: less than lower secondary education). 
The proportion of highly educated workers is higher (more than 12%) in the five youngest 
age groups and diminishes with age. 
Within the wholesale and retail trade and repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles sector, 
there is a great gender imbalance towards males, which comprises 85% of the employment 
in the sector (see Figure 41). Within different age groups, men are 89.2% in the 15-24 
age range, 84.6% in the 25-49, 83.8% in 50-64, and 82.6% in 65+.  
Figure 41. Age-gender distribution in EU-25 Wholesale and retail trade, and EU-25 Repair of 
motor vehicles and motorcycles (Q2 2015), in thousands 
 
Source: Own elaborations. 
Altogether, workers in this sector will require new training to keep performing the job after 
AVs deployment. The innovations will likely generate new professional figures who will 
team with traditional mechanics as long as the AVs will not be predominant. The internal 
competition in the sector will increase with time for those who will not stay updated with 
the new maintenance procedures. The young age profile in the sector employment is 
promising with respect to the learning capabilities of the workers.  
Others 
AVs are likely to be used more in road freight, which is an intermediate input to other 
goods. In general, a cheaper service will generate a positive employment effect coming in 
the reduction of production costs for downstream firms and increase in demand for services 
offered by road transport companies, for upstream firms, and those that offer 
complementary services.  
Summary 
Economic effects of CAVs will affect in the same direction employment in different sectors. 
However, there might be an opposite (and negative) impact in sectors where labour might 
be substituted or where task changes in the occupation will be so drastic that workers 
unable to requalify will not find a market for their abilities and might eventually exit the 
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profession. This might be the case of drivers and mechanics. According to the descriptive 
statistics and studies presented in the earlier chapters, the two occupations are at risk of 
automation or technology unemployment, which are made more severe by the relatively 
lower level of education among employees and older age structure in those sectors. The 
upcoming technological advancement in the transport sector is estimated to benefit high-
skilled workers. Not only high-skilled workers in the transport sector will profit from the 
adaption of new technologies, but also workers in the other sectors, such as IT and 
telecommunication, are predicted to face an upward shift in labour demand. Moreover, the 
boundaries between sectors that demand higher level of education may fade. 
Technological development and digitalisation tend to create more jobs than are lost due to 
the labour substitution effect (ITF, 2017). However, the reconstruction of labour markets 
may create structural unemployment, particularly harming lower-educated workers that in 
turn, can lead to increased inequality. 
In order to provide a comprehensive picture of the possible effects on different sectors, 
more specific data and complex modelling would be required, but still this would include 
the difficult task of projecting the future social structure, both in terms of acceptance and 
uptake of the new technology. 
Moreover, in our analysis we have disregarded the impact of legislation and policies on the 
adaption of automated driving technology. For this reason, the time frame for technological 
adaption is hard to predict. The faster the changes are the larger are the labour market 
disruptions. 
Nonetheless, the rough estimations of the sectors’ average age and level of education can 
provide information about the possible development paths. In general, knowledge-based 
sectors and occupations are predicted to gain comparative advantage whereas sectors with 
manual tasks are in danger to face labour market disruptions. Aging population and 
decreasing population growth may stabilize the labour market effects of CAVs in Europe 
but the impacts of the aging population as a stabilizing factor should be interpreted 
cautiously.  
3.3.2 Impact of AV technologies on skills 
On the basis of the employment effects identified in this study, an analysis of gaps and 
needs in relation to the skills that will be associated to the future employment is made.  
As our previous employment analysis has revealed, the freight transport sector has been 
identified as the one where the most significant labour changes may take place as a result 
of automation. Also, sectors where new jobs may be created are mostly those related to 
ICT, jointly with digital services, electronics and robotics (the latter ones are coming from 
an EESC opinion, European Economic and Social Committee, 2017). In such a changing 
workforce landscape, the demand for skills will evolve significantly. It will require an 
increased investment in education and skills to support people in their adaptation to 
technological change along their careers (Hawksworth et al., 2018). 
It is expected that physical and routine tasks will be reduced, whereas problem-solving 
and creative tasks are likely to increase (European Economic and Social Committee, 2017). 
Broad-based competencies will be increasingly demanded (European Economic and Social 
Committee, 2017). A Commission communication from 2017 (European Commission, 
2017c) has evidenced the increasing demand for ICT skills in particular for vehicle 
manufacturing and maintenance workers. 
Reskilling will also be needed for professional drivers (European Commission, 2017c). 
Specifically, drivers in the freight sector will be increasingly faced to new and expanded 
responsibilities, like potentially the management, operation and maintenance of fleets of 
AVs (Rea et al., 2017). Such new roles would require new competences. For instance, fleet 
monitors would need to know how to operate tracking systems, dynamic routing and AV 
technologies. In a recent survey conducted by CEDEFOP (European Skills and Jobs Survey, 
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ESJ (135)), five main skills have been identified for drivers and mobile plant operators (ISCO 
83). These are: problem solving, job-specific skills, teamwork, communication and 
learning. An increasing dependence on ICT-based and specialised equipment is also 
highlighted, in particular for those workers in the land transport sector (NACE H49). 
Consequently, future occupations will demand new and more advanced skills in engineering 
and ICT, together with knowledge on how to use specific software and novel technologies 
like AVs or platooning. 
Similarly, mechanics in the maintenance and repair sector would need to learn how to 
repair CAV systems of increasing complexity (Rea et al., 2017). Other occupations, like 
police officers, would also need to know how CAV technologies work and the underlying 
regulations (Rea et al., 2017).  
In the future, there will be an increasing demand for high-skilled professionals (such as 
software developers, European Economic and Social Committee, 2017). Almost half of all 
job offerings by 2025 will demand higher qualifications, which are generally linked to 
academic and professional programmes at tertiary level (European Commission, 2016b). 
Increases in skills and education are associated to a growth in productivity and GDP per 
capita (European Commission, 2016b). Acknowledging the need to adapt, among the ten 
actions identified in the New Skills Agenda for Europe adopted in June 2016, the ‘Digital 
Skills and Jobs Coalition’ action is aimed at improving the digital skills of the wider 
population, and not just addressed to IT professionals. 
In this context, a shortage of ICT professionals has been identified for 2020 (European 
Commission, 2016b). Such estimate urges on the necessity to face future skills by adapting 
education and training programs. The OECD Survey of Adult Skills (OECD, 2016) has 
revealed that higher proficiency in literacy, numeracy and problem solving in technology-
rick environments usually leads to better labour market outcomes (getting an employment 
and earning higher salaries), compared to adults with lower skills. A more intense use of 
information-processing skills tends to be associated to higher salaries. At work, the most 
frequently used skills are writing and problem solving, followed by reading skills, whereas 
numeracy and ICT skills are the least used ones. In some countries/economies, adults with 
poor literacy and numeracy skills may have difficulties in the use of information 
technologies, which could hinder their labour market outcomes. Thus, policies targeting an 
improvement in adults’ ICT competences should cover both the enhancement of literacy 
and numeracy skills and the access to technology. Two important perspectives are given: 
the need to have an education and training system that matches the skills required in the 
labour market, and the need to ensure that the labour market matches employees to jobs 
where they can put their human capital to the best use. These are crucial aspects if a 
strong and inclusive growth is to be promoted, being equally important for individuals and 
society as for the economy. 
A forward-thinking talent model that is able to attract, retain and develop a new digital 
labour force in accordance to the evolving needs is identified as a likely challenge in (Rea 
et al., 2017). Though some degree of mismatch of qualifications and skills is unavoidable 
in a dynamic economy, as jobs gradually change in relation to technological and 
organisational development, customers’ demand and changes in labour supply (OECD, 
2015 as cited in OECD, 2016). Currently, 30% of higher education graduates in Europe are 
working in jobs that actually require a lower qualification while at the same time 40% of 
employers cannot find workers with the right set of skills as required for the open positions 
(136). Although education and training is the competence of EU Member States, the fact 
that they face similar challenges and opportunities makes it relevant to have initiatives for 
skills at European level, like the New Skills Agenda for Europe (European Commission, 
2016c). 
                                           
(135) CEDEFOP European skills and jobs (ESJ) survey, available at: http://www.cedefop.europa.eu/en/events-and-
projects/projects/european-skills-and-jobs-esj-survey (last accessed 5 April 2018). 
(136) European Commission Employment, Social Affairs & Inclusion (section on skills) website, available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=1146 (last accessed 5 April 2018).  
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Future growth and jobs will depend on the reskilling and upskilling of European citizens 
and workforce as well as on the awareness raising and support initiatives offered to users 
in response to the transformation of businesses brought in by CCAM. EU countries, 
employers’ associations, trade unions, industry and other stakeholders are called on to 
face these challenges. In this context, legacy industries facing automation would be 
particularly challenged, such as the land transport sector. 
For the broader drivers’ population, it is evident that the driving activity will be gradually 
changing as more automation is introduced into the vehicles. These changing 
circumstances will require different skills, especially to monitor the normal functioning of 
the automated driving systems (i.e. supervision and selective intervention skills against 
manual control and manoeuvring skills; as described in Spulber and Wallace, 2016), up to 
the point where no human intervention will be required with fully automated driving 
systems. As automation gradually takes over vehicle control, the lack of frequent driving 
can create the risk that drivers no longer possess the skills required to safely regain vehicle 
control in handover situations (Meschtscherjakov et al., 2018). Understanding the 
automated driving systems functioning will be essential for the safe operation of AVs, for 
which the highly heterogeneous vehicle systems could represent a challenge (Spulber and 
Wallace, 2016). As automation is gradually deployed, progressive and continuous training 
could become more relevant than the current one-off initial training (Spulber and Wallace, 
2016). This will have an effect on the training provided through driving schools for 
obtaining a driving license. 
3.3.3 Concluding remarks on employment and skills 
The concerns on job destruction by machines can be dated back to the first industrial 
revolution. The short run effects of effective technologies implementation negatively 
impacted workers (The White House, 2016) but on the long run, technology advancements 
eventually led to higher job creation (ITF, 2017). In general, estimating the number of 
jobs at risk of automation has been proved difficult and can lead to completely different 
results depending on minor changes applied in the approach used. Frey and Osborne 
(2017) find for example that 47% of US jobs are at risk of computerisation but Arntz et al. 
(2016) find that only 9% of jobs in OECD countries is at risk instead. The former study 
estimates the share of jobs threatened by automation based on experts opinion over 
specific occupations while the latter uses the same methodology but with a task-based 
approach, so based on the same experts predictions but estimating the degree of their 
automation-risk predictions on the proportion of automatable task within each occupation.  
At the present state of art, AVs cannot perform all the tasks required in most driving-
related jobs and there is much uncertainty if they will ever do (Litman, 2018). However, a 
partial tasks substitution (e.g. platooning substitutes the tasks that now strictly require a 
second driver to perform) will increase competition in the lower-skills labour market. 
Firstly, because the tasks substitution by AVs will make the job appealing for more people 
that previously had a dislike for driving (Miller, J., 2015). Secondly, because lower demand 
for drivers will make the transport sector less accessible. The competition effect will not 
only be restricted to the transport sector but to all the other lower-skilled occupations 
where displaced drivers will apply (The White House, 2016).  
According to our estimations, workers endangered of technological substitution (drivers 
and mobile plant operators, ISCO 83, International Labour Organization) working in land 
transport (NACE 49) amount to approximately 1.5% of total EU-15 employment in 2012 
and those who require new training to keep performing the job (metal, machinery and 
related trades, ISCO 72) in wholesale, retail and repair of motor vehicles (NACE 45) 
amount to 0.7% of total EU-15 employment in 2012. It also seems evident that 
employment effects will not only be restricted to the land transport sector but will impact 
all sectors that employ drivers such as warehousing and support, wholesale trade or postal 
and courier activities. ITF (2017) estimates that the current 3.2 million truck-driving jobs 
in Europe may decrease to 2.3 or even up to 0.5 million by 2040 according to different 
scenarios. A slow CAV uptake or an informative awareness campaign can lead workers to 
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qualify on time and mitigate the transition costs for them (ITF, 2017). Retraining or income 
assistance programs are mechanisms that can support the transition (Rea et al., 2017).  
It is relevant to note that both occupations under study (ISCO 72 and 83) have low levels 
of ICT use, whereas ICT skills will be increasingly demanded in the future. CEDEFOP 
(2016) highlights the increasing land transport sector dependency on ICT-based and 
specialized equipment and products. Thierer and Hagemann (2015) also emphasize the 
need for ICT skills in addition to the traditional vehicle repair skills. In this context, a 
shortage of ICT professionals has been identified for 2020 (European Commission, 2016b). 
If the demanded skills can be matched in the future, there could be opportunities for 
reallocation of employees. For instance, Thierer and Hagemann (2015) claim that in the 
future some highly qualified mechanics might move over to higher-paying jobs in the 
information sector. ITF (2017) also postulates that skilled and experienced drivers could 
be demanded in the case that remote control rooms are installed for CAVs monitoring.  
Inequality between low-skilled and high-skilled workers will widen. AVs can make some 
sectors more profitable but most of the benefits will be reaped by those highly skilled 
workers who can either produce and repair the new vehicles or those who get more 
productive with the additional time previously spent in transport activities. This has been 
proved to be the case in other non-transport-related sectors (as stated in e.g. ITF, 2017; 
The White House, 2016; Arntz et al., 2016; Frey and Osborne, 2017; OECD, 2016). The 
European Commission highlights that by 2025, about 50% of EU’s jobs offerings will target 
highly qualified people (European Commission, 2016c). However, another aspect to 
consider is the easier geographical connectivity facilitated by CAV technologies, which could 
enable workers to accept jobs from firms previously rejected due to distance to the 
workplace or because less accessible in general (Litman, 2018). This effect is likely to be 
positive on labour market participation and on skills match between employers-employees.  
Another challenge is predicting what kind of new occupations will be created in the 
future. Even though recent labour market experiences suggest that those will be mostly 
skewed on the higher part of the skill distribution (ITF, 2017), it is very difficult to 
determine the qualifications and characteristics of the future jobs demanded by the 
economy.  
At the level of skills required for driving a CAV, the automation of the driving task will 
increasingly require supervision and selective intervention skills in opposition to manual 
control and manoeuvring skills (Spulber and Wallace, 2016). Understanding the automated 
driving systems functioning will also be essential for a safe operation of AVs for which the 
highly heterogeneous vehicle systems could represent a challenge (Spulber and Wallace, 
2016). As automation is gradually deployed, progressive and continuous training could 
become more relevant than the current one-off initial training (Spulber and Wallace, 2016). 
The impacts of CCAM on employment are largely influenced by the speed of introduction 
of the new technologies and mobility changes. The more gradual the introduction will be 
the higher the probability that the negative implications on employment will be absorbed 
by the economic system of the European society. 
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4 Limitations of the study and future lines of work 
4.1 Limitations of the study 
Along the study, some simplifying assumptions have been adopted given the uncertainty 
and complexity of the topic under study, as well as the lack of data. These should be 
relaxed in the future, accounting for additional insights onto CAVs behaviour and effects in 
different areas. Although it is implicitly considered in the narrative used to define the 
different scenarios, the study does not consider interaction effects among sectors and 
complexity causal loops. Substitution effects are not considered neither. The estimations 
may therefore suffer from some double counting and from non-linear effects that cannot 
be properly addressed in the present work.  
In addition, the economic impacts have to be seen as the global impacts of the introduction 
of CAVs to the European case. How much of these impacts will contribute to the European 
economy has still to be seen. Much will depend on the capability of the European industry 
to keep the pace of new competitors especially from the communication and IT sectors, as 
well as on the ability of education stakeholders to take anticipatory actions that address 
the skills needed in the future. It is also worth mentioning that the indicator to measure 
the economic impacts are the potential revenues. The impact on the future European Value 
Added has not been considered at this stage.  
The reader is invited to consider the estimations presented in this study as indications of 
future trends and not in absolute terms. 
4.2 Methodological approach for future studies 
The present JRC study stands as a preliminary exploratory research activity that will feed 
into a larger project whose aim is to go deeper into the analysis of the possible impacts of 
future mobility scenarios on EU employment and the macro-economic changes connected 
to the mobility revolution. The project’s goal is to support the social dimension of impact 
assessments dealing with European transport strategies. For that purpose, different units 
from the JRC are collaborating, cross-cutting and combining social sciences, economics 
and engineering, on the basis of robust science. The approach and ambition of this project 
go well beyond the state of the art of current studies in the field. Overall, efforts will be 
placed in capturing the dynamics and causal loops intrinsic to the European economic 
sector, addressing the limitations of the present study. 
A first research line will analyse the job impact and employment intensity of all segments 
of the transport sector (manufacturing, maintenance services, as well as transport 
services) with a bottom-up data driven assessment approach. It will combine various 
statistical resources from Eurostat with other data (including business data and big data) 
to derive a detailed and complete picture of the EU transport sector with Member State 
detail. The bottom-up approach will also include, to the extent possible, the socio-economic 
stratification and skills of workforce. An important step forward will be the analysis of the 
occupational distribution within each analysed sector, aiming at understanding how the 
existing occupational breakdown of each sector will evolve in different possible future 
scenarios. For that purpose, the task contents of occupations can be used to predict the 
potential impact of automation at an occupational level. This methodology will be partially 
based on previous pioneering JRC work to assess job impacts of new transport regulation 
and transport workers’ skills, renewable electricity deployment, of the deployment of 
alternative fuels infrastructure and future car CO2 regulation.  
The second research line will build on the previous one and integrate (to the extent 
possible) the detailed bottom-up employment data, combined with an improved and 
extended technological representation of the transport sector, into the global macro-
economic, JRC’s General Equilibrium Model for Economy-Energy-Environment, JRC-GEM-
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E3 model (137). This model will also allow to analyse the macro-economic impacts of 
different mobility scenarios, various low-carbon policies, shifts in global value chains, trade 
and tax policies, energy security issues (like the Iran oil embargo of 2012). The JRC-GEM-
E3 model has been used intensively by DG CLIMA and DG ENER over the last 10 years for 
their impact assessments and has a proven policy and academic track record (138). 
Besides supporting the assessment of employment impacts of future Commission proposals 
(in transport and beyond), this project will provide support to policy development for 
inclusive growth in the context of the Low-Emission Mobility Strategy as well as Agenda 
for Jobs, Growth and Investment, and allow the Commission to better assess policy 
initiatives to foster employment and foresee and mitigate any possible negative social 
impacts. Better analytical capabilities of JRC-GEM-E3 model may benefit other activities 
under the Energy Union (and beyond) such as the macro-economic scenarios in support to 
POTEnCIA (Policy Oriented Tool for Energy and Climate Change Impact Assessment) 
analyses, and GECO (Global Energy and Climate Outlook) reports in context of the 
international climate negotiations (in combination with the POLES model). 
A first overview to the activities that will form the basis of this future project is given below: 
1. Project coordination to ensure the proper progress of the different tasks and 
adopt the necessary adjustments to guarantee that project deadlines are met in a 
timely manner. 
2. Establishment of a bottom-up methodology to analyse job impacts and job shifts 
in the transport sector; extend the JRC-GEM-E3 model with a much better 
representation of the transport sector (both technologies and in employment). 
3. Identification of yet realistic (possibly disruptive) mobility scenarios for a 
transition towards highly automated and electrified road transport by or beyond 
2050. 
4. Exploration of policy options and strategies for enhancing positive job impacts 
and mitigating negative job impacts caused by a smart mobility revolution 
combining the various developed and improved tools in the project with a qualitative 
framing of possible barriers and other social dimensions. 
5. Policy user group establishment, to profit from further collaboration 
opportunities. 
Other future and on-going activities could also benefit from the outcomes of the present 
study, helping to understand the relative importance of each of the sectors of the EU 
economy that will most likely be affected by CCAM, as well as potential effects on the 
workforce and skills. As an example, the following on-going project has been identified as 
relevant to the cope of this study (among the recent projects funded with Horizon 2020 
calls (139)): 
— Piloting Automated Driving on European Roads - L3Pilot (140) 
L3Pilot belongs to the ART-02-2016 H2020 call and is an innovation action with a 
budget of roughly 47 million euros coordinated by Volkswagen AG and joining efforts 
of 34 partners. 11 European countries, 100 vehicles and 1000 test drivers. The tested 
functions cover a wide range from parking to urban and highway driving, which will 
                                           
(137) European Commission EU Science Hub General Equilibrium Model for Economy-Energy-Environment (JRC-
GEM-E3) description website, available at: https://ec.europa.eu/jrc/en/gem-e3/model?search (last accessed 
5 April 2018).  
(138) JRC-GEM-E3 list of related publications available at: https://ec.europa.eu/jrc/en/gem-e3/publications (last 
accessed 5 April 2018). 
(139) European Commission Innovation and Networks Executive Agency (INEA) H2020 Automated Road Transport 
list of related projects available at:  https://ec.europa.eu/inea/en/horizon-2020/h2020-transport/projects-
by-field/automated-road-transport (last accessed 5 April 2018). 
(140) L3Pilot project website available at: http://www.l3pilot.eu/home/ (last accessed 5 April 2018). 
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provide valuable data for evaluation of technical aspects, user acceptance, driving and 
travel behaviour as well as on the impact on traffic and society. 
— Trilateral Working Group on Automation in Road Transportation (Innamaa et 
al., 2017) 
A framework for assessing the impacts of AVs is under preparation within the Trilateral 
Working Group on Automation in Road Transportation among EU, US and Japan 
stakeholders. In it, direct and indirect impacts are identified, the latter representing 
broader effects resulting from a chain of direct impacts (“ripple effect”) (Innamaa et 
al., 2017). Socio-economic effects belong to this category of indirect impacts. For 
instance, improvements in safety, use of driving time, or emissions will have long-term 
economic impacts. Some possible KPIs in this area are: GDP, productivity estimates, 
work time lost from traffic crashes, work time gained due to multitask while travelling, 
labour force participation rate. 
Other currently on-going Horizon 2020 calls of relevance to this field are the following, 
especially the ones highlighted in bold (European Commission, 2017n): 
— Call ‘Digitising and Transforming European Industry and Services: Automated Road 
Transport’ H2020-DT-ART-2018-2020, under the Smart, green and integrated 
transport workprogramme: 
o DT-ART-01-2018: Testing, validation and certification procedures for highly 
automated driving functions under various traffic scenarios based on pilot test 
data  
o DT-ART-02-2018: Support for networking activities and impact 
assessment for road automation  
o DT-ART-03-2019: Human centred design for the new driver role in highly 
automated vehicles  
o DT-ART-04-2019: Developing and testing shared, connected and cooperative 
automated vehicle fleets in urban areas for the mobility of all  
o DT-ART-05-2020: Efficient and safe connected and automated heavy-duty 
vehicles in real logistics operations (forthcoming) 
o DT-ART-06-2020: Large-scale, cross-border demonstration of highly automated 
driving functions for passenger cars (forthcoming) 
— Public Procurement along 2018-2019 - Exploring the possible employment 
implications of connected and automated driving. 
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5 Conclusions 
The present study has evidenced some main challenges and opportunities linked to the 
transition towards a future CCAM mobility, which will need to be faced in order to unlock 
the unprecedented benefits that CAV technologies could bring to our society and economy.  
In particular, the study has evidenced the following key conclusions: 
— In economic terms, it is expected that CCAM provides profitable opportunities for 
sectors like automotive, electronics and software, telecommunication, data services, 
digital media and freight transport; mostly as a consequence of increased vehicle sales, 
data exchanges and services, and more efficient transport operations.  
— Sectors like insurance and maintenance and repair are however identified as businesses 
that might suffer important decreases in revenues in the future, especially as a result 
of decreased accidents. Although new revenue opportunities are also expected to 
appear, the overall long-term effect is expected to be negative. 
— The economic impacts of CCAM will reach other sectors like construction of roads, land 
development, or health, especially in the long-term.  
— At a societal level, a CCAM mobility could bring important safety and productivity gains. 
Nevertheless, some important concerns exist, such as users’ acceptance, ethics, social 
inclusion, or labour. 
— Specifically, important labour changes lie ahead for professional drivers, decreasing 
driving responsibilities towards the acquisition of new and more technical roles. Some 
of these jobs will disappear in the long-term and anticipatory actions remain a crucial 
mechanism to ensure that workers receive support and retraining opportunities. 
Concerns around inequality might also exist. 
— At the level of skills, ICT competences will be increasingly demanded in the future, e.g. 
in manufacturing, maintenance and transport-related jobs. The skills required for 
driving a vehicle will also change as automation gains full control of the vehicle, e.g. 
requiring more supervision and selective skills. 
Overall, the impacts of CCAM on the economy and society are expected to be positive. It 
is nevertheless highly important to emphasise the great transformational power that CCAM 
entails and the fact that there will be both losers and winners in the mobility transition. It 
becomes then crucial to anticipate the needs that come along the new business 
opportunities and workforce evolution.  
Although the scenarios analysed in this study do not represent a forecast of impacts, they 
help to illustrate a set of possible effects that will drive fundamental changes in different 
sectors of our economy. The specific calculations are subject to a great uncertainty though, 
as the evolution of prices of technologies and market penetration rates are still highly 
unknown. Also, little is known about the long-term effects of a CCAM mobility in terms of 
traffic flows, travel and vehicle use patterns, among other impacts. Thus, the focus shall 
not be paid on the precise estimations given in this study, if not as qualitative indications 
of possible future evolution paths. More studies are needed to explore the range of 
potential impacts and build knowledge in this area.  
In particular, the outcomes of this initial assessment will be used as an input to a more 
thorough study where the different elements identified at this stage will be integrated in a 
modelling framework able to handle the dynamics and the causal loops intrinsic of the 
European economic sector. 
Policymakers, industry and education players in Europe shall then seize the opportunity of 
capturing the indicated benefits within the EU by adopting broad sets of measures, 
especially given the relevance of sectors like automotive, electronics and software or 
freight transport in Europe. The same holds true for the minimisation of the potential 
negative implications. This study does not claim to be the final word, rather to provide 
input to current discussions and research efforts through an exploration of possible socio-
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economic changes and preparatory actions, which could contribute to shape the future 
mobility in compliance of specified policy targets. We are confident that the findings 
presented in this study will contribute to the ongoing debate on the type and magnitude of 
potential impacts of CCAM in the European economy and society.  
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Annexes 
Annex 1. Definitions of economic sectors 
Table 44 shows the sectors analysed in this study, based on the Nomenclature statistique des Activités économiques dans la Communauté 
Européenne (NACE) Rev. 2 classification of economic activities (Eurostat, 2008). 
Table 44. Sectors analysed in the present study, combining relevant NACE Rev. 2 classes of economic activities 
Sector Code Description Detailed description 
Automotive C27.11 
Manufacture of 
electric motors, 
generators and 
transformers 
This class includes: 
— manufacture of electric motors (except internal combustion engine starting motors) 
— manufacture of distribution transformers, electric 
— manufacture of arc-welding transformers 
— manufacture of fluorescent ballasts (i.e. transformers) 
— manufacture of substation transformers for electric power distribution 
— manufacture of transmission and distribution voltage regulators 
— manufacture of power generators (except battery charging alternators for internal 
combustion engines) 
— manufacture of motor generator sets (except turbine generator set units) 
— rewinding of armatures on a factory basis 
This class excludes: 
— manufacture of electronic component-type transformers and switches, see 26.11 
— manufacture of electric welding and soldering equipment, see 27.90 
— manufacture of solid state inverters, rectifiers and converters, see 27.90 
— manufacture of turbine-generator sets, see 28.11 
— manufacture of starting motors and generators for internal combustion engines, see 
29.31 
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Sector Code Description Detailed description 
Automotive 
(continued) 
C27.40 
Manufacture of 
electric lighting 
equipment 
This class includes:  
— manufacture of discharge, incandescent, fluorescent, ultra-violet, infra-red etc. lamps, 
fixtures and bulbs  
— manufacture of ceiling lighting fixtures  
— manufacture of chandeliers  
— manufacture of table lamps (i.e. lighting fixture)  
— manufacture of Christmas tree lighting sets  
— manufacture of electric fireplace logs  
— manufacture of flashlights 
— manufacture of electric insect lamps  
— manufacture of lanterns (e.g. carbide, electric, gas, gasoline, kerosene)  
— manufacture of spotlights 
— manufacture of street lighting fixtures (except traffic signals) 
— manufacture of lighting equipment for transportation equipment (e.g. for motor vehicles, 
aircraft, boats)  
— manufacture of non-electrical lighting equipment 
This class excludes:  
— manufacture of glassware and glass parts for lighting fixtures, see 23.19  
— manufacture of current-carrying wiring devices for lighting fixtures, see 27.33  
— manufacture of ceiling fans or bath fans with integrated lighting fixtures, see 27.51 
— manufacture of electrical signalling equipment such as traffic lights and pedestrian 
signalling equipment, see 27.90  
— manufacture of electrical signs, see 27.90 
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Sector Code Description Detailed description 
Automotive 
(continued) 
C28.11 
Manufacture of 
engines and 
turbines, except 
aircraft, vehicle 
and cycle 
engines 
This class includes:  
— manufacture of internal combustion piston engines, except motor vehicle, aircraft and 
cycle propulsion  engines:  
o marine engines 
o railway engines 
— manufacture of pistons, piston rings, carburettors and such for all internal combustion 
engines, diesel  engines etc. 
— manufacture of inlet and exhaust valves of internal combustion engines 
— manufacture of turbines and parts thereof: 
o steam turbines and other vapour turbines 
o hydraulic turbines, waterwheels and regulators thereof 
o wind turbines 
o gas turbines, except turbojets or turbo propellers for aircraft propulsion 
— manufacture of boiler-turbine sets 
— manufacture of turbine-generator sets 
— manufacture of engines for industrial application 
This class excludes: 
— manufacture of electric generators (except turbine generator sets), see 27.11 
— manufacture of prime mover generator sets (except turbine generator sets), see 27.11 
— manufacture of electrical equipment and components of internal combustion engines, 
see 29.31 
— manufacture of motor vehicle, aircraft or cycle propulsion engines, see 29.10, 30.30, 
30.91 
— manufacture of turbojets and turbo propellers, see 30.30 
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Sector Code Description Detailed description 
Automotive 
(continued) 
C29 
Manufacture of 
motor vehicles, 
trailers and 
semi-trailers 
This division includes the manufacture of motor vehicles for transporting passengers or 
freight. The manufacture of various parts and accessories, as well as the manufacture of 
trailers and semi-trailers, is included here. The maintenance and repair of vehicles 
produced in this division are classified in 45.20. 
G45.1 
Sale of cars and 
light motor 
vehicles 
This class includes: 
— wholesale and retail sale of new and used vehicles:  
o passenger motor vehicles, including specialised passenger motor vehicles such as 
ambulances and minibuses, etc. (with a weight not exceeding 3,5 tons) 
— wholesale and retail sale of off-road motor vehicles (with a weight not exceeding 3,5 
tons) 
This class excludes:  
— wholesale and retail sale of parts and accessories for motor vehicles, see 45.3  
— renting of motor vehicles with driver, see 49.3  
— renting of motor vehicles without driver, see 77.1  
G45.3 
Sale of motor 
vehicle parts 
and accessories 
This group includes wholesale and retail trade of all kinds of parts, components, supplies, 
tools and accessories for  
motor vehicles, such as:  
o rubber tyres and inner tubes for tyres 
o spark plugs, batteries, lighting equipment and electrical parts 
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Sector Code Description Detailed description 
Electronics 
and software 
C26.20 
Manufacture of 
computers and 
peripheral 
equipment 
This class includes the manufacture and/or assembly of electronic computers, such as 
mainframes, desktop computers, laptops and computer servers; and computer peripheral 
equipment, such as storage devices and input/output devices (printers, monitors, 
keyboards). Computers can be analog, digital, or hybrid. Digital computers, the most 
common type, are devices that do all of the following: (1) store the processing program or 
programs and the data immediately necessary for the execution of the program, (2) can 
be freely programmed in accordance with the requirements of the user, (3) perform 
arithmetical computations specified by the user and (4) execute, without human 
intervention, a processing program that requires the computer to modify its execution by 
logical decision during the processing run. Analog computers are capable of simulating 
mathematical models and comprise at least analog control and programming elements. 
This class includes: 
— manufacture of desktop computers 
— manufacture of laptop computers 
— manufacture of main frame computers 
— manufacture of hand-held computers (e.g. PDA) 
— manufacture of magnetic disk drives, flash drives and other storage devices 
— manufacture of optical (e.g. CD-RW, CD-ROM, DVD-ROM, DVD-RW) disk drives 
— manufacture of printers 
— manufacture of monitors 
— manufacture of keyboards 
— manufacture of all types of mice, joysticks, and trackball accessories 
— manufacture of dedicated computer terminals 
— manufacture of computer servers 
— manufacture of scanners, including bar code scanners 
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Sector Code Description Detailed description 
Electronics 
and software 
(continued) 
C26.20 
(conti-
nued) 
Manufacture of 
computers and 
peripheral 
equipment 
(continued) 
— manufacture of smart card readers 
— manufacture of virtual reality helmets 
— manufacture of computer projectors (video beamers) 
— manufacture of computer terminals, like automatic teller machines (ATM’s), point-of-
sale (POS) terminals, not mechanically operated 
— manufacture of multi-function office equipment performing two or more of following 
functions: printing, scanning, copying, faxing 
This class excludes: 
— reproduction of recorded media (computer media, sound, video, etc.), see 18.20 
— manufacture of electronic components and electronic assemblies used in computers and 
peripherals, see 26.1 
— manufacture of internal/external computer modems, see 26.12 
— manufacture of interface cards, modules and assemblies, see 26.12 
— manufacture of loaded electronic boards, see 26.12 
— manufacture of modems, carrier equipment, see 26.30 
— manufacture of digital communication switches, data communications equipment (e.g. 
bridges, routers, gateways), see 26.30 
— manufacture of consumer electronic devices, such as CD players and DVD players, see 
26.40 
— manufacture of television monitors and displays, see 26.40 
— manufacture of video game consoles, see 26.40 
— manufacture of blank optical and magnetic media for use with computers or other 
devices, see 26.80 
 
 185 
Sector Code Description Detailed description 
Electronics 
and software 
(continued) 
C26.40 
Manufacture of 
consumer 
electronics 
This class includes the manufacture of electronic audio and video equipment for home 
entertainment, motor vehicle, public address systems and musical instrument 
amplification. 
This class includes: 
— manufacture of video cassette recorders and duplicating equipment 
— manufacture of televisions 
— manufacture of television monitors and displays 
— manufacture of audio recording and duplicating systems 
— manufacture of stereo equipment 
— manufacture of radio receivers 
— manufacture of speaker systems 
— manufacture of household-type video cameras 
— manufacture of jukeboxes 
— manufacture of amplifiers for musical instruments and public address systems 
— manufacture of microphones 
— manufacture of CD and DVD players 
— manufacture of karaoke machines 
— manufacture of headphones (e.g. radio, stereo, computer) 
— manufacture of video game consoles 
This class excludes: 
— reproduction of recorded media (computer media, sound, video, etc.), see 18.2 
— manufacture of computer peripheral devices and computer monitors, see 26.20 
— manufacture of telephone answering machines, see 26.30 
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Sector Code Description Detailed description 
Electronics 
and software 
(continued) 
C26.40 
(conti-
nued) 
Manufacture of 
consumer 
electronics 
(continued) 
— manufacture of paging equipment, see 26.30 
— manufacture of remote control devices (radio and infrared), see 26.30 
— manufacture of broadcast studio equipment such as reproduction equipment, 
transmitting and receiving antennas, commercial video cameras, see 26.30 
— manufacture of antennas, see 26.30 
— manufacture of digital cameras, see 26.70 
— manufacture of electronic games with fixed (non-replaceable) software, see 32.40 
C26.51 
Manufacture of 
instruments and 
appliances for 
measuring, 
testing and 
navigation 
This class comprises manufacturing of search, detection, navigation, guidance, 
aeronautical, and nautical systems and instruments; automatic controls and regulators for 
applications, such as heating, air conditioning, refrigeration and appliances; instruments 
and devices for measuring, displaying, indicating, recording, transmitting, and controlling 
temperature, humidity, pressure, vacuum, combustion, flow, level, viscosity, density, 
acidity, concentration, and rotation; totalising (i.e., registering) fluid meters and counting 
devices; instruments for measuring and testing the characteristics of electricity and 
electrical signals; instruments and instrumentation systems for laboratory analysis of the 
chemical or physical composition or concentration of samples of solid, fluid, gaseous, or 
composite material; other measuring and testing instruments and parts thereof. The 
manufacture of non-electric measuring, testing and navigating equipment (except simple 
mechanical tools) is included here. 
This class includes: 
— manufacture of aircraft engine instruments 
— manufacture of automotive emissions testing equipment 
— manufacture of meteorological instruments 
— manufacture of physical properties testing and inspection equipment 
— manufacture of polygraph machines 
— manufacture of radiation detection and monitoring instruments 
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Sector Code Description Detailed description 
Electronics 
and software 
(continued) 
C26.51 
(conti-
nued) 
Manufacture of 
instruments and 
appliances for 
measuring, 
testing and 
navigation 
(continued) 
— manufacture of surveying instruments 
— manufacture of thermometers liquid-in-glass and bimetal types (except medical) 
— manufacture of humidistats 
— manufacture of hydronic limit controls 
— manufacture of flame and burner control 
— manufacture of spectrometers 
— manufacture of pneumatic gauges 
— manufacture of consumption meters (e.g., water, gas, electricity) 
— manufacture of flow meters and counting devices 
— manufacture of tally counters 
— manufacture of mine detectors, pulse (signal) generators; metal detectors 
— manufacture of search, detection, navigation, aeronautical, and nautical equipment, 
including sonobuoys 
— manufacture of radar equipment 
— manufacture of GPS devices 
— manufacture of environmental controls and automatic controls for appliances 
— manufacture of measuring and recording equipment (e.g. flight recorders) 
— manufacture of motion detectors 
— manufacture of radars 
— manufacture of laboratory analytical instruments (e.g. blood analysis equipment) 
— manufacture of laboratory scales, balances, incubators, and miscellaneous laboratory 
apparatus for measuring, testing, etc. 
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Sector Code Description Detailed description 
Electronics 
and software 
(continued) 
C26.51 
(conti-
nued) 
Manufacture of 
instruments and 
appliances for 
measuring, 
testing and 
navigation 
(continued) 
This class excludes: 
— manufacture of telephone answering machines, see 26.30 
— manufacture of irradiation equipment, see 26.60 
— manufacture of optical positioning equipment, see 26.70 
— manufacture of dictating machines, see 28.23 
— manufacture of weighing devices (other than laboratory balances), levels, tapemeasures 
etc., see 28.29 
— manufacture of medical thermometers, see 32.50 
— installation of industrial process control equipment, see 33.20 
— manufacture of simple mechanical measuring tools (e.g. measuring tapes, calipers), see 
manufacturing class according to main material used 
J62 
Computer 
programming, 
consultancy and 
related activities 
This division includes the following activities of providing expertise in the field of 
information technologies: writing, modifying, testing and supporting software; planning 
and designing computer systems that integrate computer hardware, software and 
communication technologies; on-site management and operation of clients’ computer 
systems and/or data processing facilities; and other professional and technical computer-
related activities. 
Telecommu-
nication 
F42.22 
Construction of 
utility projects 
for electricity 
and 
telecommunicati
ons 
This class includes the construction of distribution lines for electricity and 
telecommunications and related buildings and structures that are integral part of these 
systems. 
This class includes: 
— construction of civil engineering constructions for: 
o long-distance and urban communication and power lines 
o power plants 
This class excludes: 
— project management activities related to civil engineering works, see 71.12 
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Sector Code Description Detailed description 
Telecommu-
nication 
(continued) 
F43.21 
Electrical 
installation 
This class includes the installation of electrical systems in all kinds of buildings and civil 
engineering structures of electrical systems. 
This class includes: 
— installation of: 
o electrical wiring and fittings 
o telecommunications wiring 
o computer network and cable television wiring, including fibre optic 
o satellite dishes 
o lighting systems 
o fire alarms 
o burglar alarm systems 
o street lighting and electrical signals 
o airport runway lighting 
o electric solar energy collectors 
— connecting of electric appliances and household equipment, including baseboard heating 
This class excludes: 
— construction of communications and power transmission lines, see 42.22 
— monitoring and remote monitoring of electronic security systems, such as burglar alarms 
and fire alarms, including their installation and maintenance, see 80.2 
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Sector Code Description Detailed description 
Telecommu-
nication 
(continued) 
J61 
Telecommuni-
cations 
This division includes the activities of providing telecommunications and related service 
activities, that is transmitting voice, data, text, sound and video. The transmission 
facilities that carry out these activities may be based on a single technology or a 
combination of technologies. The commonality of activities classified in this division is the 
transmission of content, without being involved in its creation. The breakdown in this 
division is based on the type of infrastructure operated. In the case of transmission of 
television signals this may include the bundling of complete programming channels 
(produced in division 60) in to programme packages for distribution. 
Data 
services 
J63 
Information 
service activities 
This division includes the activities of web search portals, data processing and hosting 
activities, as well as other activities that primarily supply information. 
Digital Media G47.91 
Retail sale via 
mail order 
houses or via 
Internet 
This class includes retail sale activities via mail order houses or via Internet, i.e. retail sale 
activities where the buyer makes his choice on the basis of advertisements, catalogues, 
information provided on a website,  models or any other means of advertising and places 
his order by mail, phone or over the Internet (usually through special means provided by a 
website). The products purchased can be either directly downloaded from the Internet or 
physically delivered to the customer.  
This class includes:  
— retail sale of any kind of product by mail order  
— retail sale of any kind of product over the Internet  
— direct sale via television, radio and telephone 
— Internet retail auctions 
This class excludes: 
— retail sale of motor vehicles and motor vehicles parts and accessories over the Internet, 
see groups 45.1, 45.3  
— retail sale of motorcycles and motorcycles parts and accessories over the Internet, see 
45.40  
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Sector Code Description Detailed description 
Digital Media  
(continued) 
J60.10 
Radio 
broadcasting 
This class includes: 
— activities of broadcasting audio signals through radio broadcasting studios and facilities 
for the transmission of aural programming to the public, to affiliates or to subscribers  
— activities of radio networks, i.e. assembling and transmitting aural programming to the 
affiliates or subscribers via over-the-air broadcasts, cable or satellite  
— radio broadcasting activities over the Internet (Internet radio stations)  
— data broadcasting integrated with radio broadcasting  
This class excludes:  
— the production of taped radio programming, see 59.20 
J60.20 
Television 
programming 
and 
broadcasting 
activities 
This class includes the creation of creating a complete television channel programme, from 
purchased programme components (e.g. movies, documentaries etc.), self produced 
programme components (e.g. local news, live reports) or a combination thereof. This 
complete television programme can be either broadcast by the producing unit or produced 
for transmission by a third party distributor, such as cable companies or satellite television 
providers. The programming may be of a general or specialised nature (e.g. limited 
formats such as news, sports, education or youth oriented programming). This class 
includes programming that is made freely available to users, as well as programming that 
is available only on a subscription basis. The programming of video-on-demand channels is 
also included here. This class also includes data broadcasting integrated with television 
broadcasting. 
This class excludes:  
— the production of television programme elements (movies, documentaries, talk shows, 
commercials etc.) not associated with broadcasting, see 59.11 
— the assembly of a package of channels and distribution of that package, without 
programming, see division 61 
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Sector Code Description Detailed description 
Freight 
Transport 
H49.2 
Freight rail 
transport 
This class includes:  
— freight transport on mainline rail networks as well as short line freight railroads 
This class excludes: 
— warehousing and storage, see 52.10 
— freight terminal activities, see 52.21 
— operation of railroad infrastructure; related activities such as switching and shunting, 
see 52.21 
— cargo handling, see 52.24 
H49.41 
Freight 
transport by 
road 
This class includes: 
— all freight transport operations by road: 
o logging haulage 
o stock haulage 
o refrigerated haulage 
o heavy haulage 
o bulk haulage, including haulage in tanker trucks including milk collection at farms 
o haulage of automobiles 
o transport of waste and waste materials, without collection or disposal 
— renting of trucks with drive 
— freight transport by man or animal-drawn vehicles 
This class excludes: 
— log hauling within the forest, as part of logging operations, see 02.40 
— distribution of water by trucks, see 36.00 
— operation of terminal facilities for handling freight, see 52.21 
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Sector Code Description Detailed description 
Freight 
Transport 
(continued) 
H49.41 
(conti-
nued) 
Freight 
transport by 
road  
(continued) 
— crating and packing activities for transport, see 52.29 
— post and courier activities, see 53.10, 53.20 
— waste transport as integrated part of waste collection activities, see 38.11, 38.12 
H49.42 
Removal 
services 
This class includes: 
— removal (relocation) services to businesses and households by road transport 
H50.2 
Sea and coastal 
freight water 
transport 
This class includes:  
— transport of freight over seas and coastal waters, whether scheduled or not 
— transport by towing or pushing of barges, oil rigs etc. 
— renting of vessels with crew for sea and coastal freight water transport 
This class excludes: 
— storage of freight, see 52.10 
— harbour operation and other auxiliary activities such as docking, pilotage, lighterage, 
vessel salvage, see 52.22 
— cargo handling, see 52.24 
— renting of commercial ships or boats without crew, see 77.34 
H50.4 
Inland freight 
water transport 
This class includes: 
— transport of freight via rivers, canals, lakes and other inland waterways, including inside 
harbours and ports 
— renting of vessels with crew for inland freight water transport 
This class excludes: 
— cargo handling, see 52.24 
— renting of commercial ships or boats without crew, see 77.34 
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Sector Code Description Detailed description 
Freight 
Transport 
(continued) 
N77.12 
Renting and 
leasing of trucks 
This class includes: 
— renting and operational leasing of the following types of vehicles: 
o trucks, utility trailers and heavy motor vehicles (with a weight exceeding 3,5 tons) 
o recreational vehicles 
This class excludes: 
— renting or leasing of heavy goods vehicles or trucks with driver, see 49.41 
Passenger 
transport  
H49.10 
Passenger rail 
transport, 
interurban 
This class includes: 
— rail transportation of passengers using railroad rolling stock on mainline networks, 
spread over an extensive geographic area 
— passenger transport by interurban railways 
— operation of sleeping cars or dining cars as an integrated operation of railway companies 
This class excludes: 
— passenger transport by urban and suburban transit systems, see 49.31 
— passenger terminal activities, see 52.21 
— operation of railroad infrastructure; related activities such as switching and shunting, 
see 52.21 
— operation of sleeping cars or dining cars when operated by separate units, see 55.90, 
56.10 
H49.31 
Urban and 
suburban 
passenger land 
transport 
This class includes: 
— land transport of passengers by urban or suburban transport systems. This may include 
different modes of land transport, such as by motor bus, tramway, streetcar, trolley bus, 
underground and elevated railways etc. The transport is carried out on scheduled routes 
normally following a fixed time schedule, entailing the picking up and setting down of 
passengers at normally fixed stops. 
— town-to-airport or town-to-station lines 
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Sector Code Description Detailed description 
Passenger 
transport 
(continued) 
H49.31 
(conti-
nued) 
Urban and 
suburban 
passenger land 
transport  
(continued) 
— operation of funicular railways, aerial cableways etc. if part of urban or suburban transit 
systems 
This class excludes: 
— passenger transport by interurban railways, see 49.10 
H49.32 Taxi operation 
This class includes: 
— other renting of private cars with driver 
H49.39 
Other passenger 
land transport 
n.e.c. 
This class includes: 
— other passenger road transport: 
o scheduled long-distance bus services 
o charters, excursions and other occasional coach services 
o airport shuttles 
— operation of teleferics, funiculars, ski and cable lifts if not part of urban or suburban 
transit systems 
— operation of school buses and buses for transport of employees 
— passenger transport by man- or animal-drawn vehicles 
This class excludes: 
— ambulance transport, see 86.90 
H51.10 
Passenger air 
transport 
This class includes: 
— transport of passengers by air over regular routes and on regular schedules 
— charter flights for passengers 
— scenic and sightseeing flights 
— renting of air transport equipment with operator for the purpose of passenger 
transportation 
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Sector Code Description Detailed description 
Passenger 
transport 
(continued) 
H51.10 
(conti-
nued) 
Passenger air 
transport  
(continued) 
— general aviation activities, such as:  
o transport of passengers by aero clubs for instruction or pleasure 
This class excludes: 
— renting of air transport equipment without operator, see 77.35 
N77.11 
Renting and 
leasing of cars 
and light motor 
vehicles 
This class includes: 
— renting and operational leasing of the following types of vehicles: 
o passenger cars and other light motor vehicles (with a weight not exceeding 3,5 
tons) without driver 
This class excludes: 
— renting or leasing of cars or light motor vehicles with driver, see 49.32, 49.39 
Insurance 
K65.12 
Non-life 
insurance 
This class includes: 
— provision of insurance services other than life insurance: 
o accident and fire insurance 
o health insurance 
o travel insurance 
o property insurance 
o motor, marine, aviation and transport insurance 
o pecuniary loss and liability insurance 
K65.2 Reinsurance 
This class includes: 
— activities of assuming all or part of the risk associated with existing insurance policies 
originally underwritten by other insurance carriers 
 
 197 
Sector Code Description Detailed description 
Maintenance 
and repair 
G45.20 
Maintenance 
and repair of 
motor vehicles 
This class includes: 
— maintenance and repair of motor vehicles: 
o mechanical repairs 
o electrical repairs 
o electronic injection systems repair 
o ordinary servicing 
o bodywork repair 
o repair of motor vehicle parts 
o washing, polishing, etc. 
o spraying and painting 
o repair of screens and windows 
o repair of motor vehicle seats 
— tyre and tube repair, fitting or replacement 
— anti-rust treatment 
— installation of parts and accessories not as part of the manufacturing process 
This class excludes: 
— retreading and rebuilding of tyres, see 22.11 
Power D35.1 
Electric power 
generation, 
transmission 
and distribution 
This group includes the generation of bulk electric power, transmission from generating 
facilities to distribution centres and distribution to end users. 
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Sector Code Description Detailed description 
Land 
development 
and Traffic 
police 
O84.13 
Regulation of 
and contribution 
to more efficient 
operation of 
businesses 
This class includes:  
— public administration and regulation, including subsidy allocation, for different economic 
sectors:  
o agriculture   
o land use  
o energy and mining resources  
o infrastructure 
o transport  
o communication  
o hotels and tourism  
o wholesale and retail trade  
— administration of research and development policies and associated funds to improve    
economic performance  
— administration of general labour affairs  
— implementation of regional development policy measures, e.g. to reduce unemployment  
This class excludes:  
— research and experimental development activities, see division 72 
O84.24 
 
Public order and 
safety activities 
This class includes:  
— administration and operation of regular and auxiliary police forces supported by public 
authorities and of port, border, coastguards and other special police forces, including 
traffic regulation, alien registration, maintenance of arrest records  
— provision of supplies for domestic emergency use in case of peacetime disasters  
This class excludes:  
— operation of police laboratories, see 71.20  
— administration and operation of military armed forces, see 84.22 
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Sector Code Description Detailed description 
Education 
O85.32 
Technical and 
vocational 
secondary 
education 
This class includes provision of education typically emphasising subject-matter 
specialisation and instruction in both theoretical background and practical skills generally 
associated with present or prospective employment. The aim of a programme can vary 
from preparation for a general field of employment to a very specific job. 
This class includes:  
— technical and vocational education below the level of higher education as defined in 85.4  
— tourist guide instruction  
— instruction for chefs, hoteliers and restaurateurs  
— cosmetology and barber schools  
— computer repair training  
— driving schools for occupational drivers e.g. of trucks, buses, coaches, schools for 
professional pilots  
This class excludes:  
— technical and vocational higher education, see 85.4  
— performing art instruction for recreation, hobby and self-development purposes, see 
85.52  
— automobile driving schools not intended for occupational drivers, see 85.53  
— job training forming part of social work activities without accommodation, see 88.10, 
88.99 
O85.4 
Higher 
education 
This group includes the furnishing of post-secondary non-tertiary and academic courses 
and granting of degrees at baccalaureate, graduate or post-graduate level. The 
requirement for admission is a diploma at least at upper secondary education level. 
This group excludes: 
— adult education as defined in 85.5 
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Sector Code Description Detailed description 
Education 
(continued) 
O85.5 Other education 
This group includes general continuing education and continuing vocational education and 
training for any profession, hobby or self-development purposes. It excludes educational 
activities as outlined in groups 85.1-85.4, i.e. pre-primary education, primary education, 
secondary education or higher education. It includes camps and schools offering 
instruction in athletic activities to groups or individuals, foreign language instruction, 
instruction in the arts, drama or music or other instruction or specialised training, not 
comparable to the education in groups 85.1 - 85.4. 
Construction 
of roads and 
motorways 
F42.11 
Construction of 
roads and 
motorways 
This class includes: 
— construction of motorways, streets, roads, other vehicular and pedestrian ways  
— surface work on streets, roads, highways, bridges or tunnels: 
o asphalt paving of roads 
o road painting and other marking  
o installation of crash barriers, traffic signs and the like  
— construction of airfield runways  
This class excludes:  
— installation of street lighting and electrical signals, see 43.21  
— architectural and engineering activities, see 71.1  
— project management for construction, see 71.1 
Medical Q86.10 
Hospital 
activities 
This class includes: 
— short- or long-term hospital activities, i.e. medical, diagnostic and treatment activities, 
of general hospitals (e.g. community and regional hospitals, hospitals of non-profit 
organisations, university hospitals, military-base and prison hospitals) and specialised 
hospitals (e.g. mental health and substance abuse hospitals, hospitals for infectious 
diseases, maternity hospitals, specialised sanatoriums). 
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Sector Code Description Detailed description 
Medical 
(continued) 
Q86.10 
(conti-
nued) 
Hospital 
activities 
(continued) 
The activities are chiefly directed to inpatients, are carried out under the direct supervision 
of medical doctors and include: 
o services of medical and paramedical staff 
o services of laboratory and technical facilities, including radiologic and 
anaesthesiologic services 
o emergency room services 
o provision of operating room services, pharmacy services, food and other hospital 
services 
o services of family planning centres providing medical treatment such as 
sterilisation and termination of pregnancy, with accommodation 
This class excludes: 
— laboratory testing and inspection of all types of materials and products, except medical, 
see 71.20 
— veterinary activities, see 75.00 
— health activities for military personnel in the field, see 84.2 
— dental practice activities of a general or specialised nature, e.g. dentistry, endodontic 
and pediatric dentistry; oral pathology, orthodontic activities, see 86.2 
— private consultants’ services to inpatients, see 86.2 
— medical laboratory testing, see 86.90 
— ambulance transport activities, see 86.90 
Legal 
activities 
M69.1 Legal activities 
This class includes: 
— legal representation of one party’s interest against another party, whether or not before 
courts or other judicial bodies by, or under supervision of, persons who are members of 
the bar: 
o advice and representation in civil cases 
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Sector Code Description Detailed description 
Legal 
activities 
(continued) 
M69.1 
(conti-
nued) 
Legal activities 
(continued) 
o advice and representation in criminal cases 
o advice and representation in connection with labour disputes 
o general counselling and advising, preparation of legal documents: 
o articles of incorporation, partnership agreements or similar documents in 
connection with company formation 
o patents and copyrights 
o preparation of deeds, wills, trusts etc. 
— other activities of notaries public, civil law notaries, bailiffs, arbitrators, examiners and 
referees 
This class excludes: 
— law court activities, see 84.23 
Oil and gas B06 
Extraction of 
crude petroleum 
and natural gas 
This division includes the production of crude petroleum, the mining and extraction of oil 
from oil shale and oil sands and the production of natural gas and recovery of hydrocarbon 
liquids. This division includes the activities of operating and/ or developing oil and gas field 
properties. Such activities may include drilling, completing and equipping wells; operating 
separators, emulsion breakers, desalting equipment and field gathering lines for crude 
petroleum; and all other activities in the preparation of oil and gas up to the point of 
shipment from the producing property. 
This division excludes: 
— oil and gas field services, performed on a fee or contract basis, see 09.10 
— oil and gas well exploration, see 09.10 
— test drilling and boring, see 09.10 
— refining of petroleum products, see 19.20 
— geophysical, geologic and seismic surveying, see 71.12 
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Sector Code Description Detailed description 
Oil and gas 
(continued) 
G46.71 
Wholesale of 
solid, liquid and 
gaseous fuels 
and related 
products 
This class includes: 
— wholesale of fuels, greases, lubricants, oils such as: 
o charcoal, coal, coke, fuel wood, naphtha 
o crude petroleum, crude oil, diesel fuel, gasoline, fuel oil, heating oil, kerosene 
o liquefied petroleum gases, butane and propane gas 
o lubricating oils and greases, refined petroleum products 
G47.3 
Retail sale of 
automotive fuel 
in specialised 
stores 
This class includes: 
— retail sale of fuel for motor vehicles and motorcycles 
— retail sale of lubricating products and cooling products for motor vehicles 
This class excludes: 
— wholesale of fuels, see 46.71 
— retail sale of liquefied petroleum gas for cooking or heating, see 47.78 
Land 
development 
H52.21 
Service 
activities 
incidental to 
land 
transportation 
This class includes: 
— activities related to land transport of passengers, animals or freight: 
o operation of terminal facilities such as railway stations, bus stations, stations for 
the handling of goods 
o operation of railroad infrastructure 
o operation of roads, bridges, tunnels, car parks or garages, bicycle parkings, 
winter storage of caravans 
— switching and shunting 
— towing and road side assistance 
— liquefaction of gas for transportation purposes 
This class excludes: 
— cargo handling, see 52.24 
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Sector Code Description Detailed description 
Land 
development 
(continued) 
M71.11 
Architectural 
activities 
This class includes: 
— architectural consulting activities: 
o building design and drafting 
o town and city planning and landscape architecture 
This class excludes: 
— activities of computer consultants, see 62.02, 62.09 
— interior decorating, see 74.10 
Source: Own elaborations (based on Eurostat, 2008). 
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Annex 2. Road transport activity 
Data on road transport activity is obtained from the PRIMES model used in EU Reference Scenario 2016, which employs a combined 
econometric and engineering approach to obtain transport activity by transport mode. The specific dataset used is coming from the updated 
baseline scenario from Hill et al. (forthcoming 2018), as shown in Table 45. 
Table 45. Road transport activity data in the 2005-2050 period 
 
Gvkm: billion vehicle kilometres.  
Source: Updated baseline scenario from Hill et al. (forthcoming 2018). 
 
 
EU28:0_F
2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050 '10-'20 '20-'30 '30-'40 '40-'50
ROAD TRANSPORT (Activity in Gvkm)
Passenger Transport 3106.9 3245.8 3347.2 3515.9 3652.9 3851.5 4013.7 4152.6 4264.7 4378.1 0.8 0.9 0.8 0.5
Public road transport 29.2 29.4 30.4 31.6 32.4 33.2 34.2 35.2 36.0 36.8 0.7 0.5 0.6 0.4
Buses 7.8 8.1 8.7 9.4 10.0 10.6 11.0 11.4 11.6 11.9 1.5 1.1 0.7 0.5
Coaches 21.4 21.3 21.7 22.1 22.4 22.7 23.2 23.8 24.4 24.9 0.4 0.3 0.5 0.4
Private cars 2694.5 2817.8 2900.1 3042.4 3159.1 3335.7 3475.0 3593.0 3687.4 3783.7 0.8 0.9 0.7 0.5
Small cars 1063.8 1109.0 1144.4 1205.3 1256.7 1330.9 1388.8 1436.6 1475.1 1514.2 0.8 1.0 0.8 0.5
Medium cars 1140.8 1195.3 1233.6 1346.9 1411.1 1502.5 1571.0 1640.6 1697.7 1753.7 1.2 1.1 0.9 0.7
Big cars 489.9 513.5 522.1 490.3 491.3 502.3 515.2 515.8 514.6 515.7 -0.5 0.2 0.3 0.0
2wheelers 111.7 112.1 118.4 124.8 130.8 136.9 144.3 151.8 159.2 166.5 1.1 0.9 1.0 0.9
Motorcycles 68.7 67.4 71.2 75.0 78.7 82.4 87.1 91.6 96.1 100.6 1.1 1.0 1.1 0.9
Mopeds 43.0 44.7 47.2 49.8 52.1 54.4 57.3 60.2 63.0 65.9 1.1 0.9 1.0 0.9
Light duty vehicles - passenger 271.5 286.6 298.2 317.1 330.6 345.7 360.2 372.6 382.1 391.1 1.0 0.9 0.8 0.5
Freight Transport 335.9 324.4 350.3 374.5 405.4 435.6 460.5 481.8 497.1 511.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Light duty vehicles - freight 163.2 150.9 154.1 161.5 176.8 192.1 202.9 213.2 220.7 227.0 0.7 1.7 1.0 0.6
Heavy Duty vehicles 172.7 173.4 196.2 213.0 228.6 243.5 257.7 268.6 276.4 284.3 2.1 1.3 1.0 0.6
Annual % change
  
 
  
GETTING IN TOUCH WITH THE EU 
In person 
All over the European Union there are hundreds of Europe Direct information centres. You can find the 
address of the centre nearest you at: http://europea.eu/contact 
On the phone or by email 
Europe Direct is a service that answers your questions about the European Union. You can contact this 
service: 
- by freephone: 00 800 6 7 8 9 10 11 (certain operators may charge for these calls), 
- at the following standard number: +32 22999696, or 
- by electronic mail via: http://europa.eu/contact 
FINDING INFORMATION ABOUT THE EU 
Online 
Information about the European Union in all the official languages of the EU is available on the Europa 
website at: http://europa.eu 
EU publications 
You can download or order free and priced EU publications from EU Bookshop at: 
http://bookshop.europa.eu. Multiple copies of free publications may be obtained by contacting Europe 
Direct or your local information centre (see http://europa.eu/contact). 
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